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Abstract
The thesis examines the process by which sustained reform became possible in 
Argentina between 1989 and 1995 after some fifty years of cyclical crisis and 
ungovernability. It argues that the first administration of Carlos Menem broke the 
earlier ‘logic’ of Argentine politics, characterised by the suffocation of economic 
policy coherence by organised political interests. What needs to be explained, in 
this light, is not why reform happened in Argentina (- this is explained readily with 
reference to the crisis of 1989), but rather how it was sustained. The central 
contention is that the consolidation of reform can be explained convincingly with 
reference to international influences from around 1991/2 onwards. These 
influences are identified as (a) globalisation, (b) conditionality, and (c) 
regionalisation. In this way, the theoretical agenda of the thesis feeds into the study 
of International Political Economy and the prevalent debates in the study of 
globalisation.
The international influences on change at the domestic level worked in two ways. 
First, they acted to ‘rescue’ the Argentine state from its conditions of crisis in the 
late 1980s by providing the political and economic space for a radical reform of 
both the economy and society. Second, the consolidation of this restructuring 
process was achieved from 1991/2 onwards through the ‘internationalisation’ of 
the state, which led to significant changes in the nature of state power. The impact 
of the three dimensions of international influence generated a ‘paradox of state 
power’, in which the state became simultaneously more and less ‘powerful’: while 
its autonomy diminished in the international context in terms of the available 
policy options, there was a marked increase in its autonomy in the internal arena 
vis-a-vis domestic political and economic actors. The result was an opportunity for 
the consolidation of the government’s political and economic reform agenda in 
Argentina.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
Along with governments in many other Latin American countries, the first 
Menem administration in Argentina is associated with the successful implantation 
of economic neoliberalism in a situation of political democracy. Between 1989 and 
1995, the government implemented a programme of structural reform that achieved 
the unilateral liberalisation of the economy and its full insertion into the 
international economic system. As a result, the Menem administration was the first 
in the post-war period to have eliminated the persistent inflationary spiral and the 
recurrent fiscal crises that had characterised the Argentine political economy.
At the same time, the government implemented a restructuring of the 
political arena, which involved the dismantling of the corporatist system of interest 
representation constructed over the preceding forty years. The result was a 
fundamental reorganisation of political interests and a significant centralisation of 
political power. As such, the process of political reform in Argentina changed the 
nature of political power as well as its distribution and created a concentration of 
state power at the expense of those societal interests that formerly had exercised a 
significant veto power over the political process.
The situation of economic and political crisis of the late 1980s explains 
why such reform processes were implemented from 1989 and also how the Menem 
government was able to implement these measures in a political system which had 
long been characterised by economic crisis, entrenched social interests and 
ungovernability. The hyperinflationary crisis opened the space in Argentina for the 
government to “craft new relationships between state and economy and to redefine 
relationships of power and accountability with society”.1 Crisis, in this sense, has 
the effect of discrediting the policy orientations of the previous administration and 
orients public support towards the incoming government and its attempts to resolve 
the situation.
1 Merilee S. Grindle: Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa 
(1996), pg 4.
2 John T.S. Keeler: “Opening the Window for Reform: Mandates, Crisis and Extraordinary 
Policymaking”, Comparative Political Studies 25, 4, January 1993.
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Moreover, in the specific context of Argentine and Latin American 
development history, the economic crisis represented the exhaustion of the 
alternative development models that had dominated the post-war period. The crisis 
constituted and, more importantly, was seen to constitute the complete de- 
legitimisation of the inward-looking and heterodox economic strategies described 
in Chapter 2.3 Although there was no definitive formulation in society of 
preferences for alternatives, by the start of the Menem government there was an 
awareness of the need for change that pushed the door at least half-open for the 
incoming administration. Because of the general perception that any alternative 
was an improvement on the status quo, the discrediting of the existing economic 
order provided Menem with a room for manoeuvre that had not been available to 
the outgoing Alfonsin administration.4 As such, therefore, the crisis created the 
conditions in which a recognition of the exhaustion of previous policy models and 
the need for drastic action generated widespread willingness to tolerate the costs of 
structural reform.
The most crucial element in the early popularity of the Menem government 
related to the elimination of hyperinflation.5 In short, if Menem was able to 
promise stability at a time when it was needed more than anything else, then the 
acquiescence of the electorate and the popularity of the Menem government in the 
early 1990s becomes easier to understand. The effect of hyperinflation in 
significantly diminishing expectations in society muted the dangers of immediate 
reaction against the negative costs of adjustment. Together with the perception of
3 For an overview o f the adoption of heterodox strategies in the 1980s and their position relative to 
other development alternatives, see Miles Kahler: “Orthodoxy and its Alternatives: Explaining 
Approaches to Stabilization and Adjustment” in Joan M. Nelson (ed.): Economic Crisis and Policy 
Choice: The Politics o f  Adjustment in the Third World (1990).
4 Pablo Gerchunoff & Juan Carlos Torre: “La Politica de Liberalizacidn Economica en la 
Administration de Menem”, Desarrollo Economico 36, 143, Oct-Dec 1996 (pp. 737-8).
5 See George Philip: “New Economic Liberalism and Democracy in Spanish America”, Government 
and Opposition 29, 3, 1994 (pg 364); Pamela K. Starr: “Government Coalitions and the Viability of 
Currency Boards: Argentina under the Cavallo Plan”, paper presented to the 37th Annual 
Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, 16-20 April 1996. For more 
detailed discussions o f support for market reforms, see Fabian Echegaray: “Understanding Support 
for Free-Market Policies in Argentina”, International Journal o f  Public Opinion Research 5, 4, 
1993; Mario F. Navarro: “Democracia y Reformas Estructurales: Explicaciones de la Tolerancia 
Popular al Ajuste Econdmico”, Desarrollo Economico 35, 139, Oct-Dec 1995; and Carlos H. Acufia
6  William C. Smith: “The Political Economy of Structural Adjustment: The Logic o f Support and 
Opposition to Neoliberal Reform” in William C. Smith, Carlos H. Acuna & Eduardo A Gamarra (eds.): 
Latin American Political Economy in the Age o f  Neoliberal Reform: Theoretical and Comparative 
Perspectives fo r the 1990s (1994).
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the exhaustion of traditional economic models and the recognition of the need for 
change, then, this lowering of expectations opened the way for radical and 
innovative reform strategies on the part of the state.
However, the limitations of any explanation based purely on crisis are 
immediately apparent. The logic of Argentine politics, as well as the implications 
of an analysis based on the politics of crisis, suggest that with the elimination of 
hyperinflation and the recovery of the economy from 1991 onwards we would have 
expected to see the resurgence of political pressures on the system with the same 
results as previously. Rather, the reverse appears to have happened. In 1989-90, 
unions, business and the military mounted quite stiff opposition in various ways, 
and on various occasions throughout the first Menem administration, relations 
between the government and these sectors (including business) were marked by 
tension and conflict. Similarly, between 1989 and 1991 inflation persisted and 
economic performance had started to dwindle. The hyperinflationary episode of 
1990, furthermore, was significant enough to call into question the political 
survival of the President. The subsequent consolidation of reform therefore 
highlights the shortcomings of crisis as the basis for an explanation of reform in 
Argentina.
Prior to 1991, Argentina had consistently abandoned market-oriented 
reform after two or three years, as Chapter 2 demonstrates. The political and 
economic events of the 1989-1991 period, in addition, demonstrate many of the 
hallmarks that might be associated with a reproduction of this pattern. Therefore, 
the achievement of the Menem government is not, as most of the literature would 
suggest, the implementation of reform, but rather its consolidation. There was a 
very strong impression in 1989 that this would be another in a chain of post-war 
reform attempts that collapsed after a couple of years. Chapter 2 demonstrates that 
these disintegrated largely as a result of the resurgence of political pressures which 
led to the consistent relegation of coherent economic policy in favour of a political 
logic which stemmed from the nature of interests and state-society linkages in this 
period. As such, Menem disrupted in an apparently quite permanent way the ‘logic’ 
of Argentine political economy. What is fundamentally new about the Menem 
period, furthermore, is the phenomenon of ‘increasing returns to power’ in which
12
there is a progressive accretion of political capital. This is the first instance in 
which market-oriented reform has impacted positively, and progressively, on the 
popularity of a President or government.
The question that needs to be answered, then, is how sustained and 
consistent political and economic reform became possible in Argentina. In other 
words, what needs to be explained is not why reform happened, but rather why it 
lasted. It is the intention of the thesis to demonstrate that the answer lies in the 
nature of international influences and the linkages between the external and 
domestic settings. The contention is that these influences - identified as (a) 
globalisation, (b) conditionality, and (c) regionalisation - created the space for a 
fundamental transformation of the nature of the state and political power in 
Argentina and, more fundamentally, the consolidation of the new economic and 
political model. The principal mechanism by which this was achieved relates to the 
‘internationalisation of the state’, particularly from 1991 onwards, and to the types 
of constraints and spaces created by the identified processes of international 
change.
More specifically, it is the intention to demonstrate that the identified 
international influences created fundamental changes in the nature of state power in 
Argentina, giving rise to what may be termed the ‘paradox of state power’. On the 
one hand, the policy-making autonomy of the sate is reduced in the international 
context as a result of the changing structure of rewards and punishments in the 
globalised international economy. As such, the feasible policy options available to 
national governments are highly constrained as a result of globalisation and the 
related dimensions of conditionality and regionalisation. This is then reinforced by 
precisely those policy measures which are ‘demanded’ by the imperatives of 
conformity with the neoliberal policy agenda associated with these types of 
international change.
On the other hand, this same process has served to strengthen the state and 
to consolidate state power vis-a-vis societal interests at the domestic level. This has 
contributed to the development of a highly statist political model that in the early- 
to mid-1990s allowed very little space for genuine societal participation in the 
political process. The result, more broadly, was the establishment of a centralised
13
and ‘exclusionary’ model of state-society relations and the marginalisation of 
participatory democracy. Clearly the use of the term ‘exclusionary’ here is not 
intended to suggest parallels between Menem and the exclusionary characteristics 
of the Pinochet regime in Chile, for example, but rather to indicate the level of 
insulation of the Argentine state from formerly dominant societal groups, 
particularly organised interests such as labour. The result was the creation of 
possibilities for durable and consistent economic reform that did not struggle with 
the sorts of political pressures that had ensured the failure of previous reform 
efforts.
The Shortcomings of the Literature and the Contribution of the Thesis
The thesis, therefore, has both an empirical and a theoretical agenda. 
Observation of the empirical case of Argentina in the 1989-95 period raises 
interesting and important theoretical questions rooted in the field of International 
Political Economy (IPE) concerning domestic-international linkages and the impact 
of globalisation on processes of domestic change. As such, the thesis contributes 
both to the empirical literature on Argentina and also to the central debates in the 
field of IPE, but, more importantly, seeks to locate the empirical study of Argentina 
in the broader theoretical framework offered by several areas of IPE. The 
contention is that the more subtle questions regarding reform processes during the 
first Menem administration cannot be understood nor answered without reference 
to both international influences and theoretical insights from the field of IPE.
Analyses of these reform efforts, as suggested above, consistently fail to 
address the question of why reform lasted in Argentina. Virtually without 
exception the literature on Argentina in the 1990s locates the analysis of reform 
within the parameters of the politics of crisis, which fails to provide a coherent 
analysis of the political economy of the Menem administration. More generally, 
however, literature on the Menem administration in Argentina is surprisingly 
scarce. In the English language there are no books which deal specifically with 
Argentine political economy in the 1990s. The most sustained and serious Spanish 
language account of this period can be found in Vicente Palermo and Marcos
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Novaro’s recent book Politico, y  Poder en el Gobierno de Menem, which 
systematically traces the nature of political and economic change within a broader 
framework of the links between Menemism and Peronism. There have been some 
articles on such subjects, as well as a couple of edited volumes, again mainly in the 
Spanish language, but these have been relatively limited to empirical and 
descriptive discussions of the nature of changes in the early part of the 1990s.6 As a 
result, sources on the most recent years of the Menem administration, particularly, 
are remarkably hard to find.
Most significantly, there is no example of a sustained analysis of the 
international influences on domestic change in Argentina, apart from scattered 
references to the Menem government’s need to court the international financial 
community (as in the Palermo and Novaro volume) and much of the work of Diana 
Tussie.7 Foreign policy has received relatively more attention, but this does not 
serve the purposes of analysing the impact of international influences on the 
domestic processes of change in Argentina under Menem. This neglect in the study 
of Argentina, and in the more general literature on reform, is surprising given that 
the study of the relationship between the international and the domestic has become 
commonplace in the field of IPE. It has become accepted that “we can no longer 
understand politics within countries ... without comprehending the nature of the 
linkages between national economies and the world economy, and changes in such
a  '
linkages”. Given this context and the orientation of the Argentine government’s 
policy agenda, the hole in the literature is glaring.
6 See, for example, William C. Smith: “State, Market and Neoliberalism in Post-Transition 
Argentina: The Menem Experiment”, Journal o f  Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 33 ,4 , 
Winter 1991; Roberto Bouzas: “^Mas A11& de la Establizacion y la Reforma? Un Ensayo sobre la 
Economia Argentina a Comienzos de los ‘90”, Desarrollo Economico 33, 129, April-June 1993; 
IRELA: “Argentina en los ‘90: Avances y Perspectivas durante el Gobierno de Menem” (Dossier 
54, 1995) and “La Argentina de Carlos Menem: ^Del Gobierno de la Crisis a la Crisis del 
Gobierno? (Dossier 33, July 1991); Atilio Bor6n et al: El Menemato: Radiografla de Dos Anos de 
Gobierno de Carlos Menem (1991); Carlos H. Acuna (ed.): La Nueva Matriz Politico Argentina 
(1995).
7 Particularly “Globalisation and Conditionality: Struggling to Make a Room o f One’s Own”, 
mimeo, Buenos Aires, March 1997; “Argentina’s Big Bang Reform: The Interplay o f MDBs and 
Domestic Actors”, mimeo, Buenos Aires, October 1997; “In the Whirlwind o f Globalisation and 
Multilateralism: The Case o f Emerging Regionalism in Latin America” in William D. Coleman & 
Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (eds.): Regionalism and Global Economic Integration: Europe, Asia and 
the Americas (1998)
8 Helen V. Milner & Robert O. Keohane: “Internationalization and Domestic Politics: An 
Introduction” in Keohane & Milner (eds.): Internationalization and Domestic Politics (1996), pg 3.
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The general literature on reform processes in the 1990s is mired either in 
the analysis of the 1980s debt crisis or alternatively ignores the international 
dimensions of reform altogether. In early accounts of the politics of adjustment 
around the turn of the decade, for example, external influences on the reform 
processes in a variety of developing countries are classed solely as the influences of 
international financial institutions in promoting structural adjustment and 
managing the debt crisis.9 The emphasis, therefore, is on policy dialogue with 
officials in international institutions rather than on the dynamic processes of 
change at the international level. Clearly this is a function of the time and context 
in which these accounts were produced, but given that they constitute the bulk of 
recent work on reform, this hole is also clearly apparent.
One of the first notable attempts to introduce an element of international 
influence into studies of reform in developing countries is found in Haggard & 
Kaufman’s edited collection The Politics o f  Economic Adjustment. Barbara 
Stallings’ chapter, for example, identifies three dimensions of international 
influence: the operation and impact of international markets; the ‘ideological’ 
linkages between domestic and external actors; and the question of leverage in 
power relations between international actors and governments in the ‘Third 
World’.10 The first concerns the availability of economic resources (principally in 
the form of finance) and levels of vulnerability to international shocks. The second 
concerns the linkages between domestic actors such as technocratic groups, 
business sectors, the military and the middle classes with their counterparts abroad. 
This is a means of identifying the ‘outward orientation’ of significant societal and 
governmental actors, which in turn affects the orientation and nature of policy 
preferences. The third, predictably, concerns relations between national 
governments and international financial institutions in the context of structural 
adjustment and debt management.11 This chapter is followed by Miles Kahler’s
9 See, for example, Nelson (ed.): Economic Crisis and Policy Choice and Fragile Coalitions: The 
Politics o f  Economic Adjustment (1989).
10 “International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilization, and Structural Reform” in 
Stephan Haggard & Robert R. Kaufinan (eds.): The Politics o f Economic Adjustment: International 
Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State (1992), pp. 48-9.
" ibid., pp. 49-58.
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Vanalysis of the external influences of international financial institutions and 
conditionality in the context of the 1980s.12
These two chapters in the Haggard & Kaufman volume raise a number of 
important issues, but are only limited in their applicability to reform in the 1990s as 
opposed to the 1980s. For example, Stallings’ analysis of the international 
economy, apart from being outdated, does not take into account the dynamic 
processes of change such as globalisation and regionalisation which have become 
dominant. Rather, the analysis is a static assessment of the availability of foreign 
funds in the context of the debt crisis, and a limited evaluation of indicators of 
vulnerability. The account of the international linkages of key actors does not 
consider the ways in which these are converted into concrete policy outcomes nor 
their engagement with the key policy-making institutions of the state. The analysis 
of structural adjustment and international institutions, furthermore, is simply 
outdated for the purposes of analysing conditionality and reform in the later part of 
the 1990s.
Some more recent studies of neoliberalism or neopopulism in Latin
America do emphasise that the possibilities for successful radical reform, contrary
1 ^to the expectations of institutionalists such as Douglass North , can be explained 
in part with reference to global factors that now matter far more than historical- 
structural ones, especially in terms of the limitations on policy choice as a result of 
globalisation.14 Other analyses focus on the reinforcing qualities of global change 
for the establishment of liberal democracy, or the establishment of global capitalist 
and liberal democratic models.15 Some of these mention trends in the international 
political economy such as regionalism: Vacs, for example, has drawn some 
preliminary attention to what he sees to be the dangerous implications of 
regionalism for both global capitalism and the maintenance of democratic
12 “External Influence, Conditionality, and the Politics of Adjustment” in Haggard & Kaufman 
(eds.).
13 Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990).
14 George Philip: “The New Populism in Spanish South America”, Government and Opposition 33, 
1, Winter 1998 (pp. 89-90).
15 For example, Laurence Whitehead: The International Dimensions o f  Democratization: Europe 
and the Americas (1996) and Aldo C. Vacs: “Convergence and Dissension: Democracy, Markets 
and Structural Reform in World Perspective” in Smith et al (eds.): Latin American Political 
Economy.
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accountability at the domestic level.16 Although the thesis (and specifically the 
analysis in Chapter 6) challenges both of these conclusions, this sort of 
consideration is a welcome exception in the literature.
One other apparently promising edited volume entitled Mas Alla de la 
Estabilidad: Argentina en la Epoca de la Globalizacion y  la Regionalizacion
1 n
(After Stability: Argentina in the Era of Globalisation and Regionalisation) starts 
with an assessment of these two international currents, with the clear intention of 
locating the discussion of Argentina within this framework. What follows, 
however, is largely a discussion of economic policy in the 1990s, which in most 
cases makes little reference to the trends outlined in the Introduction. What the 
volume does offer is a useful analysis of the changing economic strategies of 
various groups (such as business and industry) and the development of indicators 
(such as unemployment) in response to new economic imperative under the 
Menem government. However, the connection between neoliberal reform and 
globalisation / regionalisation is never adequately made, although the chapter on 
Mercosur clearly looks at the impact of the new imperatives for the policies or 
strategies of various groups. There is certainly no sustained analysis of the 
interaction of domestic and international processes, nor reference to a coherent 
theoretical framework as the title suggests. This volume could just as easily be 
entitled “After Stability: Argentina’s New Economic Model” without losing too 
much descriptive accuracy.
Other accounts recognise simply that “changes in the international context
1 ftstrongly condition the development options in Latin America”. The particular 
paper from which this quotation is taken is a prime example of an analysis of 
reform that sees the study of international influences to be inadequate for 
explaining the variety of responses to a common international environment, and as 
a result privileges domestic level analysis. Reform is acknowledged to be at least in 
part a response to changing international circumstances, but this is treated
16 Vacs: op.cit., pp. 90-91.
17 Pablo Bustos (ed.), 1995.
18 Juan Carlos Torre: “Las Dimensiones Politicas e Institucionales de las Reformas Estructurales en 
America Latina”, mimeo, Buenos Aires, 1996 (pg 2).
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perfunctorily as a contextual backdrop which, as mentioned above, is a common 
shortcoming in analyses of reform processes.
Nevertheless, although this thesis is concerned principally with the 
dynamics of external influence of reform processes in Argentina, it accepts the 
argument that domestic-level analysis remains indispensable and recognises 
throughout the importance of domestic institutions in mediating and conditioning 
international influences. It envisions the external influences as shaping and 
reinforcing processes of change that are fundamentally endogenous in their origins. 
Therefore, the thesis uses international influence as the principal explanatory 
variable, but departs from the assumptions (a) that these influences interact in a 
dynamic way with domestic processes and circumstances, and (b) that these 
influences are mediated and conditioned through domestic institutional structures. 
This in turn accounts for the differential impact of globalisation across countries 
and regions. Although the processes identified in the thesis produce these dynamics 
throughout the world, the results clearly vary widely. However, the thesis maintains 
that the impact of international processes of change has been both under-estimated 
empirically and under-theorised in the literature on policy reform in Latin America 
and elsewhere. As such, the dimensions of international influence that are outlined 
in detail below are crucial to an understanding of contemporary processes of 
domestic change in a more fundamental way than just as contextual backdrops for 
the empirical observation of the Argentine case.
An improvement on this neglect, and a theoretical springboard for the 
thesis, is found in the IPE literature, which treats the relationship between the 
domestic and the international as one of its central problematics. Contemporary 
literature builds on the traditional debate in international relations theory on the 
appropriate levels for analysis - the dilemma, for example, between accounts which 
privilege structure over domestic or ‘reductionist’ explanations of outcomes - in 
attempts to examine the linkages between domestic and the international politics. 
Recent work attempts to build on the connections made in the interdependence 
literature between the international environment and the resulting constraints on 
countries in order to offer a more sustained analysis of the impact of the
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international on domestic politics}9 The thesis, clearly, is located in what might be
called the ‘second-image reversed’ approach advocated by Peter Gourevitch which
20seeks to identify the role of international factors in determining domestic politics.
However, there are a number of holes in the existing IPE literature. The 
first is that most of the literature on international-domestic linkages focuses on the 
industrialised countries. The second is that analyses of domestic policy outputs 
conditioned by the international environment is usually limited to a discussion of 
economic policy.21 Most significantly this involves a discussion of tendencies to 
liberalise national economies in the face of pressures from the international 
economy. Some recent accounts focus on the construction of coalitions mediated 
by national institutional structures, but the set of outcomes under analysis remains 
economic policies, and specifically those internationally-oriented policies such as 
trade liberalisation.22
Third, the IPE literature suffers from a general failure to make the nature of 
the linkages between the domestic and the international specific. This failure 
usually stems from an over-rigid classification of dependent and independent 
variables: the literature rooted in the ‘second image reversed’ perspective treats the 
international environment as the independent variable , and therefore often falls 
into the same trap as the comparative political economy (CPE) and reform 
literature in that it assumes the international environment to be the contextual 
backdrop, or alternatively a set of constraints within which national policy-makers 
act. This approach ignores important elements of the dynamic interaction of the 
national and international. To highlight solely the impact of the national on the 
international, or vice versa, misses important elements of the ways in which this is 
a process of mutual influence. As we will see, for example, the changes effected at 
the domestic level by globalisation feed back into the ‘loop’ to create and maintain
19 Keohane & Milner (eds.): op.cit.
20 Peter Gourevitch: “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources o f Domestic Politics”, 
International Organization 32, 4, Autumn 1978.
21 For examples o f both o f these points, see Helen Milner: Resisting Protectionism: Global 
Industries and the Politics o f  International Trade (1988); Peter Gourevitch: Politics in Hard Times: 
Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (1986); Peter Katzenstein (ed.): Between 
Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies o f  Advanced Industrial Countries (1978) and Small 
States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (1985).
22 Jeffry A. Frieden & Ronald Rogowski: “The Impact o f the International Economy on National 
Policies: An Analytical Overview” in Keohane & Milner (eds.).
23 For example, Frieden & Rogowski: op.cit.
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the process of globalisation itself. Moreover, this shortcoming stems from a failure 
to give empirical substance to dominant theories.24 It is clearly the case that the 
impact of the international environment will vary between countries, according to a 
variety of factors which include international institutions. A greater attention to 
applying relevant theories to specific national contexts will both contribute to a 
greater specificity when elaborating the nature of international and national 
linkages, and also to a better theoretical understanding of the relationship.
The fourth failing of existing IPE literature, then, is related to the third and 
stems, it seems, from precisely the same inattention to empirical application. In 
effect, it is assumed in theoretical analysis that the impact of the international 
environment on domestic coalition formation is linear and predictable: it is 
assumed that changes in domestic (economic) preferences shaped by changes at the 
international level will be “quickly and faithfully” translated into changes in 
policies and institutional structures. It is assumed that “if one understands which 
economic interests have gained economic strength, one knows which have gained 
political power, and in turn how policy is likely to change”. Although, as the 
thesis shows throughout, there is a certain argument to be made that certain groups 
in society are favoured by trends in the international economy (such as a 
privileging of business over labour) and that the relative importance of such groups 
is often reflected in political arrangements, such an approach ignores important 
mediating variables at the national level. Apart from some valiant theoretical 
attempts to model the mediation of institutions between the preferences of
Oftdomestic actors and internationally-induced change , the hole cannot be filled 
adequately in the absence of sustained empirical analysis. This observation is not 
intended to be an advocation of empiricism over theory. Rather, it is intended to 
suggest that, at this stage of the theoretical debate, a greater attention to the 
empirical validity of the central propositions in turn contributes to a fuller 
theoretical understanding of both domestic-international linkages and the study of 
IPE more generally.
24 A significant exception is the Keohane & Milner volume, but this in turn suffers from an over­
emphasis on industrialised countries at the expense of the developing world.
25 Geoffrey Garrett & Peter Lange: “Internationalization, Institutions and Political Change” in 
Keohane & Milner (eds.), pg 49.
26 Garrett & Lange: op.cit.
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The first contribution of the thesis, then, is its sustained analysis of the 
Menem administration and, more importantly, its response to the neglect of the 
international dimensions of developments in this period. There is no other English 
language text which performs either of these functions. It supplements the Palermo 
and Novaro volume and the literature outlined above on reform in Argentina (most 
of which still exists only in mimeographic form) by its promotion of international 
influences as the key variables, and also its reformulation of the central question. It 
constitutes an attempt to explain the consolidation of reform rather than its 
implementation, given the expectations generated by historical patterns of 
development and crisis. In addition, the literature on Argentina and reform suffers 
from a lack of theoretically-grounded analysis, particularly of an IPE orientation. 
The theoretical agenda of the thesis is precisely to address this shortcoming.
The contribution of the thesis to IPE, then, is four-fold. First, it aims to give 
empirical substance to the central debates in IPE on the relationship and interaction 
between the domestic and the international, and in particular on ‘globalisation. In 
the light of the economic and technological changes described in the next section, 
and as a result of the end of the Cold War, the idea of ‘globalisation’ as a paradigm 
in IPE has generated significant interest. However, the paradigm at present suffers 
from a lack of empirical depth. In this sense, the thesis aims to apply and test some 
of the central currents in the study of IPE / globalisation studies to the case of 
Argentina, and by extension to the Latin American region, which in any case have 
generally been neglected in the International Relations and IPE literatures. The 
thesis aims to contribute a specific conception of the nature of the linkages 
between international and domestic factors in the present climate of globalisation, 
in this case through the application of these ideas to Argentina.
Second, it aims to analyse the dynamic interaction between the international 
environment and the domestic setting. As noted earlier, it is concerned to show 
both how the international environment conditions political and economic reform 
at the national level and how these changes then feed back into the loop, especially 
in the current context of globalisation, to sustain the international environment 
itself. It also aims to show how international influences such as conditionality and 
regionalisation act as intermediaries between the domestic and the international,
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Yand thereby to provide an analysis which challenges the rigid classification of 
variables into ‘external’, ‘internal’, ‘independent’ or ‘dependent’.
Third, it aims to address the gap in IPE literature that focuses almost 
entirely on economic policy outputs. With the exception of some of the literature 
on globalisation, as Chapter 4 shows, the connections between international change 
and the state is underdeveloped, especially when this relates to questions of 
political development or (in some cases) democratic consolidation. Apart from the 
relatively straightforward relationship between economic policy and the financial 
orthodoxy imposed by globalisation and the conditionality attached to loans and 
funds from international banks or international financial institutions, trends in the 
external environment have important effects on the nature of state power and state- 
society relations.
Fourth, the conceptualisation of the three dimensions of international 
influence identified in the thesis aim to contribute to the IPE literature by 
expanding the often narrow focus on the ‘international economy’. It aims, first, to 
give more definition to precisely what it is that we are studying: here, this falls 
under the general heading of ‘globalisation’ as a process of international economic 
change. Second, it aims to demonstrate how these influences are transmitted. It is 
insufficient simply to assume that the nature of the processes of international 
change, and their implications, are either perceived correctly by domestic actors or 
alternatively merely taken as given. In sum, the thesis is concerned with what is at 
the ‘sharp edge’ of globalisation, and this is where the importance of the three 
dimensions becomes apparent. The analysis aims to disaggregate the concept of 
‘the international’ that pervades the IPE literature on such topics and to give greater 
substance to the nature of the variables under analysis and the mechanisms by 
which these are (a) transmitted into the national policy-making arena, and (b) 
translated into concrete political and policy outcomes.
The Concept of Globalisation
‘Globalisation’ is one of the most contested concepts in IPE. The most 
highly developed stream of criticism contends that the extent of ‘globalisation’ is
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Y27  •exaggerated and the trends associated with it are in any case not new. Sceptics 
argue that there is very little difference between globalisation and the earlier 
processes of international evolution identified variously as transnationalisation, 
interdependence, internationalisation, and globalism. According to this conception, 
the international economy is very far from truly ‘globalised’: economic exchange is 
still dominated by nation-states, and the patterns of international organisation are 
principally regional rather than national.
The response to these criticisms has been to offer various approaches to the 
study of globalisation which highlights the ways in which the process may be seen 
as distinguishable from what has gone before. One possibility in the search for such 
a conceptualisation was offered recently by Philip Cemy in the form of an 
“additive definition”, in which the term ‘globalisation’ is seen to refer to “the sum 
total of a wide range of political, economic and social processes of 
internationalisation and transnationalisation”.29 No doubt the immediate reaction to 
this from the sceptics would be that this is merely an easy way out of a tight spot: 
to say that globalisation is everything at once contributes very little to the debate. 
On the other hand, if ‘globalisation’ is seen to be part of a historical process of 
evolution in the international economy, and furthermore to be continually 
developing and expanding, then it makes some (limited) sense to see it as the 
culmination of ‘progress so far’. A more convincing alternative argues that despite 
the uneven impact of globalisation and the persistence of political inclinations 
towards protectionism, the main difference with past situations of 
internationalisation and interdependence lies in the intensity of contemporary
27 The ‘sceptical’ view is found most forcefully in Paul Hirst & Grahame Thompson: Globalization 
in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities o f  Governance (1996), and also in 
Robert Boyer & Daniel Drache (eds.): States Against Markets: The Limits o f  Globalization (1996) 
and Linda Weiss: The Myth o f  the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era 
(1998). A more general discussion of international structures which runs along the lines of ‘there is 
nothing new under the sun’ is found in Stephen Krasner: “International Political Economy: Abiding 
Discord”, Review o f  International Political Economy 1,1,  Spring 1994, criticised by Susan Strange 
in “Wake up, Krasner! The world has changed”, Review o f International Political Economy, 1, 2, 
Summer 1994.
28 See particularly Hirst & Thompson: op.cit.; John Zysman: “The Myth o f a ‘Global’ Economy: 
Enduring National Foundations and Emerging Regional Realities”, New Political Economy 1,2,  
1996.
29 Philip G. Cemy: keynote lecture to Warwick University ESRC Centre for the Study o f  
Globalisation and Regionalisation conference on “Globalisation vs. Regionalisation: New Trends in 
World Politics”, December 1 Oth-11th 1997.
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linkages, which can be described as far more “organic” than previously.30 The 
extent of these ‘organic’ linkages is seen to stem from the effects of technological 
progress, the ‘end of geography’ (particularly in financial terms), and the increases
q i
in intra-industry trade.
For the purposes of the thesis it makes most sense to focus on some of the 
specific manifestations of globalisation while not losing sight of its historical roots. 
The process is usually seen to manifest itself in three broad trends which define the 
present condition of the international political economy. The first is a very 
significant growth in international capital flows, which has outstripped the growth 
of world trade in recent years. The value of trade is far exceeded by the value of the 
foreign production of firms, particularly that financed by foreign direct investment 
(FDI)32, although the growth of world trade in turn has been far in excess of the 
growth in world output.33 In addition, international financial markets currently and 
increasingly operate apparently autonomously of external regulation and 
independently of the constraints imposed by territorial borders. The emergence of 
truly global financial markets is signalled further by increase in the issue of private 
bonds and equities and by the fact that interest rates are now determined globally 
rather than nationally.34 In this way, the idea of economic globalisation usually 
refers primarily to financial globalisation, which is seen to be the most important 
and most salient manifestation of change in the international economy.
Second, there has been a huge growth in all types of transnational activity, 
particularly in relation to the operations of transnational corporations (TNCs). The 
United Nations World Investment Reports have consistently argued in recent years
30 Richard Higgott: “Globalisation and Governance: Accommodating Regionalisation and 
Localisation”, mimeo, University o f Warwick, February 1997.
31 Richard Higgott & Simon Reich: “Intellectual Order for the Global Order: Understanding Non- 
State Actors and Authority in the Global System”, paper presented to the conference on ‘Non-State 
Actors and Authority in the Global System’, Warwick University ESRC Centre for the Study of  
Globalisation and Regionalisation, October 31 st-November 1st 1997.
32 John H. Dunning: “Globalisation: The Challenge for National Economic Regimes”, 24th Geary 
Lecture, The Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, 1993 (pg 4).
33 This has been described as the “decoupling” o f world output and trade activities in the early 
1990s. For example, in 1994 the volume of world merchandise trade increased by an estimated 
9.2%, while world GDP grew by 2.8%. In addition, growth in world export volume increased from 
4.4% in 1993 to 9.2% in 1994. See Shigeru Otsubo: “Globalisation: A New Role for Developing 
Countries in an Integrating World”, World Bank, July 1996 (pg 7).
34 Jonathan Perraton et al: “The Globalisation o f Economic Activity”, New Political Economy 2, 2, 
1997 -pp. 265-271.
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that the competition between states will be increasingly determined by the activities 
of TNCs rather than by firms operating solely in the domestic arena. This can be 
extended to include those firms in Latin America and other parts of the developing 
world that are becoming increasingly transnational in their operations, as well as 
those foreign-owned firms that are active in these countries. The growth of TNCs 
has also been accompanied by the emergence of ‘stateless’ firms, which are 
characterised by the percentage of shares held abroad, rather than the value of sales 
or assets held outside the home country. Nevertheless, TNCs should be seen as 
the principal motor of economic activity, but not necessarily as the original impetus 
of change. It was the globalisation of the marketplace that necessitated the 
transnationalisation of economic activity, and therefore, in the terms used by Susan 
Strange, the shift of authority from state to market36 that made political actors out 
of TNCs.
The third principal manifestation of economic globalisation is the 
increasing number of countries that are active in the international economy and in 
the financial infrastructure. This can be seen in a number of trends. First, North- 
South and South-South economic transactions in the last decade or so have 
expanded particularly rapidly. Second, the increasing importance of developing 
countries in the international economy can be seen particularly in the share of 
foreign investment that these countries consume. At present, around 45% of total 
FDI flows go to developing countries, and this has been seen to account for the 
above-average growth rates of Latin American and East Asian countries. Third, 
the widespread move towards market-oriented policies in all parts of the world, but 
particularly in developing countries, can be seen in the membership figures of 
multilateral institutions such as the GATT: there are four times as many signatory 
countries now as in 1950.39 The globalisation of economic activity has as much to 
do with participants and international economic relations as with specific types of 
economic interaction and growth generation.
35 See Wyn Grant: “Economic Globalisation. Stateless Firms and International Governance”, 
Department o f Politics and International Studies, University o f Warwick, April 1992 (pp. 6-11).
36 The Retreat o f  the State: The Diffusion o f World Power in the World Economy (1996), pp. 44-5.
37 Tussie: “In the Whirlwind”, pg 83.
38 Tussie: “Globalisation and Conditionality”, pp. 3-4.
39 Tussie: “In the Whirlwind”, pg 88.
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These, then, are the principal economic manifestations of globalisation. The 
other way in which globalisation may be conceptualised is in terms of a shift in 
perceptions, on the part of individuals, societies and ‘states’ (without assuming 
these to be unitary actors). There is a clearly an increasing perception of the need 
for national policies consistent with the perceived realities of the international 
economy, as well as a heightened awareness of cultural globalisation, the 
possibility of a ‘global civil society’, and the necessity for efficient forms of 
international governance. It is clear also that technological advances have served to 
heighten the perception that the world is shrinking in size, that the ‘global’ is now 
truly accessible from most parts of the world, and that there is an increasing need 
for a re-orientation of our conceptions of nationality and territory as a result. These 
can perhaps be seen as the ‘political’ dimensions of globalisation, the existence and 
salience of which may well distinguish ‘globalisation’ from previous stages in the 
evolution of the world economy.
Following from this last point, conceptions of globalisation that emphasise 
the elimination of territorial barriers to trade and finance, or the spread of 
transborder transactions more generally, can be supplemented by a conception that 
sees globalisation as “a discourse of political knowledge offering one view of how 
to make the post-modern world manageable”.40 In this way, globalisation has been 
described as “a normalising rationality of government, acting to limit what is 
possible and thinkable”.41 The arguments of the thesis draw on both of these 
approaches to globalisation - that which attempts to describe the roots and 
manifestations of global economic change and that which focuses on changing 
assumptions regarding international order and the nature of political organisation.
The Three Dimensions of International Influence
Drawing on this working conception, then, the three dimensions of 
international influence are identified in the thesis as globalisation, conditionality 
and regionalisation, and are addressed in three consecutive chapters (4, 5, and 6). 
The above conception of globalisation serves as the ‘umbrella’ for the three
40 Higgott: “Globalisation and Governance”.
41 ibid.
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dimensions. All three are conceived as trends that have defined the recent evolution 
of the international political economy, although none is a novel development. 
Rather, it is claimed that each has assumed new dimensions and significance in the 
1990s. As we have seen, globalisation is undoubtedly part of an ongoing process of 
internationalisation and transnationalisation in the international arena, but has 
achieved a momentum and scope in recent years that has led to the perception of a 
qualitatively new phase in the evolution of the international structure. Relations 
with international financial institutions are clearly not new for any country in the 
world, much less Latin American and other developing countries, and 
conditionality was a crucial part of these relations throughout the ‘structural 
adjustment’ decade of the debt-ridden 1980s. However, the nature of conditionality 
and the operations of the international financial institutions has changed radically 
in recent years, and the thesis aims to reflect these developments. Similarly, 
regionalisation is not a new phenomenon, particularly in Europe, but is one which, 
along with globalisation, has come to be identified as the principal trend in the 
contemporary international political economy. Furthermore, although there have 
been several attempts at regionalism in Latin America through the post-war period, 
the Mercosur is located within the most recent phase which is qualitatively 
different from its predecessors.
There are two other ways in which the classification and treatment of 
international influence in the thesis is novel. First, the analysis aims to use the three 
dimensions as inherently inter-related and interlinked trends and processes, and 
therefore to highlight the connections and relationships between them. The 
contention of the thesis is that conditionality and regionalisation are the two 
principal mechanisms by which the influence of globalisation is transmitted and by 
which countries respond to the constraints and opportunities created by it. As such, 
it is argued that conditionality and regionalisation, apart from being dimensions of 
international influence, stand at the interface of the global / international and 
national, and act as the meditating influences between them. The imperatives 
generated by globalisation are channelled to national arenas through conditionality 
and the activities of international financial institutions and are reflected in the 
operation of regional blocs. Furthermore, countries have actively sought closer
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links with these institutions and constructed regional integration arrangements as a 
means of responding to the challenges of globalisation.
Second, the treatment of these interconnected dimensions of international 
influence departs from the literature in that it aims to offer an amplified conception 
of what constitutes ‘international influence’. It incorporates processes and trends 
that are not usually considered in analyses that focus narrowly on the ‘international 
economy’ or alternatively the ‘globalisation of economic activity’. By highlighting 
the absence of analyses that examine the transmission mechanisms by which 
‘international influence’ becomes incorporated into national policy-making 
agendas, the thesis creates space for a more comprehensive treatment of 
‘international influence’ and makes the consideration of other dimensions of the 
international environment necessary and instructive.42 The existing holes, then, are 
reflected in the narrow conceptions of ‘international influence’, the neglect of the 
relationship between globalisation and conditionality, and the severe shortage of 
analyses that consider regionalism as a policy input as well as output. The thesis 
aims to address these problems.
Finally, apart from offering this amplified analysis, the thesis aims to 
contribute to the study of each of the three dimensions individually. Studies of 
globalisation, first, suffer from a lack of application to different domestic contexts, 
and as such lacks in regional and national specificity. As stated above, this is 
particularly the case with regard to the Latin American region and developing 
countries more generally. Furthermore, the literature on the relationship between 
globalisation and the national state is growing, but remains rather patchy, as 
outlined in Chapter 4. The thesis, therefore, seeks to add empirical specificity to the 
study of globalisation and to contribute to the burgeoning debate on the 
relationship between globalisation and the state.
42 The dual international / national nature of the policy agenda, however, is reflected in the ‘two- 
level games’ approach to international negotiations. See Robert D. Putnam: “Diplomacy and 
Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International Organization 42, Summer 1988, 
and Peter B. Evans et al (eds.): Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic 
Politics (1993). For a recent extension o f this to a ‘three-level games’ framework, see Lee Ann 
Patterson: “Agricultural Policy Reform in the European Community: A Three-Level Game 
Analysis”, International Organization 51,1, Winter 1997.
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Studies of conditionality remain, with rare exceptions43, rooted in the
analysis of the debt crisis and structural adjustment efforts of the 1980s, and
furthermore have neglected its relationship with globalisation. The thesis aims to
counter both of these shortcomings: by moving the analysis forward from its
timewarp of the 1980s and also by locating the study of conditionality and
international financial institutions in the broader context of globalisation and
%
international change. In addition, it aims to fill a gap by redressing the neglect of 
the political impact of conditionality, and particularly its implications for state- 
society relations.
Regionalism or regionalisation, finally, is usually identified as the ‘twin’ to 
globalisation as a dominant trend in the international political economy, but is 
usually approached as a policy output, normally as a (positive or negative) response 
to globalisation. Furthermore, with the exception of analyses which show how 
regional (and international) constraints and imperatives are incorporated into the 
domestic policy agenda, its impact on the domestic economic and political 
alternatives remains under-theorised and underdeveloped. The thesis, in response, 
presents regionalism as a policy input as well as a policy output, that has significant 
implications for the evolution of the national state and state-society relations, as 
well as the economic policy agenda.
The Study of the State and Conceptions of State Power
Having defined the first of the key concepts in the title, then, the final task 
of this Introduction is to clarify the conception of state power used and developed 
in the thesis, and to show how its arguments fit into the theoretical and empirical 
study of the state. The state is normally understood in three different ways in 
political science, which are often conflated: as a set of institutions; as a particular 
type of regime; and as the group of government officials that occupy the principal 
executive positions.44 The latter two categories can be understood as influencing 
state strength by mediating relations between the state and the various components
43 For example, Tussie: “Globalisation and Conditionality” and “Argentina’s Big Bang Reform”.
44 Evelyn Huber: “Assessments o f State Strength” in Peter H. Smith (ed.): Latin America in 
Comparative Perspective: New Approaches to Methods and Analysis (1995), pg 165.
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of civil society, and therefore the ability of the state to govern, or exercise power 
over the economy and over political society.45 This thesis understands the state 
principally in terms of the first and last of these: both as a set of institutions and as 
inherently linked to the offices of government. Especially given the concentration 
of policy-making authority in the executive branch of government, as Chapter 4 
highlights, the third dimension of the state is particularly useful in the study of the 
Argentine political system and its Latin American counterparts. By understanding 
the state in terms of the offices of government, furthermore, many of the problems 
associated with concepts such as state autonomy, rational actions and state 
preferences are eased. Such an approach also allows for the recognition of the 
importance of agency in understandings of the state: in this case the agency-centred 
perspective emphasises the centrality of policy elites.46
With respect to state power, the thesis is not concerned with more 
conventional definitions that refer to the maintenance of territorial security and 
other dimensions of strength associated with the exercise of foreign policy. Rather, 
the thesis works with a conception of state power that operates on three levels. 
First, state power is formulated principally in terms of the capacity o f  national 
governments to implement their policy preferences. In this way, state power is 
conceptualised from the perspective of implementation: it concerns the state’s 
ability to implement its stated goals and preferences. This conception, however, 
does not make any a priori assumptions concerning the origins or nature of those 
preferences. As such, it does not subscribe to the notion that the state has its own 
discrete set of interests or preferences which is fundamental to the ‘state autonomy’ 
approach favoured in 1980s political science.47 The conceptualisation of state 
power in terms of implementation, therefore, relates directly to assessments of the
45 Huber, pg 165.
46 For an example o f an analysis that focuses on elites and policy choices, see Merilee S. Grindle & 
John W. Thomas: Public Choices and Policy Change: The Political Economy o f  Reform in 
Developing Countries (1991).
47 See, for example, Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol (eds.): Bringing the 
State Back In (1985); Stephen D. Krasner: “Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and 
Historical Dynamics”, Comparative Politics 16, 1984 and Defending the National Interest: Raw 
Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (1978); Eric A. Nordlinger: On the Autonomy o f  the 
Democratic State (1981).
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effectiveness of the state in implementing its policy preferences, which is quite
4Rdifferent from the concept of autonomy.
On the second level, state power is conceptualised in terms of the degree of 
centralisation o f  political power. In other words, state power is understood to refer 
to the extent of the state’s insulation from societal groups or interests. In practical 
terms, in the Argentine and many other cases, this is directly linked to the first 
conception of power concerning the state’s capacity for policy implementation. A 
corollary of this conception is that state power is inherently relative, in that a high 
level of centralisation or insulation necessarily involves a reduction in the capacity 
of societal interests to significantly influence the political process.
The assumption that the preferences of a democratic government will 
inevitably “significantly reflect the demands and interests of civil society”49 is not 
empirically useful in the study of contemporary Latin America. The analysis of 
political reform in Chapter 4 demonstrates that in the processes of structural reform 
implemented in Argentina and a variety of Latin American countries, the policy 
orientation and goals have been accepted by societal groups, but that this 
acceptance was achieved subsequent to the implementation of the reform 
strategies. As such, these are processes of reform ‘from above’, in which 
government elites are principally responsible for the formulation and execution of 
reform strategies. In the specific context of Argentina and Latin American 
countries, then, the implementation perspective refers to the government’s power 
to promote domestic adjustment.
The disarticulation of civil society that resulted from the situation of 
political and economic crisis at the end of the 1980s undoubtedly gave the 
government a free hand in the formulation of policies and strategies, as argued 
above. Nevertheless, this argument does not assume a static picture of relations 
between state and society in Argentina or elsewhere. On the contrary, as the 
following chapters demonstrate, the initial centralisation of political power which 
allowed for the relatively autonomous policy-making environment lasted only a 
short time, giving way to the construction of new forms of state-society relations 
according to evolving sets of circumstances. On a theoretical level, therefore, the
48 Weiss, pg 29.
49 Huber, pg 166.
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conception of state power as referring to the government’s capacity to implement 
its preferences works only when no assumptions are made concerning the origins 
or nature of these preferences. As such, the conception here is used in a relatively 
loose way as a skeleton analytical tool. The flesh, or substance, is provided by 
empirical analysis of individual countries or cases.
The contention of the thesis, as outlined earlier, is that an important 
neglected dimension of the study of state power concerns the impact of 
international change, or the international environment, on both domestic policy 
choices and the political alignments that are created in order to maintain the new 
orientation. Paradoxically, although the policy autonomy of the state is reduced in 
terms of the available feasible options, the strength or power of the state, according 
to the two understandings outlined above, is enhanced as a result of engagement 
with processes of international change and its specific manifestations. As a result 
of the imperatives established by a globalised international economy and the 
related dimensions of conditionality and regionalisation, the implementation 
functions of the government are strengthened and the space is created for a 
significant centralisation of political power, leading to an increased insulation of 
the state from societal interests.
Nevertheless, the emphasis on insulation and centralisation is not intended 
to stand in opposition to the ideas of ‘embedded autonomy’ developed by Peter 
Evans, which suggest that “transformative capacity requires a combination of 
internal coherence and external connectedness”.50 It does, however, challenge 
Evans’ assumption that there is a necessary contradiction between this and ideas of 
insulation. As the analysis in Chapter 4 and the Conclusions in Chapter 8 
demonstrate, the high degree of centralisation in Argentina during the Menem 
administration should not be taken to mean that the government dispensed with all 
ideas of political support bases or alliances with certain societal interests. The 
situation in Argentina is one, essentially, of ‘centralising populism’ in which 
Menem maintained the traditional Peronist support structures and established 
alliances with certain business sectors at the same time as neutralising the veto
50 Peter Evans: “The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and 
Structural Change” in Haggard & Kaufman (eds.), pg 176.
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powers of labour and the military.51 The process of political reform did not involve 
the suspension of elections, furthermore, but rather the relegation of those political 
institutions (such as the legislature and the judicial branch) that are supposed to be 
independent representations of the public interest. The most intriguing element of 
the picture is the fact that this type of reform was accomplished with increasing 
returns to power, reflected in the growth of Menem’s political popularity and his 
re-election in 1995. The ‘embedded’ nature of the autonomy of the Argentine state 
is also demonstrated by the extent of its international linkages, covered in Chapters 
5, 6 and 7.
The study of the state more generally is dominated by what has been called 
the “phenomenon of ‘state denial’”.52 As Chapter 5 demonstrates, the state is 
generally assumed to have withered or else taken a secondary role as a result of the 
processes of internationalisation, globalisation and interdependence. The thesis, 
however, contends that a statist approach to reform in Latin America, as well as to 
politics more generally in the region, is neither outdated nor anachronistic. 
Although the study of the state has changed significantly in recent years along with 
the nature of states in the region, it is asserted that the state has recovered itself 
from the conditions of crisis in the 1980s, and has become the locus of an even 
higher degree of centralisation of power. Furthermore, the hypothesis of the thesis 
is that this situation was created in important ways by the nature of international 
influences in the 1990s and the results of the dynamic interaction of these with 
domestic circumstances and institutional structures. As such, it appears that ‘state 
denial’ is indeed a “fundamentally Anglo-American institution” which, moreover, 
has been over-generalised in globalisation theory. The thesis contends that 
although unfashionable, the study of the state in Latin America remains 
fundamental to an understanding of contemporary political economy, and 
especially to the processes o f economic restructuring and political reform.
51 For interesting recent analyses of Menem’s retention o f Peronist support bases, see Edward L. 
Gibson & Ernesto Calvo: “Electoral Coalitions and Market Reforms: Evidence from Argentina”, 
Working Paper no. 35, Universidad Torcuato Di Telia, Buenos Aires, April 1997.
52 Weiss, pg 2.
53 Weiss, pgs 3 & 194.
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Paradoxically perhaps, the state is pivotal in masterminding an economic and 
political model that involves a fundamental redefinition of its own role.54
In addition, the study of globalisation in the thesis is based on the 
hypothesis that the relegation of the state in the study of IPE ignores important 
ways in which the national state is undergoing a process of transformation and 
redefinition, and that the ‘retreat of the state’55 is overplayed in current IPE and 
globalisation studies. The contention of the thesis is that states remain fundamental 
to the cause of constructing and maintaining the process of globalisation in the 
international economy, as well as in formulating national responses to it. Therefore, 
the state remains pivotal when viewed both from the angle of domestic political 
structures and economic strategies, and from the perspective of global change. 
Each of the three chapters on international influence give empirical and theoretical 
substance to this contention.
The Organisation of the Thesis
The first three chapters, then, are concerned with the empirical questions 
outlined at the start of this Introduction. Chapter 2 demonstrates the ‘logic’ of 
Argentine political economy in the post-war period which would have led us to 
expect a different outcome for the reform effort launched by the Menem 
government. Chapters 3 and 4 respectively outline the dimensions of the economic 
and political reform agenda pursued by the Menem government, and pay special 
attention to the implementation-consolidation trajectory. These chapters 
demonstrate the progressive strengthening of the model contrary to the predicted 
increase in political pressure and the erosion of the economic consistency as a 
result.
54 In the 1980s, a version o f this observation was formulated as the ‘orthodox paradox’ which saw a 
tension between international financial institutions’ perception o f the state as the main obstacle to 
development and their use of the state as the primary vehicle for promoting reform. See, for 
example, Thomas M. Callaghy: “Toward State Capability and Embedded Liberalism in the Third 
World: Lessons for Adjustment” in Nelson (ed.): Fragile Coalitions, pp. 116-7, and Kahler: 
“Stabilization and its Alternatives”.
55 See, for example, Strange: The Retreat o f the State and David Held: Democracy and the Global 
Order (1995).
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Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are concerned with the three dimensions of 
international influence outlined above. Chapter 5 analyses the effects of 
globalisation on the nature of the state and state power, and demonstrates the ways 
in which the possibilities for consolidation of economic and political reform in 
Argentina were strengthened by the constraints and opportunities created by these 
processes of international change. The main strands of the argument concern the 
‘paradox of state power’ and the ‘internationalisation of the state’ which have been 
outlined briefly above. Chapter 6 is concerned with impact of the conditionality 
provisions attached to loans from the international financial institutions. It draws 
on similar arguments to Chapter 5 relating to the ‘internationalisation of the state’, 
and the ways in which the ‘locking in’ of economic policies contributes to a 
particular kind of political development. Chapter 7 examines the regional 
dimensions of reform with reference to the role of the ‘regionalisation of the state’ 
in the consolidation of reform at the domestic level. Each of these three chapters 
demonstrates the pivotal importance of international influences in explaining the 
trajectory and outcome of reform under Menem.
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Chapter 2
Cycles of Crisis and Reform in Argentina
The administration of Carlos Menem is identified with a sustained project 
of transformation in both the economic and political spheres in Argentina, ending 
the spiral of political and economic ungovernability that had characterised the 
entire post-war period. The Menem government’s reform effort constituted the only 
sustained and successful attempt in over four decades to govern both the economic 
and political arenas, and as such is identified as having broken the earlier and 
established ‘logic’ of Argentine political economy. The pertinent question is not, 
however, why reform happened after the crisis of the 1980s, but rather why the 
Menem government was able to sustain and consolidate its agenda when the 
pattern of post-war development, as well as general feeling at the start of the first 
Menem administration, would have predicted otherwise.
The task of this chapter is to demonstrate the importance of this central 
research question by highlighting the roots of the cycles of crisis and reform in 
Argentina. The repetition of these cycles over a period of more than forty years can 
be attributed primarily to political factors, which led to the consistent relegation of 
coherent macroeconomic policy management. The Argentine political economy 
since the first Peronist government was characterised by a fierce ‘distributional 
conflict’ in which entrenched corporatist and other interests competed in the arena 
of the state for resources and power. This was exacerbated by the persistent 
tensions between Peronist forces in political society and anti-Peronist factions, 
most notably the military. The implementation of reform following an episode of 
crisis was invariably followed by an increase in political pressures on the 
government and the system, which led to the abandonment and/or collapse of the 
economic policy model after a relatively short period of time. In this way, as Table 
2.1 shows, patterns of post-war political economy in Argentina were characterised 
by boom-bust and stop-go cycles, usually of around three to five years’ duration. 
The episodes of economic crisis invariably led to stabilisation and adjustment 
efforts which again collapsed a couple of years later. Table 2.1 also demonstrates 
the links between growth and inflation.
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Table 2.1: Percentage Change of Real GDP and Consumer Prices, 1945-1989
Year Real GDP Consumer prices
1946 8.3 17.7
1947 13.7 13.5
1948 1.2 13.1
1949 -4.6 31.1
1950 1.6 14.1
1951 3.9 50.4
1952 -5.1 38.7
1953 5.4 4.0
1954 4.1 3.8
1955 7.1 12.3
1956 2.8 13.4
1957 5.1 24.7
1958 6.1 31.6
1959 -6.4 114.0
1960 7.8 27.1
1961 7.1 13.6
1962 -1.6 28.2
1963 -2.4 24.0
1964 10.3 22.2
1965 9.1 28.7
1966 0.6 32.0
1967 2.7 29.2
1968 4.3 16.2
1969 8.6 7.6
1970 5.4 13.6
1971 4.8 34.7
1972 3.1 58.5
1973 6.1 60.3
1974 6.1 23.5
1975 -0.9 182.3
1976 -1.7 443.2
1977 4.9 176.1
1978 -3.9 175.5
1979 6.7 159.5
1980 0.7 100.8
38
Table 2.1 (cont.)
1981 6.6 104.5
1982 -4.9 164.8
1983 2.4 343.8
1984 2.4 626.7
1985 -4.3 672.1
1986 5.6 90.1
1987 2.2 131.3
1988 -1.9 343.0
1989 -6.2 3,079.0
Source: Statistical Abstract o f Latin America, various numbers.
On the basis of the evidence presented above, we can identify the principal 
points of the cycles as those at which crisis gave way to emergency adjustment 
measures, often in connection with agreements with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF): 1952 under the government of Peron, 1958 and 1962 at the start and 
end of the Frondizi government, 1966-7 under Ongania, 1976 at the end of the 
second Peronist administration, 1982 at the end of the military government, and 
1985 and 1988-9 under Alfonsin. The following sections outline in more detail the 
political economy of successive crises in post-war Argentina, and then draw the 
strands together to offer a context in which to examine the political and economic 
reform process implemented by the Menem government from 1989.
Peronism to the ‘Dirty War’: Crisis and Instability
The Collapse o f  the Peronist Experiment in the 1950s
Following the collapse of laissez-faire as a result of the Depression and the 
Second World War, the first Peronist government which took power in 1946 
institutionalised an alternative development strategy in Argentina. This was based 
on the doctrine of import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) as a means of 
achieving full employment and emphasised the following policy objectives: (a) the 
further development and consolidation of the industrialisation drive through a more
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coherent system of state intervention in the economy; (b) the political integration of 
the working classes through a programme of social reform; and (c) the achievement 
of national autonomy vis-a-vis the international economy.
The Peronist strategy enjoyed some considerable success in terms of its 
stated goals in its early years. By the late 1940s, almost all of the foreign-owned 
economic activities had been nationalised, industry experienced a period of 
unprecedented investment and expansion (largely as a result of a 35% increase in 
the money supply), and new institutions had been created to complement the new 
economic orientation. An example is the Argentine Trade Promotion Institute 
(IAPI) which constituted the state monopoly on agricultural exports and was 
originally intended to finance the government’s five-year economic plan.1 The 
consumer boom between 1946 and 1950 was accompanied by an increase in real 
wages of 33%, or 70% when fringe benefits are included in the calculations.
The inflationary potential of this combination of high wages, easy credit 
and the expansion of the money supply is self-evident. The increase in wages far 
exceeded increases in productivity and generated an annual rise in living costs of 
some 68% by 1949. By 1948 gold reserves had been depleted by 89% and foreign 
currency holdings remained largely in the form of sterling, which was not 
convertible in the international marketplace.4 The difficulties in the economy were 
exacerbated after 1948 by a decline in export earnings, drought in 1950 and 1951 
and inflationary pressures as a result of unsustainable increases in incomes and 
wages. The crisis of the late 1940s and early 1950s gave way to the announcement 
of a package of emergency austerity measures, known as the Economic Plan for 
1952, which included a two-year freeze on wages, price increases, reduced state 
expenditure, the increased availability of credits for rural producers, and the 
proposal to limit domestic consumption for exportables such as beef and wheat.5 
As such, the Economic Plan constituted a departure from the sacred cows of 
Peronism: the privileging of the industrial working classes over rural producers and
1 Robert A. Potash: The Army and Politics in Argentina 1945-62: Peron to Frondizi (1980), pp. 61- 
3; Paul H. Lewis: The Crisis o f Argentine Capitalism (1992), pp. 159-61.
2 Lewis, pg 182.
3 ibid., pg 183.
4 Gary Wynia: Argentina in the Postwar Era: Politics and Economic Policy Making in a Divided 
Society (1978), pg 6.
5 Potash, pg 92.
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a position of autonomy vis-a-vis foreign investment and international economic 
exchange. Priority was given to agrarian sectors, energy resources, mining, heavy 
industry and infrastructural development: only 4% of the projected expenditure for 
1953-57 was intended for social programmes, compared with 42% for public 
works and 33% for export promotion.6 The implementation of these objectives was 
seen to be dependent on foreign and domestic private capital, which was reflected 
in an apparent about-turn on foreign investment laws and, significantly, oil sector 
policy which previously had been the nationalist symbol of Peronist independence.
The Economic Plan led to some degree of recovery in the next two years, 
particularly in terms of a reduction in inflation and correction on the balance of 
payments, and some considerable support for short-lived ideas of economic 
integration with neighbouring countries. However, the new economic orientation 
gave relatively more political weight to business sectors, despite the fact that the 
labour sector remained the bulwark of Peron’s power base. The emphasis in the 
early 1950s, in contrast to the early days of Peronism, was on the maintenance of 
labour discipline and the avoidance of new wage demands. In addition, Peron 
systematically alienated both the military institution and the Church, culminating in 
the open hostilities of 1954 and 1955, and the overthrow of the government by a 
military coup in September 1955.
The reasons for the failure of the experiment can be attributed in part to
o
broad difficulties associated with ISI. It is generally recognised that the 
implementation of ISI in various parts of Latin America was mis-timed: while 
Argentina and other countries were closing their economies the international 
economy was embarking on a period of growth that lasted for more than thirty 
years. Furthermore, the size and capacity of the internal market is one of the 
fundamental constraints on the successful implementation of this type of economic 
strategy. ISI depends on the expansion of domestic demand in order to increase 
productive capacity and to compensate the loss of consumption potential in foreign
6 ibid., pg 144.
7 ibid., pg 165.
8 For fuller accounts of the economic difficulties associated with ISI, see Werner Baer: “Import 
Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and Interpretations”, Latin 
American Research Review VII, Spring 1972; and Juan Carlos de Pablo: “Beyond Import 
Substitution” in Werner Baer & Larry Samuelson (eds.): Latin America in the Post-Import- 
Substitution Era, special issue o f World Development 5, 1/2, 1977.
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markets. The size of the market is inevitably going to restrict the viability of such 
an expansion, and the bottlenecks without exception became quickly apparent in 
Latin American flirtations with this type of development model. Other difficulties 
concern the damage to both import and export sectors caused by protectionist 
economic policies, which push resources into inefficient and unproductive sectors 
and create problems associated with social welfare.9
However, the principal reasons for the collapse of the experiment are 
clearly political, and set the pattern for the following forty years. The Peronist 
experiment inevitably, and intentionally, brought traditional rural interests and the 
industrial sectors into sharp conflict and created a situation of political stalemate. 
The government financed its industrialisation project from two main sources: its 
substantial gold reserves accumulated during the War and the agricultural export 
sector. The relative importance of the latter increased as the former became 
depleted, especially in the absence of revenues from exports. In this way, the 
viability of the economic model rested on the state’s ability to transfer resources 
from the rural to the urban sectors. The former consistently resisted the process of 
industrialisation and the erosion of their political and economic influence. The 
controls imposed by the state on trade, credit and exchange flows and the 
regulations imposed on the financial system alienated the very sectors on which the 
project depended for financing. The hostility from rural producers to the economic 
orientation established in the 1940s waned somewhat in response to the more 
favourable measures outlined in the 1952 package, but stopped far short of turning 
into overall support for the Peronist government.
The political project established the working classes as the power base for 
the government, in exchange for economic concessions like better wages and 
protective legislation, and political benefits in the form of possibilities for much 
higher levels of participation.10 The increasing political weight of these interests 
explains the reluctance of the government to lower wages throughout the 1949-52 
period, even with strong evidence of impending economic crisis. It also explains 
how the freeze on wages announced as part of the 1952 Economic Plan was
9 Tim Congdon: Economic Liberalism in the Cone o f  Latin America (1985), pg 8.
10 Carlos Waisman: Reversal o f  Development in Argentina: Postwar Counterrevolutionary Policies 
and Their Structural Consequences (1987), pg 135.
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implemented without a withdrawal of support from the affected interests. However, 
the collapse of the economy and of the government in 1955 can be attributed 
almost entirely to the damage caused to the confidence of industrialists as well as 
rural producers by the apparent loss of direction evident in the policy provisions of 
the 1952 Economic Plan. Initially, industrial interests opposed these amendments 
to the economic orientation, although this stopped short of a withdrawal of political 
support. However, by 1955 their withdrawal of support was as critical to the fate of 
the government as the opposition of traditional rural interests. In sum, the 
government failed to convince most of the crucial non-Peronist actors of the utility 
and coherence of the policy package, which was at least in part attributable to the 
centralised nature of the policy-making process it established.
At the same time, the expansion of political participation under Peron had 
not been accompanied by a successful strategy of inclusionary 
institutionalisation.11 The upshot was the creation of the most militant trade unions 
in Latin America and an enduring pattern of polarised party and interest group 
politics, in which there was a clear perception that “there was little room for
19compromise in the governing of the nation”. These trends combined with 
deliberate efforts on the part of the government to restrict the possibilities for 
political opposition, in line with a growing perception that Peronist ideology was 
the national ideology rather than a partisan issue. In 1949, new legislation 
prohibited the construction of electoral coalitions or the formation of new political 
parties. The Peronist majority in Congress, furthermore, together with an 
increasingly hard line on the independence of the media, was used to restrict the
1 -j
possibilities for criticism of policy or politics. As such, the increasing ideological 
polarisation of Argentine politics created a tension between Peronist and anti- 
Peronist elements in society, most notably the Armed Forces, and gave way to a 
repeated alternation in power between civilian and military authorities.
11 The Argentine case therefore corresponds with Samuel Huntington’s praetorian society, in which 
the increase in participation is not matched by the development o f political institutions through 
which the increased pressures on the political system can be channelled and controlled. Political 
Order in Changing Societies (1968).
12 Wynia: Argentina in the Postwar Era, pg 80.
13 Potash, pg 103-4.
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In just over twenty years, twelve presidents held office14, of which over half 
came to power as the result of a military coup and only two through open elections. 
The recurring pattern was one of military intervention in response to the real or 
potential electoral successes of the Peronists during interludes of inclusionary 
democracy. However, neither civilian nor military authorities were able to govern 
effectively without Peronism given the veto power of the unions and electoral 
abstention that undermined the possibilities for genuinely inclusionary or 
representative democracy. On the other hand, even those attempts at inclusionary 
democracy failed as a result of the anti-Peronist factions in society and the 
reluctance of the Peronists themselves to be ‘included’ in the mainstream political 
process.15
As far as the state is concerned, the Peronist legacy was one of the ‘hyper­
politicisation’ of the economic sphere, in which the state was simultaneously 
activated and centralised. With its expansion, the state assumed entire 
responsibility for the provision of public welfare.16 The consolidation of the 
corporatist structures established under Peron maintained the centralisation and 
politicisation of the state, but also created a situation in which the state became the 
main site of the political and distributional conflicts created by the polarisation of 
economic interests. As such, this was a corporatist system of interest representation 
in which the state struggled to mediate and satisfy the huge range of societal 
interests against which it was constrained to contend. Significantly, these interests, 
particularly labour and the military, assumed an important veto power over the 
political process. The perpetual instability in the economic arena and the stubborn 
persistence of inflation can be traced directly to the subordination of economic 
policy to the requirements of political survival. The economic and political history 
of post-war Argentina, and particularly the high turnover of regimes, demonstrate 
that very few governments achieved even this objective successfully.
14 Gen. Eduardo Lonardi (Sept 1955-Nov 1955), Gen. Pedro E. Aramburu (Nov 1955-May 1958), Dr 
Arturo Frondizi (May 1958-Mar 1962), Dr Jose Marla Guido (Mar 1962-Oct 1963), Dr Arturo Illla 
(Oct 1963-June 1966), Gen. Juan C. Onganla (June 1966-June 1970), Gen. Roberto M. Levingston 
(June 1970-Mar 1971), Gen. Alejandro Lanusse (Mar 1971-May 1973), Dr Hector C&mpora (May 
1973-July 1973), Mr Raul Lastiri (July 1973-Sept 1973), Gen. Juan D. Per6n (Oct 1973-July 1974), 
and Mrs Isabel Peron (July 1974-Mar 1976).
15 Vicente Palermo & Marcos Novaro: Politicay Poder en el Gobierno de Menem (1996), pg 38.
16 Gary Wynia: Argentina: Illusions and Realities (1986), pg 65.
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Crisis in the Early 1960s
The government of General Pedro Aramburu from 1955 aimed essentially 
to resuscitate the economy and to re-establish political stability through the 
elimination of Peronism and the restoration of constitutional government. The 
former objective was implemented in connection with ECLAC economist Raul 
Prebisch, and involved a neoliberal solution to the problems of Peronism. The 
abolition of the LAPI and the creation of the National Institute of Agrarian 
Technology (INTA) reflected the move away from state control of foreign trade 
and the new focus on the expansion and technification of the agricultural sector. 
The National Directorate of State Industry (DINIE) was also dissolved and the 
confiscated foreign companies returned to their owners. The refinancing of the 
foreign debt in 1955 led to Argentina’s re-admission to the multilateral trading 
arena, and its subsequent membership of the Paris Club, the IMF and the World 
Bank. Other measures included the reform of the financial and banking sectors and 
the active promotion of basic industries.
However, this sort of strategy coincided with a period in which 
international terms of trade were at their worst since the early 1930s and 
investment flows were in any case inhibited by the exchange controls and tariff 
barriers erected by the Peronist government. The disappointing performance of 
exports and the low levels of confidence in Argentina on the part of multinationals 
fuelled the conviction that capital accumulation depended on foreign investment 
rather than trade, and led to the dependence on the former which characterised 
subsequent economic policies.17 Moreover, the difficulties encountered by this 
attempt at a shift away from ISI reinforced perceptions of the virtues of Peronist 
economic strategies, especially with respect to self-sufficiency.
From May 1958 nationalist resentment stymied the attempts of the
government of Arturo Frondizi to chart a middle course between the twin currents
1 8of national populism and economic liberalism. The experiment in 
‘developmentalism’ under this administration was based on a policy of “intensive
17 Pablo Gerchunoff: “A Note on the Economic Policies o f the ‘Liberating Revolution’ in Di Telia 
& Dombusch (eds.), pg 106.
18 Lewis, pp. 277-8.
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vertical ISI” which emphasised the promotion of basic industries (such as steel, 
energy, chemicals, machinery and capital goods) together with an emphasis on 
foreign sources of finance for the purposes of capital accumulation, industrial 
modernisation and infrastructural development.19 This was made feasible by the 
expansion of US investment in Latin America (partly out of anti-Communist
90concerns) and the increased availability of trade and suppliers’ credits.
This went together with the controversial policy of allowing foreign 
participation in the oil sector, especially in the light of Frondizi’s originally 
nationalist credentials. In this sense, the Frondizi government was something of a 
“study in contradictions”, in which an apparently nationalist economic agenda was
91financed by massive injections of foreign capital. The nationalist resentment of 
both of these policy positions was fuelled by Peronist opposition to the ‘selling out’ 
of the economy to imperialist interests, and led to a spate of labour activism, the 
most important instance of which was the Peronist-led oil workers’ strike of 
November 1958. The President, significantly, made increasing use of military 
agents to assist in the management and repression of these episodes of protest in
99order to enable him to continue his economic policies.
The economic crisis which had been brewing since the end of the Peronist 
government led to the negotiation of a stand-by agreement with the IMF in 
December 1958, which in the event was never enforced with any degree of 
conviction. In part the collapse of developmentalism subsequently can be attributed 
to an increased dependence on private loans in order to avoid the problems of
90
reconciling IMF demands and domestic pressures. More importantly, however, 
the failure to enforce the agreement can be attributed to the political pressures it 
generated. Government links with the IMF fuelled the Peronist-led nationalist 
opposition and led, together with the effective freeze on wages involved in the 
stand-by agreement, to the breakdown of the alliance that had been established with 
labour. This was exacerbated by the further involvement of the military in
19 Kathryn Sikkink: Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (1991), pg 4; 
Celia Szusterman: Frondizi and the Politics o f Development in Argentina, 1955-62 (1993).
20 Sikkink, pg 215.
21 William C. Smith: Authoritarianism and the Crisis o f  the Argentine Political Economy (1989), 
pp. 39-40.
22 Potash, pg 298.
23 Sikkink, pg 48.
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‘enforcing’ the political conditions necessary for the implementation of the 
economic policy agenda. At the same time, the military’s support for the IMF 
agreement led to the replacement in June 1959 of Economy Minister Emilio Del 
Carril and his team with one acceptable to military preferences (headed by Alvaro 
Alsogaray) along with the effective end to possibilities for resurrecting labour 
relations.
However, political pressures continued to weigh heavy on economic policy 
coherence, and led to such measures as a huge increase in government spending for 
public works in the run-up to the March 1960 elections, which entailed a doubling 
of the rate of monetary expansion and the resurgence of the inflationary pressures 
which Alsogaray had been attempting to eliminate. Before the 1962 elections, 
furthermore, huge sections of the budget were diverted for the purposes of hiring 
more government employees and financing more public projects.24 These measures 
exacerbated the negative balance of payments situation and the persistence of 
payments and liquidity problems throughout 1962.
The crisis can also be seen in the economic context of the shortcomings of 
ISI, relating to the limited absorbent capacity of the domestic market and the 
balance of payments issues generated by the need for investment inputs from 
foreign sources. The effect of the foreign exchange bottleneck was to produce 
significant inflationary pressures and a policy shift towards agricultural exports in 
order to meet foreign debt obligations and purchase industrial inputs. However, this 
shift coincided with a period of declining international prices for agricultural goods 
and precipitated a series of devaluations which fed into the inflationary spiral, 
especially after the abandonment of exchange controls in 1959. It is clear, 
however, that there was very little political support for developmentalism in 
Argentina. Although opposition stemmed primarily from Peronist quarters, 
industrial sectors and the military were largely lukewarm, and therefore there was 
limited backing from other sectors which might have helped to increase the 
legitimacy of the experiment. The expectation that the increased emphasis on both 
foreign capital and some encouragement of the agricultural sector signalled a
24 Lewis, pg 278.
25 Daniel James: Resistance and Integration: Peronism and the Argentine Working Class, 1946- 
1976 (1988), pg 164.
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reversal of the policy orientation was not fulfilled, and the consistency of policy 
management was undermined as a result.
The political legitimacy of the government was eroded from the outset by 
the exclusion of the Peronists from the 1958 elections. When Aramburu took 
office, the Peronist Party (PJ) had been declared illegal and its assets confiscated. 
The effort to destroy the Peronist movement was conducted against the labour 
sector, with the encouragement of the emergence of an anti-Peronist union 
leadership. A series of labour reforms aimed to depoliticise and disempower the 
unions and, by extension, the working classes. Decree 7107, for example, banned 
from union activity all those who had held leadership or representative positions in 
the main union, the General Labour Confederation (CGT), and associated 
organisations between February 1952 and September 1955. This was subsequently 
extended to all those who had been present at the CGT Congress of 1949 at which 
new statutes proclaimed the CGT as the “faithful repository of the Peronist
9 f \doctrine”. The anti-Peronist factions of society during the Frondizi government, 
particularly the military, were keen for these and other restrictions to be 
maintained, while Peronists were pressing for a full restoration of former levels of
97influence.
The military government which overthrew Frondizi, however, was followed 
by an ill-fated attempt at inclusionary elections which brought Arturo Illfa to power 
and undermined his political authority. Although this was the most liberal period in 
post-war Argentine politics, this democratic experiment in the event did more to 
increase the legitimacy of non-democratic forms of government than any other. 
Many nationalist policies abandoned by Frondizi were reinstated, with the 
exception of links with the IMF, and there was an improvement in the foreign debt 
and balance of trade situations. Nevertheless, by 1965 inflation was resurgent and 
production was slowing, export levels were falling and the familiar foreign 
exchange bottlenecks were emerging. The effect was a decline in industrial output 
as a result of restrictions on imports and an increase in unemployment. Moreover, 
the collapse of the Illfa government can be linked most clearly to electoral politics. 
Immediately after the election, all elements of the urban and rural bourgeoisie
26 James: op.cit., pg 55.
27 Potash, pg 281.
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mounted a fierce opposition campaign against the government, which found itself 
at the same time in conflict with the unions and Peronists.28 The CGT-led ‘Protest 
Week’ of 1963 and the ‘Battle Plan’ of mid-1964, as well as general patterns of 
mobilisation throughout 1965, contributed to a general climate of instability which 
created the conditions for the coup of 1966.
Labour activism during this period was apparently intended to demonstrate 
the weakness of the Illia government to the military, and to highlight the
• • • • 90advantages for political order of allowing Peronist electoral participation. In
doing so, however, the unions underestimated the anti-Peronist orientation of the
Armed Forces, and were unlikely ever to have won the political game they were
attempting to play. As noted above, the pattern of military intervention suggests
that even the threat of Peronist electoral success was sufficient to prompt a military
reaction. The provincial elections of 1965 demonstrated clearly that the Radical
party was still unable to compete electorally with the Peronists, and suggested to
the Armed Forces that potential Peronist success in presidential elections could
11
only be avoided by the elimination of Peronism from the political landscape. 
Although there is a suggestion that the perception of threat was significantly 
exaggerated32, this was the basis on which General Juan Ongania came to power in 
1966.
Ongania, the 1966/7 Crisis and the Revival o f Peronism
We have seen, then, that since 1946 macroeconomic consistency and 
policy-making coherence were systematically undermined by political pressures 
stemming from the entrenchment of societal interests and the polarisation of 
interest and class politics. The most sustained attempt at rectifying this pattern 
occurred under the Ongania dictatorship of 1966-70. This was the first attempt in 
the post-war period to ‘depoliticise’ economic policy-making and to privilege
28 Guillermo O’Donnell: Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in Comparative 
Perspective (1988), pg 42.
29 James: op. cit., pg 183.
30 O’Donnell: op.cit., pg 43.
31 ibid., pg 51.
32 George Philip: The Military in South American Politics (1985), pg 249.
49
technical expertise as the basis of the policy-making process. The success of the 
economic strategy, therefore, was seen to depend fundamentally on the removal of 
such obstacles to the essentially ‘technical’ task of economic policy formulation 
and management.33 This was also the first instance of an authoritarian regime 
which aimed to centralise state power and use it to attack the unions and working 
classes.34
Economic policy emphasised the completion of the industrialisation project 
through the manipulation of income distribution and relative prices, with greater 
importance attached than previously to the private sector and multinationals.35 This 
was not, however, a free-market strategy. Economy Minister Adalbert Krieger 
Vasena did not share Alsogaray’s belief in the market as the vehicle for promoting 
efficient industrialisation, but rather emphasised state planning and regulation in 
the pursuit of growth and the reduction of inflation. In addition, the economic 
strategy aimed to achieve an extensive redistribution of resources from domestic to 
foreign investors (through a lowering of tariff and other barriers and an increase in 
the incentives for foreign investment), and from workers and the agrarian sector to 
urban employers.36
The economic strategy announced in March 1967 involved a tight 
monetarist stabilisation plan which entailed wage controls, fiscal restraint, credit 
restriction and a 40% devaluation of the currency. In addition, the package 
involved a significant reduction in import duties, the liberalisation of the foreign 
currency market, the suspension of collective bargaining, and a price agreement 
with industrial firms in exchange for access to credit and state contracts.37 This was 
supplemented several days later by the announcement of a stand-by agreement with 
the IMF and several other lines of international credit. The rationalisation of the 
state sector involved the removal of subsidies to regional governments and 
transportation, the reduction in the size of government bureaucracy, and the 
reduction of the protection available to small and medium sized businesses. The 
reform of the state was clearly fundamental to the strategy of depoliticising the
33 O’Donnell: op.cit., pp. 75-6.
34 James: op.cit., pg 218.
35 Wynia: Argentina in the Postwar Era, pg 167.
36 James: op.cit., pg 217.
37 O’Donnell: op.cit., pp. 85-6.
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economy and the task of economic management, in the same way as the free 
market strategies of the 1970s and 1990s.
The positive initial results of the programme, especially with regard to 
growth figures, inflation, and the foreign exchange and fiscal situations, did not 
hide its more compromising effects on agriculture and the export sector. The 
government evidently expected that the details of the economic plan would serve 
several political purposes simultaneously: the subordination of the popular sector 
and the agrarian bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the cooptation of the workers
-JO
through the maintenance of low food prices on the other. However, the economic 
orientation failed to achieve support from influential interests, despite the fact that 
the coup had been backed by both economic liberals and the CGT, which hoped to 
achieve a kind of ‘Peronism without Peron’. Although the labour movement was 
significantly weakened as a result of the undermining of its bargaining power, there 
was fierce opposition to this ‘denationalisation’ of industry and to associated cuts 
in government spending, as well as the repression of wages which affected income 
distribution. In February 1967, the CGT’s ‘Plan of Action’ demanded wage and 
salary increases and greater possibilities for political participation in the decision­
making process, as well as calls for mobilisation and strike action.40 These 
measures were repressed by the military on anti-subversive grounds. Similarly, 
opposition emerged after the first couple of years from business, rural landowners 
and regional entrepreneurs whose position deteriorated relative to industrial and 
financial interests.41
The result of this and opposition to the authoritarian and repressive nature 
of the regime was the Cordobazo uprising of 28-29 May 1969, which started as 
student protest action and grew into strikes and bloody rioting. The Cordobazo 
destroyed the confidence of the upper bourgeoisie which had been the 
government’s only pillar of support, as a result of the manifest failure of the 
Ongania administration to maintain political order.42 The consequent political
38 ibid., pg 121.
39 Philip: op.cit., pg 249.
40 O’Donnell: op.cit., pg 79. The major strike action of February 1967, however, failed miserably 
and greatly strengthened the government’s hand in terms o f its economic policy agenda. See Philip: 
op.cit., pg 252.
41 James: op.cit., pg 221.
42 O’Donnell: op.cit., pg 168.
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instability also undermined investor confidence and led to increasing economic 
difficulties. Krieger Vasena was dismissed and replaced by an economic team less 
openly favourable to foreign investors. The Ongania administration, then, is a 
particularly good example of the subordination of economic policy to politics. The 
Cordobazo had very little to do with economic performance: Table 2.1 shows that 
GDP in 1969 registered one of the highest growth rates in the post-war period 
(8.6%), and inflation one of the lowest (7.6%). Rather, the events of the Cordobazo 
responded to the political exclusion of Peronism from electoral competition since 
195 5.43
The collapse of this particular authoritarian interlude in 1973 (after the 
periods in office of Generals Levingston and Lanusse) relate, as before, to the 
failure to find an acceptable means of incorporating social sectors into the political 
system. It is perhaps the case that Ongania fell into the typical military trap of 
assuming governance to be simply a technical matter in which politics could be 
relegated or eliminated: particularly in view of the complexity and sophistication of 
Argentine political society, the emphasis on the technical aspects of economic 
policy-making was simply too limited.44 The emergence of terrorist activity in the 
late 1960s is one manifestation of the resurgent political pressure. The resulting 
levels of instability affected economic performance and the external credibility of 
the Argentine economy, feeding into the cyclical pattern of crisis. In essence, by 
1973 the economic problems were largely the same as those which had faced 
Aramburu in 1955 and Frondizi in 1958, and the political problems constituted a 
vicious cycle which neither democratic nor authoritarian governments had been 
able to break.
The military’s response to such persistent political tensions, exacerbated by 
new forms of violent conflict, was to allow Juan Peron to return from exile and 
begin a second period in office. In the interests of re-establishing political order 
and reducing labour unrest, Peron’s initial approach rested on a ‘social pact’ which 
aimed to bring inflation under control and revive productivity through wage and
43 Adolfo Canitrot: “Crisis and Transformation o f the Argentine State (1978-1992)”, in William C. 
Smith, Carlos H. Acuna & Eduardo A. Gamarra (eds.): Democracy, Markets and Structural Reform in 
Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico (1993), pg 76.
44 Philip: op.cit., pg 255.
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price freezes agreed with business and the unions.45 The aim, in sum, was to stem 
the “inter-sectorial bickering” and the hostility between capital and labour46 
Worker unrest was expected to diminish with the full-scale incorporation of the 
CGT into the political process. Basic labour legislation remained largely intact, but 
the capacities of the CGT were greatly enhanced vis-a-vis the state and local 
unions, and the monopolies of the unions over their economic sectors were 
strengthened.47 Similarly, Peronist domination of the labour sector was 
consolidated even further, and labour leaders held significant government positions 
in the 1973-4 period. However, the new government failed to realise that many 
unions and other labour groups had moved away from the CGT during Peron’s 
time in exile, and the Peronist Youth, particularly, had become accustomed to 
revolutionary militancy.48 As a result, the early part of the second Peronist 
government had little political success in stemming labour unrest or terrorist 
violence.
The politically-inspired economic policies pursued during this first year 
also failed to achieve the stabilisation of the economy. Despite early improvements 
in employment figures, inflation, growth figures and the external situation, the 
expansion of the money supply was creating inflationary pressures and the 
economy showed clear signs of overheating, exacerbated by the oil shock of 
1973.49 After Peron’s death in July 1974, the new president Isabel Peron ended the 
Social Pact which in any case had started to crumble, and the renegotiation of 
wages prompted an open confrontation with the unions. The alliance with labour 
was shattered by the conservative orientation of Isabel Peron’s policies and the 
1975-6 period was dominated by increasing levels of activism and protest from the 
bulwark of the Peronist support base, which were violently repressed. Economic 
policy was dominated by a freeze on wages and prices that deterred investment and 
a fixed exchange rate that led to an overvaluation of the currency, economic
45 Lewis, pg419.
46 Guido Di Telia: “Argentina’s Economy under a Labour-Based Government, 1973-1976” in Di 
Telia & Dombusch (eds.), pg 217.
47 Paul W. Drake: Labor Movements and Dictatorships: The Southern Cone in Comparative 
Perspective (1996), pg 155.
48 Wynia: Argentina: Illusions and Realities, pg 75; Lewis, pp. 418-9.
49 Guido Di Telia: “The Economic Policies of Argentina’s Labour-Based Government (1973-6) in 
Rosemary Thorp & Laurence Whitehead (eds.): Inflation and Stabilization in Latin America (1979), 
pp. 190-1.
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overheating and foreign exchange shortages. In an attempt at a ‘do-it-yourself 
adjustment under Economy Minister Rodrigo in 1975, the currency was devalued 
by 50%, which led to a doubling of the exchange rate and a three-fold increase in 
petrol prices. Inflation rose from 67.7% in the year to May 1975 to 87.7% by May 
1976. The economic crisis was such that the government was forced to negotiate a 
stabilisation agreement with the IMF in early 1976, which constituted a reversal of 
its traditionally nationalist position. Isabel Peron was overthrown by a military 
coup in March.
Military Dictatorship, 1976-82
The most sustained attempt after Ongania to break the cyclical pattern of 
crisis occurred under the military government of 1976-82, with the ‘Process of 
National Reorganisation’. The link between the economic and political projects in 
the ‘Proceso’ goes to the heart of the problems of the post-war period. The 
economic crisis was seen to be a direct result of the social and sectoral conflicts 
that led to a situation of ungovernability. The military’s virulent anti-Peronism was 
justified on the grounds that the spiral of economic and political instability was a 
direct consequence of the changes implemented by the first Peronist government in 
1946-55. Specifically, the problems of the preceding decades were attributed to the 
excessive role of the state in the economy and the distortion of domestic prices as a 
result of the industrialisation policy, both of which were consequences of Peronist 
strategy in the 1940s and 1950s.50 The industrialisation drive furthermore had 
created a polarised social and civil environment characterised by militant unions 
and a huge state bureaucracy.
The adoption of liberal economic policies, therefore, was intended not only 
to eliminate the distortions in the national economy through market-oriented 
reform but also to eliminate the political problems attributed to Peronism. Apart 
from the colossal physical repression of Peronist opposition, in which thousands of 
people were killed or ‘disappeared’, tortured, incarcerated or kidnapped, this was
50 Adolfo Canitrot: “La Disciplina como Objetivo de la Polltica Econdmica: Un Ensayo sobre el 
Programa Economico del Gobiemo Argentino desde 1976”, Desarrollo Economico 76, 19, Jan- 
March 1980 (pg 453).
54
attempted through the elimination of the economic arena in which Peronist and 
associated political interests functioned. A reduction in the size and role of the 
state, therefore, served both economic and political goals. However, despite this 
opposition to Peronism there remained significant dialogue between the military 
government and the unions, which stemmed in part from a long-standing 
endeavour by elements in both camps to reconstruct the coalition between the state, 
the military and the unions that had existed under the first Peronist administration 
in the 1940s.51
The economic programme of the 1976-80 period was the first attempt in 
post-war Argentina to effect a fundamental change in the pattern of capital 
accumulation, and the first to demonstrate a genuine commitment to market- 
oriented reform. The first phase of ‘orthodox stabilisation’ from April 1976 to May 
1977 was supported by a substantial inflow of foreign funds following the 
negotiation of a stand-by agreement with the IMF. Policy measures included the 
implementation of foreign investment legislation, wage controls and the freeing of 
prices, which together led to an improvement in Argentina’s external situation (in 
conjunction with the renegotiation of the foreign debt) although inflation remained 
bothersome. Major financial reform followed from June 1977 to April 1978, the 
implications of which generated the ‘20 December Plan’ of 1978, which 
constituted an attempt to use foreign competition to stabilise domestic inflation. 
This involved commercial liberalisation, the shift of public finance from the 
Argentine Central Bank (BCRA) to internal and external capital markets, and the 
adoption of an exchange table (tablita). The fixing of the exchange rate at a level 
significantly below inflation was intended to generate stability and investor 
confidence, and to influence internal price levels so that domestic and international 
prices would converge.53
The economic reasons for the eventual failure of Economy Minister 
Martinez de Hoz’s policy package are several. On the one hand, the counter-
51 Drake, pg 164.
52 Following the stand-by, $1 billion was granted to Argentina by a consortium o f Japanese, US and 
European banks. See William C. Smith: “Reflections on the Political Economy o f Authoritarian 
Rule and Capitalist Reorganization in Contemporary Argentina” in Philip O’Brien & Paul Cammack 
(eds.): Generals in Retreat: The Crisis o f Military Rule in Latin America (1985), footnote 38.
53 Smith: Authoritarianism, pg 241.
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inflationary effort was pursued at the cost of an overvaluation of 50%, which in 
turn hurt the liberalisation component of the economic strategy. The overvaluation 
was also generated by the failure of the military government to make the drastic 
reductions in state spending necessary for addressing the fiscal problem: levels of 
state ownership and government expenditure actually increased during the Proceso, 
particularly in areas of industrial promotion and military budgets, together with the 
acquisition of key enterprises such as Fabricaciones Militares. The agricultural bias 
of commercial policy, as well as the liberalisation of the economy, led to a 
sustained process of de-industrialisation: industrial production declined by more 
than 25% between 1976 and 1980. The labour force, for its part, was reduced by 
26%.54 In any event, the liberalisation programme was never successfully 
implemented (in 1981, the highest tariff rate was still 55%), the current account 
slipped from a surplus of $2 billion in 1978 to a deficit of $5.7 billion in 1981, and 
the balance of trade registered a deficit of $2.23 billion in 1980 after a $2.34 billion 
surplus in 1978. Capital flight was endemic by the early 1980s as a result of the 
collapse of the banking sector in March 1980.55 The foreign debt rose from $8 
billion in 1975 to $27 billion in 1980 and $45 billion by late 1983.
The failure of the project of the Proceso was linked more generally to the 
subordination of economic policy to strategic / military concerns, and also, more 
importantly, to the unravelling of the initial support coalition it constructed.56 This 
was compounded by extremely high levels of factional disunity within the military 
institution, which complicated the generation of consensus both within the ruling 
elite as well as outside it.57 As economic difficulties compelled adjustments in the 
economic policy orientation, the support of the Argentine Rural Society (SRA) and 
the financial community (to whose interests the financial reform of 1977 had 
responded) began to dwindle, and with it the militaiy’s only sources of societal 
legitimacy.
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The Alfonsin Administration and the Economic Crisis of 1988-9
The most pressing objectives for the incoming civilian government in 1983, 
therefore, were the stabilisation and adjustment of the economy and the 
normalisation of Argentina’s external position. During the first part of the 1980s, 
the government proposed simultaneously to reactivate the economy, eliminate 
inflation and increase real wages. As such, the strategy was a largely sui generis 
attempt to address the problem of inflation (running at 343.8% in 1983) without 
fiscal restructuring, to instigate a policy of redistribution rather than structural 
reform on the assumption that growth would resume as a result of reactivated 
domestic demand, and to adopt a confrontational stance vis-a-vis external creditors 
in the expectation that their concern for the maintenance of democracy would 
compel special treatment.58 The poor performance of the economy from 1983-5, 
however, reflects a general underestimation of the severity of the economic crisis59, 
on the part of the government and of societal actors that were not inclined at this 
stage to tolerate the costs of harsh adjustment measures. Business groups were 
opposed the general orientation of the Alfonsin government’s economic strategy. 
The failure of the government’s plans for labour reform in 1984 combined with 
poor economic performance in the first couple of years provoked significant 
opposition to the Radical administration from the labour sector, which may well 
have been expected in light of its traditional allegiance to the PJ. The consequent 
decision to postpone initiatives on labour legislation and the resort to legal 
mechanisms established during the Proceso to set prices and salaries strengthened 
the unions to the extent that the leadership felt able to launch a concerted campaign 
of opposition.60
The appointment of Juan Sourrouille as Economy Minister in February 
1985 led to a change in this economic strategy with the announcement of the
58 Roberto Bouzas: “M&s AIM de la Estabilizacidn y la Reforma: Un Ensayo sobre la Economia 
Argentina a Comienzos de los 90”, Desarrollo Economico 33, 129, April-June 1993 (pg 9).
59 Jose Luis Machinea: “Stabilisation under Alfonsin” in Colin M. Lewis & Nissa Torrents (eds.): 
Argentina in the Crisis Years (1983-1990): From Alfonsin to Menem (1993), pgs 124 & 127.
60 Carlos H. Acuna: “Politics and Economics in the Argentina o f the Nineties (Or, Why the future no 
longer is what it used to be)” in William C. Smith, Carlos H. Acuna & Eduardo A. Gamarra (eds.): 
Democracy, Markets and Structural Reform in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico (1994), pp. 32-3.
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Austral Plan in June. This was a heterodox economic plan that aimed to control 
inflation and stabilise the external sector. Effectively, the shock treatment aimed to 
force socio-economic actors to redefine their expectations and generate credibility for 
the government both internally and externally.61 After early positive results, and the 
implementation of the second phase in February 1987, a combination of structural 
difficulties associated with the reform programme, an increasingly unfavourable 
international environment (especially with regard to agricultural prices) and political 
factors led to the re-emergence of economic imbalances and the Austral Plan quickly 
ran out of steam. The recession generated by falling inflation levels and the impact 
of the wage freeze on incomes led to increased labour activism and a spate of 
industrial action.
These early difficulties of the Alfonsin administration stemmed largely from 
societal reactions to economic instability (in the form of a loss of confidence in the 
government) and to the frustration of the high expectations that inevitably accompany 
a transition to democracy. Former President Alfonsin insists on the point about 
unsustainable expectations, although he maintains that these did not have a
ff)significant impact on policy choice. In fact, the government’s emphasis on 
building relations with key societal interests, and its need for the support of both 
business and labour, were not matched by any significant concessions to societal 
input into the decision-making process. For example, after a series of lukewarm 
efforts to negotiate a general ‘social pact’ with the unions, from May 1986 the 
Sourrouille team started to bypass the CGT in favour of bargaining directly with
61 Acufia: op.cit., pp. 33-4. For a full account of the Austral Plan, see William C. Smith: 
“Hyperinflation, Macroeconomic Instability, and Neoliberal Restructuring in Democratic 
Argentina” in Edward C. Epstein (ed.): The New Argentine Democracy: The Search for a 
Successful Formula (1992), pp. 27-32; Luigi Manzetti & Marco Dell’Aquila: “Economic 
Stabilisation in Argentina: The Austral Plan”, Journal o f  Latin American Studies 20, 1, 1988; and 
Roberto Bouzas & Saul Keifman: “Argentine Export Promotion Policies: An Overview o f the 1976- 
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the heads of key industrial federations, in the interests of stemming wage
64pressures.
Despite considerable scepticism from the private sector throughout the 
period, the Austral Plan garnered tentative initial support from business but 
outspoken opposition from labour. Hostile reactions to continued austerity 
measures, falling wage levels, rising unemployment, recession in the agricultural 
sector and the government’s failure to take a hard line with the unions, by 1987 had 
engendered opposition from both labour and capital, agricultural groups and the 
Argentine Industrial Union (UIA). Furthermore, the political wings of the Radical 
administration were leaning on the technocratic economic team as a result of the 
political backlash from the Austral plan and subsequent economic policies.65 These 
tensions were exacerbated by the coincidence of the Austral Plan announcement 
with the start of judicial proceedings against members of the Armed Forces 
associated with human rights violations.
The situation in late 1986 and early 1987 reflected the reconsideration of 
government policy. It appeared that the government had recognised its earlier 
underestimation of the severity of the crisis, and the new emphasis on liberalisation 
and state reform constituted an attempt to rectify the consequent failure of 
economic policy. The problem was that the government had considerably eroded 
the political capital it possessed in 1983 as a result of the transition to democracy, 
and growing societal opposition even at this stage significantly reduced the 
feasibility of successfully implementing the new set of policy goals.66 In addition, 
political developments contributed to the general impression of government 
weakness: the military’s Easter uprising of 1987, and the appointments of a union 
leader as Labour Minister and a representative of the SRA as Agriculture Secretary 
appeared to contradict the ‘new’ orientation of economic policy.67 Put together, 
these created an impression of political vulnerability, in which the government was 
seen to be capitulating to the demands and preferences organised interests.
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Attempts were made to deepen and reinforce the process of structural 
adjustment throughout 1987, particularly with the ‘July Plan’, in the shadow of the 
1987 elections in which the government lost its majority in the Chamber of Deputies 
and control of several provincial governments. Despite the government's assurances 
throughout June and July of the following year that it was not preparing a new anti- 
inflationary 'shock' programme68, in August 1988 the ‘Spring Plan’ (Plan Primavera) 
was implemented as a last-ditch attempt to shore up political capital and to secure the 
financial support of international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank.69 
It involved an agreement with the UIA and the Argentine Chamber of Commerce, 
both of which were concerned that an economic crisis would result in the presidential
nr\
election of a Peronist candidate. However, the condemnation of the Plan from all of 
the major agricultural groupings (including the SRA) was almost immediate, and
71soon accompanied by opposition from industrial interests.
The failure of the Spring Plan and the continuing economic instability, as 
well as the persistence of inflation, led to the virtually complete withdrawal of 
support by all economic (and political) sectors by late 1988. This was exacerbated 
by expectations of greater pressures on wages and the intensification of the 
presidential election campaigns, in which candidate Menem was making reference to
79a possible moratorium on the external debt and the salariazo. The ensuing political 
and economic crisis, characterised most notably by the return of hyperinflation, 
necessitated the resignation of Sourrouille on 31 March 1989, along with the BCRA 
President Jose Luis Machinea, Treasury Secretary Mario Brodersohn, Economic 
Coordination Secretary Adolfo Canitrot and Domestic Trade Secretary Carlos 
Bonvecchi.73 Sourrouille was replaced by Juan Carlos Pugliese, who was in turn 
replaced in June by Jesus Rodriguez after waves of rioting and looting in various 
parts of the country, in response to which the government declared a state of siege.74
68 Latin America Weekly Report, 2 June 1988.
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On 31 May, Alfonsin and President-elect Menem issued a joint communique after a 
secret meeting, in which Menem agreed to the establishment of joint UCR-Peronist 
commissions to work on reformulating the 1989 budget (giving greater attention to 
social issues), sending a delegation to the United States to discuss the debt situation 
and designating representatives in all areas of government to facilitate the changeover 
of government.75 This was followed by a surprise announcement (even to Menem) of 
Alfonsin’s intention to leave the presidency on 30 June rather than in November.
The crisis of the late 1980s was characterised principally by an acute foreign 
exchange shortage and hyperinflation caused by macroeconomic imbalances, 
accompanied by a fall of around 20% in per capita income and a reduction in 
domestic investment of around 50%.76 In addition, in the light of fears of a default on 
the foreign debt, capital flight accelerated, along with an increase in tax evasion that 
exacerbated the problem of deteriorating revenues. The crisis has been attributed to
77three trends that characterised the Argentine economy in the 1980s. The first was 
the consolidation of an inflationary economy, characterised not only by persistent 
increases in price indexes, but also by a “set of formal and informal institutional 
arrangements which aimed to equip private sector activity to a highly uncertain and 
unstable environment”. Second, the collapse of the financial system at the start of the 
decade produced a marked reduction of internal financial intermediation and a 
notable dollarisation of significant parts of the private sector. Third, the external debt 
accumulated in the late 1970s drastically altered the structure of external accounts, 
and net outflows of funds created a persistent current account deficit. Moreover, the 
economy became more vulnerable to external shocks such as rises in interest rates, 
and participation in international markets was thus constrained. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union, after a steady decline in its importance as a market for Argentine 
exports, exacerbated these difficulties in the external sector. Moreover, the fiscal 
deficit, which presented the most apparently intractable problem for the Alfonsin 
government, was never low enough (with the exception of the first year of the Austral
7 0
Plan) to sustain the stabilisation of the economy. This may be traced to a
75 ibid.
76 Bouzas: “M&s A11&”, pg 3.
77 ibid.
78 Machinea, pg 131.
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conjunction of political factors, dominated by a concern for the survival of 
democracy.
On the political front, the end of the decade was characterised by a general 
mobilisation on the part of formerly corporatist political interests. These included a 
series of military uprisings (such as the La Tablada incident) in protest at the 
Alfonsin administration’s attempts to try officers responsible for human rights 
abuses under the military government and later at the pervasive economic crisis. 
Labour activism increased, particularly from 1986, in the form of frequent general 
and partial strikes. Between 1983 and 1989, there were a total of 13 general strikes 
and 72 sectoral strikes. If the number of participants in the latter are added 
together, these sectoral strikes would constitute over 50 general strikes over a six- 
year period.79 Business registered its opposition through the usual mechanisms of 
sending capital abroad and decreasing investment levels in the economy. The 
regional electoral successes of the PJ throughout 1987 and 1988 contributed to an 
overall climate of instability and frustration, and fed into the spiral of economic 
decline which ended in hyperinflation and the collapse of the government in 1989.
With each failure of stabilisation under Alfonsin, public confidence in the 
government was eroded further. As such, this was something of a vicious circle in 
which a failure to stabilise threatened economic development, but the failure of 
stabilisation, which can be attributed largely to political constraints on addressing 
the fiscal issue, generated exactly the same loss of legitimacy. The economic 
consequences of the repeated failures, furthermore - such as a lower demand for 
money and diminishing opportunities to finance the deficit in the domestic capital 
market - fed back into the loop and made stabilisation dependent on an even lower 
fiscal deficit, which in turn was made unfeasible by the government’s loss of 
credibility.80
79 Interview with Julio Godio, Buenos Aires, 26 May 1997. For a full analysis o f labour relations 
under the Alfonsin government, see James W. McGuire: “Union Political Tactics and Democratic 
Consolidation in Alfonsln’s Argentina”, Latin American Research Review 27, 1, 1992.
80 Machinea, pg 131.
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Patterns of Crisis and Reform in Argentina
The above analysis has demonstrated, then, that the recurrent crises in the 
Argentine political economy stemmed largely from a blend of political difficulties 
which led to the relegation of macroeconomic consistency in favour of short-term 
political gain. This approach to politics was prompted, on one level, by the chronic 
insecurity of tenure in office and the constant threat of military take-over, which 
created a situation in which short-term political capital was far more important than 
long-term development strategy. The consequences for inflation (in the economic 
sphere) and also for the belligerence of societal interests (in the political sphere) 
follow a predictable pattern of generation and regeneration, and have been 
highlighted throughout the above discussion. Both of these in turn weaken the 
legitimacy of governments and further exacerbate the same insecurity of tenure in 
office. As such, Argentine political and economic history can be described as a 
sequence of ever-decreasing circles in which governments are consistently unable 
to balance political and economic imperatives. Those which concentrate on the 
pacification of societal demands create economic crisis, and those which attempt to 
concentrate on the implementation of an economic strategy incur political crisis.
The lesson is one which the Menem administration managed to learn quite 
well. The twists and turns taken by policy reform efforts in post-war Argentina 
stem largely from attempts to divert or neutralise political opposition to economic 
policy in a situation of weak governmental legitimacy. This lack of legitimacy 
applies to governments of all colours in this period, and stems largely from sharp 
divisions in the power bases or ‘constituencies’ represented by the main political 
protagonists. Peronism’s support base was clearly much more firmly established 
than either the military’s or the Radical Party’s. The Peronist alliance was 
dominated by organised labour (principally under the umbrella of the CGT), small 
and medium sized business sectors and industry (represented by the General 
Economic Confederation (CGE)), with tangential support from large industry (the 
UIA) and major agriculture in rural areas (the SRA). The military, on the other 
hand, was closely linked to multinational finance and agricultural export sectors. 
Organised support for the Radical Party (UCR) was always relatively weak, and
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there was no sector that traditionally has offered the sort of unconditional political 
commitment that the PJ received from the labour sector.81 The result, predictably, 
was a political economy characterised by a high level of union militancy, a 
stalemate between capital and labour, and the extreme politicisation of the Armed 
Forces. These tensions and conflicts, furthermore, were enacted in a context of 
corporatism, in which the government itself established the pattern of political 
relations which created the situation of political and economic ungovernability.
The result of these patterns was open confrontation between different 
societal groups and between government (or state) and society. From the 1940s no 
single economic grouping was able to achieve sustained access to political power, 
which had the additional effect of undermining the possibilities for unity within 
these groupings.82 Furthermore, no government after 1955 was able to absorb the 
electoral strength of Peronism. The experiences of the second Peronist 
government in 1973-6 demonstrate that the relations of the labour sector with even 
Peronist administrations were often tense or uneasy, and these were exacerbated by 
ideological conflicts within and between the unions. Similarly, the industrialisation 
biases of the 1946-76 period in Argentina generated hostility to government policy 
from the economically and politically disempowered agricultural sectors, and also 
rivalry with industrial sectors for resources and political influence. Fragmentation 
even existed between industrial sectors, especially between those that utilised 
foreign sources of capital and those that were oriented towards domestic 
production and investment. It may well be the case that the consequent weaknesses 
of these societal interests played a large part in determining the repeated failure of 
attempts at social pacts between government, business and labour.
In sum, the hyper-politicised state bequeathed by the Peronist government 
of 1946-55 was not adequate to the task of either economic or political governance. 
This was demonstrated in its inability to direct or control the corporatist system of 
interest representation, and in the constant undermining of economic development 
as a result of political instability and the impact on prices of the excessive
81 Epstein: “Recent Stabilization Programs”, pg 992.
82 Colin M. Lewis: “Cycles and Macroeconomic Policy since the 1930s” in Lewis & Torrents (eds.), 
pg 113.
83 O’Donnell: op.cit., pg 43.
84 Lewis, pg 115.
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commercial protection demanded by these interests. The result was a spiral of 
recurrent economic crisis, which usually led to military intervention, and hence to 
recurrent political crisis. The period from the mid-1950s to the time of the 
military’s intervention in 1976 was characterised principally by stop-go growth 
cycles in the economy with consistently high levels of inflation, and in the political 
sphere by an astonishingly high turnover of governments. The expansionary phases 
in the economy were associated usually with the democratic interludes, while the 
restrictive policies that followed were typically implemented by military 
governments that were less compelled to be responsive to hyperactive political 
interests.
As a result, the predominance of inflation in the Argentine economy can be
Of
explained with reference to a process by which “inflation replaced politics” as the 
state resorted to inflationary policies of transfers of income between sectors as a 
means of resolving societal conflict. Democratic governments concerned with 
political survival were most likely to implement expansionary policies that were 
inherently inflationary. The other feature of this situation concerned the inadequate 
tax system, the implication of which was a huge gap between the state’s ability to 
extract resources from society and its contractual obligations to various societal 
sectors. From there stemmed recurrent fiscal problems and the pattern of 
development based on the maintenance of high deficits, high levels of indebtedness 
and problems with inflation as a result of the expansion of the monetary base.
This ‘culture of inflation’ exacerbated the short-termism mentioned earlier 
on the part both of government policy-makers and society at large. This in turn 
created high levels of “distributional conflict” in which all groups in society were 
pursuing short-term pay-offs in the expectation that inflation would remain high.87 
The distributional conflict, therefore, is characterised by a situation in which a 
government attempting to implement a stabilisation programme during a situation 
of economic crisis or stagnation would necessarily have to engage in zero-sum 
payoffs and impose income losses on labour, sectors of the middle classes and the 
weaker business sectors. These conditions would be exacerbated by a reduction in
85 Palermo & Novaro, pg 40.
86 ibid., pg 42.
87 Smith: “Democracy, Distributional Conflicts”, pg 4.
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the collective wealth of the society which imposes negative-sum payoffs in the 
process of adjustment.88
These tensions characterised the Alfonsin government throughout the 
1980s. Apart from political opposition to government policy, this featured an 
enduring opposition between labour and business sectors, which resisted overtures
• O Q  #
from the latter towards the construction of some kind of social pact. At the time 
of the announcement of the Spring Plan, the economic team were blunt in their 
attribution of the economic difficulties to Argentine civil society. Furthermore, in 
1989 the interim Economy Minister Rodriguez stated that the ‘definancing’ of the 
Argentine economy was due principally to the situation of political fragility 
throughout the period.90 However, the problem can be better formulated in terms of 
the government’s limited political capacity to implement its policies and to achieve 
respect for these from society and societal interests.91
Put together with the military unrest of 1987 and 1988, the crisis can be 
seen in two ways: first, as the culmination of the process of economic decline 
characterised by recurrent inflation and fiscal collapse, and second, as the 
culmination of the type of political society and interest group politics constructed 
by Peronism and maintained throughout the post-war period. As such, therefore, 
we can see the crisis of the late 1980s as representing the exhaustion of both the 
economic model that dominated the preceding 40 years, and the political structure 
of Argentina characterised by a hyperactive state and a corporatist system of 
interest representation.
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated both the cyclical nature of post-war 
development in Argentina, and the essentially interconnected nature of the political 
and economic trajectories. As Paul Lewis summarises neatly, “the political and 
economic systems are like two connected wheels that rotate together with a certain
88 ibid., pp. 4-5.
89 Jesus Rodriguez: “Agosto ‘89”, mimeo, Buenos Aires, 1989 (pg 11).
90 ibid.
91 Graciela Ducatenzeiler & Philip Oxhom: “Democracia, Autoritarismo y el Problema de la 
Gobemabilidad en America Latina”, Desarrollo Economico 34, 133, April-June 1994 (pg 45).
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degree of predictability”.92 The cycles can be defined according to a number of 
different parameters: growth, inflation, foreign exchange bottlenecks and military 
intervention in politics are some of the possibilities. These trends in the Argentine 
political economy led most analysts and observers to be pessimistic about the 
prospects for resolving the perpetual propensity towards crisis. Numerous statements 
to the effect of “even under an authoritarian regime, a strategy of transformation 
based upon market mechanisms is bound to face insurmountable opposition in
QO #
Argentina” give a good impression of the ways in which the pattern of crisis and 
reform was perceived to be institutionalised and intractable. There was no reason to 
assume in 1989 that the experience of the incoming Menem government would be 
any different.
At face value, therefore, the implementation of reform in the 1989-91 
period is not particularly surprising as a response to the severity of the economic 
crisis and the collapse of the state in 1988-9. The consolidation of Menem’s reform 
effort through the first part of the 1990s, on the other hand, is rather more 
surprising. Rather than collapsing under its own weight as a result of political 
pressures, the outcome of reform in the 1990s was the consolidation of a neoliberal 
economic model which has remained intact despite the recent emergence of serious 
opposition parties in Argentina. Although the political orientation of the Menem 
administration is the foundation of these new opposition currents, the economic 
model is rarely questioned. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 argue that this can be traced 
directly to new international currents which allowed for a sustained and durable 
process of reform in Argentina. The following two chapters, by way of preface to 
this analysis, are concerned with the nature of economic and political reform under 
Menem, and the ways in which these processes led to a rupture with the pattern of 
crisis and reform discussed above.
92 op.cit., pg 502.
93 L. Beccaria & R. Carciofi: “The Recent Experience of Stabilising and Opening Up the 
Argentinian Economy”, Cambridge Journal o f  Economics 6, 1982 (pg 163).
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Chapter 3
‘Surgery Without Anaesthetic’: Economic Reform under Menem
The recurrent crises of the post-war period point to two principal problems 
in the Argentine economy. The first is one of economic (mis)management, and 
relates to flaws in policy choice as well as problems of economic governance 
created by the political difficulties outlined in the previous chapter. Essentially, the 
politics of economic management in Argentina frustrated possibilities for coherent 
macroeconomic policy and created a situation in which long-term development 
strategy was subordinated to short-term considerations dictated by the pervasive 
threat of military take-over. The second is a growth problem, characterised by 
persistent economic stagnation. This may be attributed reasonably to a crisis in the 
export economy. The inward-looking orientation of post-war economic policy 
resulted in the neglect and underdevelopment of the external sector, as well as 
Argentina’s relative isolation from the international economy. In the 1980s, this 
was exacerbated by the closing of international markets in the aftermath of the 
Falklands War and the collapse of the alternative market - the Soviet Union - 
towards the end of the decade.
This and the next chapter are concerned with outlining the nature of 
Menem’s economic and political strategies, and therefore with addressing the ways 
in which Menem apparently rectified both of these problems in the political 
economy of his country. This two-fold classification of the difficulties of the 
Argentine economy also sheds further empirical light on the more theoretical 
arguments advanced in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. The issue of management was 
addressed largely through the establishment of closer relations with the IMF, and 
the adoption of the political and economic measures required to comply with the 
conditionality provisions. The growth issue ties in with the discussion of 
regionalisation. If the stagnation of the Argentine economy can be related primarily 
to the poor functioning of the export economy, the development of the Southern 
Cone Common Market (Mercosur) is obviously a means by which this particular 
bottle-neck can be resolved. These arguments will be expanded in the relevant 
chapters.
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The specific economic achievements of the Menem government, in the light 
of the recurrent characteristics of post-war development, can be identified as the 
following. First, throughout the post-war period economic policies associated with 
anti-inflationary strategies necessarily conflicted with any possibilities for genuine 
or sustained growth. Similarly, the macroeconomic imbalances created by the 
persistence of inflation complicated the implementation of coherent growth 
strategies. The Menem government, on the other hand, managed to combine low 
inflation with relatively high growth levels, thus eliminating the traditional trade­
off between these two economic goals. This is illustrated in Table 3.1 below. 
Second, the economic strategy was the first to achieve the full-scale reform of the 
state, principally through policies of privatisation, deregulation and administrative 
reform, which had the effect of eliminating the inefficiencies and fiscal burdens 
associated with an inflated public sector. This also had a significant political 
dimension, in that the depoliticisation of the economy was closely linked to the 
reform of the state and the consequent removal of the arena in which 
socioeconomic interests could actively press their demands. Third, the Menem 
government is associated with the only successful liberalisation of the economy in 
the post-war period, based on an opening to international markets and a process of 
internal deregulation.
Table 3.1: Percentage Change of Real GDP and Consumer Prices, 1988-1995
Year GDP Growth Rates Consumer Prices
1988 -1.9 343.0
1989 -6.1 3079.0
1990 0.0 1343.9
1991 8.8 84.0
1992 8.6 17.5
1993 6.1 7.4
1994 7.4 3.9
1995 -4.4 1.6
Sources: United Nations Economic Survey o f  Latin America and the Caribbean, various numbers; 
Statistical Abstract o f  Latin America, various numbers
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For the purposes of the present chapter, the chronology of reform under 
Menem is particularly important for fleshing out the central research question: how 
sustained and consolidated reform became possible in Argentina. The process of 
economic reform can be divided into two periods: from 1989-1991, and from 
1991/2 to the end of the first Menem administration in 1995. The evidence 
suggests that the first ‘implementation’ phase showed signs of repeating the pattern 
that had been established over previous decades, with the resurgence of 
hyperinflation in 1990 and the emergence of serious questions about the fate of the 
government. The implementation of the Convertibility Plan in 1991, after the 
appointment of Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo, constituted the start of the 
second ‘consolidation’ phase in which the Argentine economy was genuinely 
stabilised and restructured. As such, the chronological analysis of reform suggests a 
reversal of the usual outcome of reform efforts in the post-war period, and the 
consequent installation of a “neoliberal revolution” in Argentina.1 This chapter, 
therefore, aims to trace the development of economic policy under Menem and to 
highlight the issue of the chronological sequence of reform, as well as the nature of 
the strategies pursued in both of the phases.
1989-91: Implementation of Reform and Resurgence of Hyperinflation
The economic policy trajectory of the Menem government was somewhat 
bumpy from 1989 until the appointment of Domingo Cavallo as Economy Minister 
in March 1991. This can be attributed in part to the often incoherent and inefficient 
implementation of policy as a result of significant power struggles in the executive 
branch. Nevertheless, the government’s commitment to neoliberal reform was 
manifest and remained intact during the first two years of the administration. The 
response of successive economic teams to the resurgence of inflation or the prospect
1 Carlos H. Acufla: “Politics and Economics in the Argentina o f the Nineties (Or, Why the future no 
longer is what it used to be)” in William C. Smith, Carlos H. Acufia & Eduardo A. Gamarra (eds.): 
Democracy, Markets and Structural Reform in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico (1994), pg 31.
2 See, for example: “Menem troubled by cabinet infighting”, Latin American Regional Reports - 
Southern Cone, 21 December 1989; “Argentina’s Peronists facing a split”, Latin American 
Regional Reports - Southern Cone, 13 September 1990 .
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of renewed economic collapse was to progressively accelerate the liberalisation of the 
economy. Paradoxically perhaps, the neoliberal policy orientation was sustained and 
deepened through the 1989-91 period, largely in response to the emergence of 
difficulties with it. As the next chapter demonstrates in more detail, this period was 
also associated with a progressive centralisation of power which aimed to remove the 
political obstacles to the economic reform agenda.
In the context of severe economic crisis and political collapse, the new 
government of Carlos Menem that took power on 8 July 1989 had two principal 
economic policy goals: to eliminate hyperinflation (running at 5000%) through an 
improvement of the fiscal situation and to undertake a far-reaching reform of the 
state, including a programme of extensive privatisation, with the aim of improving 
efficiency and coherence. These goals were formulated on the basis of a number of 
assumptions concerning the economic mechanisms by which the crisis of the late 
1980s had been produced: (i) the role of state regulation of the economy in producing 
persistent economic stagnation; (ii) the role of consequent macroeconomic instability 
in creating inflationary crises, rising levels of external indebtedness and pressure on 
the exchange rate; (iii) the consequent absence of available funds for investment 
which led to low overall productivity levels; and (iv) the resulting maintenance of a 
relatively closed economy which prevented improvements in efficiency by protecting 
domestic industries from outside competition.
In a swift reversal of populist election promises, therefore, the government 
adopted a neo-liberal set of economic policies in line with the so-called ‘Washington 
Consensus’ that emphasised stabilisation, adjustment and liberalisation. This was 
accompanied by an active foreign policy that aimed to mend fences with international 
creditors, establish strong global trading links and restore political relations with 
countries such as Great Britain and the United States. The new policy direction was 
notable for its relegation of the public sector as the motor of development in favour 
of private investment, and also for the central importance accorded to the agricultural 
sector. More specifically, the economic package emphasised deregulation and 
privatisation, tax and monetary reform, exchange rate stabilisation, the long-term
3 For classic statements of the Washington Consensus, see John Williamson (ed.): Latin American 
Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (1990), and The Political Economy o f Policy Reform (1994).
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renegotiation of the foreign debt, and the continuation of trade and industrialisation 
policies in the interests of supporting price stability and renewed economic growth.
A number of stabilisation plans were implemented in quite rapid succession 
during the first two years of the Menem administration, which contributed to the 
impression of a rather ad hoc decision-making process. The first, the Plan Bunge y  
Born (or Plan BB") was announced in July 1989 by former Bunge & Bom vice- 
president and new Economy Minster Manuel Roig, and implemented following his 
sudden death by Nestor Rapanelli. The Plan BB constituted a fairly run-of-the-mill 
series of stabilisation measures with the full support of the IMF, World Bank and 
United States government. Its overall aim was to initiate a process of economic 
restructuring which emphasised deregulation, privatisation and fiscal discipline 
through the achievement of increased external competitiveness and the capitalisation 
of the foreign debt.4 The currency was devalued by 53.6% and rates for public goods 
and services raised. In addition, and in the interests of stabilising inflation and 
improving the fiscal situation, Rapanelli negotiated an agreement on prices with the 
business sector (specifically with 350 ‘price-forming’ companies) in which the latter 
agreed to moderate future price increases in return for assurances from the 
government that interest rates would be lowered and that changes to the exchange 
rate and public sector tariffs would be delayed until March 1990.5
The process of economic restructuring was facilitated by two major pieces of 
‘omnibus’ legislation enacted by decree in August 1989, with the support of both 
Chambers of Congress. The Reform of the State Law (no. 23,696) and the 
Emergency Economic Law (LEE) (no. 23.697) prepared the ground for the 
privatisation process and eliminated government policies that were seen to cosset key 
economic actors such as industrial promotion subsidies. The LEE also laid the 
ground for trade policy reform, particularly the elimination of import restrictions and
4 William C. Smith: “State, Market and Neoliberalism in Post-Transition Argentina: The Menem 
Experiment”, Journal o f  Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 33,4, Winter 1991 (pg 54).
5 Smith: “State, Market”, pg 53; Felipe A.M. de la Baize: “Reforma y Crecimiento en la Argentina” in 
De la Baize (ed.): Reformay Convergencia: Ensayos sobre la Transformacion de la Economla 
Argentina (1993), pg 61.
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export taxes.6 As such, both pieces of legislation constituted a direct hit on die model 
of “government-assisted capitalism” that had dominated the post-war period.
The stabilisation of the economy in the early 1990s was reflected in the 
behaviour of the real exchange rate, which fell from its highest level in the 
hyperinflationary episode of May 1989 to its lowest level in late 1990. When the 
Menem government came to power in 1989, the economy was characterised by high 
levels of capital flight generated by a perception that a change in the exchange rate
o
policy regime was both imminent and necessary. In the three months from 6 
February 1989 to the presidential elections in May, the exchange rate structure was 
amended three times. In December 1989 the difficulties encountered in the 
stabilisation of the economy, as well as the 50% gap between the free and official 
exchange rates, prompted the government to attempt to reverse the decline with the 
adoption of a fixed rate. This was abandoned a few days thereafter and replaced with 
a free and floating exchange rate system under which the various different rates were 
unified, accompanied by the elimination of nearly all existing price controls. Towards 
the end of December, however, rumours of the complete 'dollarisation' of the 
economy were gaining ground.9 In the first two months of 1990, the continued climb 
of the currency against the dollar prompted the government's advisor on foreign debt, 
Alvaro Alsogaray, to admit the possibility on 23 February that the government would 
allow the free circulation of foreign currencies in the domestic market.10 Although 
the policy goal of achieving a completely free foreign exchange market was not 
realised, this switch in exchange rate policy should be seen as fundamentally a move 
away from the previously consistent use of the exchange rate as an instrument of 
stabilisation towards a greater emphasis on fiscal and monetary discipline.11
Despite strong support for the Menem government, particularly from the 
capitalist classes, as a result of the positive initial results of the neoliberal policy 
agenda, in November 1989 a fall in the supply of dollars resulted from exporters’
6 For a full breakdown of the provisions o f both Laws, see Ministerio de Economia: Argentina: A 
Growing Nation (1995), pp. 4-12 & 34-5.
7 Pablo Gerchunoff & Juan Carlos Torre: “La Politica de Liberalizacidn Econdmica en la 
Administracidn de Menem”, Desarrollo Economico 36, 143, Oct-Dec 1996 (pg 736).
8 United Nations: Economic Survey o f  Latin America and the Caribbean 1989, pp. 171-4.
9 “Menem weathers end-year storm”, Latin American Regional Reports - Southern Cone, 8 February
1990.
10 Latin American Regional Reports - Southern Cone, 15 March 1990.
11 GATT: Argentina 1992, Vol 1, pg 73.
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opposition to the frozen exchange rate. Disputes within government circles led to a 
spate of resignations, including the President of the Central Bank. The Plan BB II 
was implemented in December 1989 following a burst of inflation as a result of low 
confidence in the government’s ability to maintain the exchange rate. This second 
stabilisation plan represented a significant departure in many respects from the 
original economic programme, and involved a 34.7% devaluation of the currency, the 
splitting of the foreign exchange market into official and free markets, sharp 
increases in public sector prices and 10% reduction in import tariffs, along with
19increases in fuel prices and export taxes. Generally, economic strategy up to this 
point had failed both to stem inflationary pressures and also, more fundamentally, to 
satisfy demands from economic interests for economic restructuring and genuine
13adjustment.
The forced resignation of Rapanelli and his replacement by Antonio Erman 
Gonzalez later in December 1989 brought about a renewal of the liberalising bent of 
government policy, expressed in Menem’s advocation of ‘surgery without 
anaesthetic’ in order to stem the ‘terminal disease’ of the Argentine economy. Most 
of the emergency measures implemented in the Plan BB II were reversed. The 
renewed approach quickly ran into trouble as firms raised their prices, and led to 
another devaluation of the currency and a consequent resurgence of inflation in that 
month. In response, the Bonex Plan (decree no. 36/90) was announced on 1 January 
1990, which required the conversion of fixed term deposits into ten-year dollar- 
denominated government bonds. This created a severe contraction in liquidity, in turn 
leading to a deepening of the existing recession without the intended stabilisation of 
the currency, and to an eventual suspension of IMF funds. Capital flight in mid-1990 
exacerbated the situation and led to a resurgence of hyperinflation.
In response, in March 1990 Gonzalez announced a major fiscal reform 
programme (.Erman III-IV) in order principally to regain market confidence, but the 
economy continued to contract in 1990 despite progress on the inflation front and an 
improvement in the external accounts. The latter, once again, was principally 
attributable to the climate of “hyper-recession”14 in which depressed domestic
12 Smith: “State, Market”; Acuna: op.cit., pg 41.
13 De la Baize: “Reforma y Crecimiento”, pg 62.
14 Smith: “State, Market”, pp. 59-61.
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demand led to an overall trade surplus, in addition to the effect of overvaluation on 
the export sector. Throughout this period social disturbances created serious political 
problems for the government - the so-called ‘food riots’ reflected those of May 
198915, and coincided with an atmosphere of ‘coup-mongering’ which put in 
question the survival of the President.16 At the end of late 1990, a burst of central 
bank lending to the provinces and the social security system generated a resurgence
17of hyperinflation in the early months of 1991.
This brief overview of the 1989-91 period demonstrates the clear (and 
strengthening) commitment of the government to neoliberal reform, but also its 
inability to stem the persistent recurrence of inflation. Generally, the 1989-91 period 
bears the hallmarks of a transition period, in which the economic (and political) 
conditions necessary for the success of the reform agenda were being created. As 
such, this period has the impression of a certain level of political and economic 
instability, which by 1991 was expressed in concern about the stubbornness of 
inflation and the survival of the President himself. What is clear, however, is that the 
only apparently consistent thread in this period was a general adherence to a broad 
conception of neoliberal reform, and an impression of continuity with the general 
patterns of post-war development. At the end of the 1990s it was far from clear that 
Menem’s reform effort was going to last, much less work, and this was reflected in a 
generalised instability in the political sphere as well as the economic arena with the 
resurgence of hyperinflation.
1991-95: Consolidation of Neoliberal Reform
After the shaky results associated with what we have identified as the 
‘implementation’ phase of reform in 1989-91, the appointment of Domingo Cavallo 
as Economy Minister in February 1991 marked the turning point in economic policy 
in the first Menem administration. The resulting ‘Argentine miracle’, in which
15 See Duncan Green: Silent Revolution: The Rise o f  Market Economics in Latin America (1995), 
pp. 165-72; Latin American Regional Reports - Southern Cone, 15 March 1990.
16 “Coup-mongering spells danger for Menem in crisis-ridden Argentina”, Latin American Regional 
Reports - Southern Cone, 8 February 1990; “Rumour mills busy with talk o f coups as Menem’s allies 
start to decamp”, Latin American Regional Reports - Southern Cone, 19 April 1990; “Seineldin 
arrested for planning coup”, Latin American Regional Reports - Southern Cone, 22 November 1990.
17 William R. Cline: International Debt Reexamined (1995), pg 311.
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inflation was all but eliminated, led to renewed electoral successes for the PJ, and 
Menem’s re-election in 1995. The bulk of economic restructuring was achieved 
during this second period, after the stabilisation of the economy resulting from the 
Convertibility Plan (law no. 23928) announced by Cavallo on 1 April. This was the 
centrepiece of the reform agenda.
The Convertibility Plan
Convertibility was both a response to fiscal problems in early 1991 that 
threatened currency stability and to the steady appreciation of the austral in 1990-1. It 
was also a genuine attempt to achieve the policy goal of stabilising the currency in 
the interests of maximising trade and investment opportunities. The Convertibility 
Law established the full convertibility of the Argentine currency (still at that stage the 
austral) with the US dollar, within the range of 9,500-10,000 australs to the dollar. 
This was later modified with the reintroduction of the peso from 1 January 1992 that 
was fixed on a 1:1 parity with the dollar as a means of consolidating full 
convertibility and the harmonisation of domestic and external prices. Second, the 
Convertibility Plan stipulated that the monetary base must be backed fully by 
available reserves of gold and hard currency. This mandatory dollar backing for the 
currency meant that the government was no longer at liberty to print money to cover 
deficits, and the discretionary powers of the BCRA were significantly constrained. In 
effect, the fixing of the exchange rate system under which fluctuations in the money 
supply would be linked to the balance of payments consolidated the trend mentioned 
earlier towards the use of the exchange rate as an instrument of fiscal and monetary 
discipline instead of as an instrument of stabilisation. By effectively eliminating the 
role played by the exchange rate in determining the vulnerability of economic sectors 
to pressures from outside competition, the government's policy aimed to emphasise 
costs and productivity as the keys to competitiveness. By maintaining parity with a 
cheap dollar, the task of import liberalisation was greatly assisted although 
predictably the export sector was affected negatively.
The key issue determining this shift in exchange rate policy was a recognition 
of the pressing need for stability, especially in view of the unpredictable policies
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pursued during the 1980s. With structural adjustment and trade liberalisation, 
exchange rate stability assumed an added importance relating to the competitiveness 
of Argentine products in international markets and to foreign investment flows, 
particularly with the privatisation drive of the 1990s. To this effect, Cavallo declared 
at the announcement of the Plan that “there will be no more alchemy”, and that
1 ftArgentina was entering a new phase “in which all rules point to stability”. As such, 
the exchange rate can be seen to act as the pivot between various elements of 
economic policy reform, most notably price stabilisation, trade liberalisation, foreign 
investment policy and privatisation.
In light of the interconnected nature of these policy priorities, the 
Convertibility Plan was conceived also as a broader package of policy measures, 
which related to both fiscal discipline and to creating the political conditions 
necessary for the implementation of economic reform. As a result, the Convertibility 
Plan aimed simultaneously to address the two principal problems in the Argentine 
political economy identified at the start of this chapter as relating to growth and 
economic management. Its principal contribution to the elimination of the cyclical 
process of crisis and reform identified in Chapter 2 was the simultaneous defeat of 
inflation and the maintenance of growth (as illustrated in Table 3.1 above). It also 
became identified with the consolidation of the neoliberal restructuring of the 
economy. The economic aspects of these integral policy prescriptions emphasised the 
continuation of liberalisation, reform of the state (through privatisation, deregulation 
and administrative reform), and the renegotiation of the foreign debt (through 
agreements with the IMF and a debt reduction agreement under the Brady Plan. 
These will be discussed in turn.
Trade Reform and Economic Liberalisation
The Menem government aimed to implement an extensive programme of 
import liberalisation in order to increase efficiency levels through increased 
competition, and to adjust the balance of payments difficulties experienced at the end 
of the 1980s. After a series of abortive attempts at trade liberalisation under the
18 Latin American Regional Reports - Southern Cone, 25 April 1991.
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Austral and Spring Plans during the 1980s, in mid-1989 the average tariff was 39% 
including a tariff surcharge if 15% on all imports.19 By 1993, the average tariff had 
fallen to 12%, with a maximum tariff of 35% as opposed to 50% in 1989.20 Table 3.2 
shows the sequence of reforms implemented between October 1989 and the 
announcement in April 1991 of trade policy changes associated with the 
Convertibility Plan. Other non-tariff liberalisation measures included changes to the 
legal requirements which allowed for automatic imports of goods previously 
requiring a ‘Sworn Declaration of the Need to Import’ (DJNI) and the automatic 
processing of around 734 tariff positions (Decree No. 2226/90 and Resolution 330/89 
respectively).21
Table 3.2: Import Tariff Reform, 1989-1991
Date Tariff Reform Measures
October 1989 Maintenance of maximum tariff rate of 40%, with range of 
intermediate levels from 10-38%.
Gradual elimination (between 10 October 1989 and July 1990) of 20% 
duty imposed on all imports in May 1989.
December 1989 Reduction of maximum tariff to 30%, with range of intermediate 
levels from 5-28%.
January 1990 Reduction of maximum tariff to 24%, with range of intermediate 
levels from 5-20%.
March 1990 Disinvocation of GATT Article XVELB which allowed for 
imposition of import restrictions in response to balance of payments 
difficulties.
April 1990 Retention of maximum tariff at 24%, with increases of between 2% 
and 5% on all other levels.
December 1990 Establishment of single tariff rate at 22%.
April 1991 Announcement of the Convertibility Plan and associated tariff 
reforms: three-tier structure (22%, 11% and 0%)
Source: own elaboration based on GATT: Argentina 1992: Trade Policy Review, Vol 1 -2.
19 Ministerio de Economia: Argentina: A Growing Nation, pg 45.
20 ibid., pg45.
21 GATT: Argentina 1992, Vol 1, pp. 92-3; United Nations: Economic Survey o f  Latin America and 
the Caribbean 1993 (vol. 1), pg 131. The DJNI was replaced by a registry o f imports that was to be 
used solely for statistical purposes.
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The Convertibility Plan marked a key departure in trade policy, and also the 
process of liberalising the Argentine economy. The adoption of the three-tier tariff 
structure marked the start of full-scale liberalisation after a faltering start in 1989-91. 
The new tariff structure (of 22%, 11% and 0% for finished goods, intermediate goods 
and inputs, and raw materials or food products respectively) replaced the previous 
six-tier tariff in force since the late 1980s, and eliminated licensing requirements on 
all but 25 imports (principally automobiles and parts).22 Furthermore, it classified 
import duties according to the value of the product and the existence of competing 
domestic industries, and established a simple weighted average tariff rate of 9.7%, 
effectively reducing by more than 50% the average rate in 1989. This was one of the 
lowest average tariff rates in the developing world and also compared favourably 
with some of the developed countries 23 However, in late 1991 the three-tier structure 
was modified to 22%, 13% and 5% in order to reduce the spread of tariffs. These 
minor reforms led to an overall increase in the average tariff to 12.2% between April 
1991 and early 1992 24 In addition, this round of reforms made significant strides in 
the elimination of export duties, as part of the attempt to rectify the anti-agriculture 
bias in the external sector.
These tariff reforms were supplemented by administrative reforms that aimed 
to simplify import and export procedures26 The Economic Deregulation Decree 
(DDE) (no. 2284/91) enacted on 31 October 1991 as one of Menem’s ‘mega-decrees’ 
aimed to promote internal and external trade through deregulation of markets and 
simplification of the tax system, and was intended both to extend the process of 
structural transformation introduced by the LEE and the Reform of the State and to
22 An additional tariff rate of 35% still existed and was applied to some electronic items and motor 
vehicles. The only exception to the process of import liberalisation was the adoption o f a special 
regime for the automotive sector.
23 See GATT: Argentina 1992 (Vol. 1), pg 89; Mario Damill & Saul Keifman: “Trade Liberalization in 
a High-Inflation Economy: Argentina, 1989-91” in Manuel R. Agosin & Diana Tussie (eds.): Trade 
and Growth: New Dilemmas in Trade Policy (1993), pg 274.
24 United Nations: Economic Survey o f  Latin America and the Caribbean 1991 (Vol. l) ,p g  131.
25 There remained some relatively insignificant export and import duties after the implementation o f  
this reform, namely: the National Export Promotion Fund (FOPEX), the National Merchant Marine 
Fund, the Statistical Duly, the contribution to the National Agricultural Technology Institute (INTA), 
and the Tax on foreign exchange transactions (Law 18.526) o f 0.4% for trade-related transactions. 
Report o f the Argentine Government to the GATT Trade Policy Review o f Argentina, 4-5 March 
1992. Printed in GATT: Argentina 1992, Vol 2 (pg 34).
26 For a full analysis o f the administrative structures o f external trade, see chapters in Felipe A.M. de 
la Baize (ed.): El Comercio Exterior Argentino en la Decada de 1990 (1991), pp. 193-218.
79
further the insertion of the Argentine economy in the international trading system. In 
effect, in Cavallo’s words, the package was intended to “clear the decks for the
•  •  •  m _ .private sector” to enable it to show its “entrepreneurial and creative spirit”. The 
provisions of the Decree allowed for the elimination of quantitative restrictions 
(QRs) and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade, the rationalisation of inspection and 
customs procedures, and the elimination of the 0.4% tax on foreign exchange 
transactions relating to trade.28 In addition, in 1992 the Government was in the 
process of elaborating a new Foreign Trade Law which would be submitted to 
Congress as the replacement for the 1984 Foreign Trade Law (no. 23,101). The new 
Law aimed to simplify the existing system for the purposes of introducing greater 
transparency and competitiveness into international operations.29
From 1991, the general orientation of commercial policy remained largely 
intact. Those policy measures that were implemented were largely ad hoc and 
temporary, often in response to unforeseen difficulties in the economy. More 
importantly, the Convertibility provisions were creating a not entirely unexpected 
overvaluation of the currency which, along with increases in cheaper Brazilian 
imports, were seen to necessitate some minor adjustments to the trade policy regime. 
In the October 1992 reform package, the average level of reimbursements for 
exporters was raised from 3.3% to 6.3%, which eliminated a substantial part of the 
anti-export bias in the economy. The tariff structure was also modified to 20%, 
10% and 0%, along with an ‘temporary’ increase in the ‘statistical tax’ applied to all 
merchandise imports from 3% to 10%. This was reflected in the exchange rate, but
*X 1did not have a significant impact on imports. These policy measures were a 
response principally to the possibility that 1992 would register the first trade deficit 
since 1981, due to an increase of around 60% in imports, and were largely seen as a 
response to pressure from exporters and industrialists both to offset the impact of
• *X0imports and to make exports more competitive.
27 “Menem slashes red tape”, Latin American Regional Reports - Southern Cone, 21 November
1991.
28 Report of the Argentine Government to the GATT Trade Policy Review, pp. 81-84.
29 Report o f the Argentine Government to the GATT Trade Policy Review, pg 22.
30 Ministerio de Economia: Argentina: A Growing Nation, pg 45.
31 United Nations: Economic Survey o f Latin America and the Caribbean 1992, Vol. 1, pg 137.
32 “Cavallo acts to reverse imbalance”, Latin American Regional Reports - Southern Cone, 19 
November 1992.
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From 1993 onwards (as Chapter 5 shows) the record is slightly mixed, with 
increased resort to anti-dumping measures (mainly on textiles and iron and steel 
products) and specific duties (principally on imports of textiles and clothing 
products) offset by a further reduction in duties on imports of machinery and selected 
industrial inputs, and a reduction in the 10% statistical duty.33 As a result of these 
measures, by the end of 1993 the average nominal protection had increased to 18.6%, 
or double the rate at the time of the implementation of the Convertibility Plan.34 On 
the other hand, duties on imports of inputs were reduced to 0%, along with the 
elimination of all duties and statistical taxes on imports of capital goods. Tariffs and 
duties on imports of capital goods were eliminated in May 1993, but raised to 10% in 
March 1995 in response to the difficulties created by the Mexican peso crisis 
discussed below. Trade policy from 1991, however, was kept on an even keel by the 
establishment of the Mercosur, which made alterations to the fundamentals of policy 
increasingly difficult. As Chapter 7 discusses in greater detail, from January 1995 the 
Argentine tariff structure was changed to conform with the common external tariff of 
the Mercosur, the 10% statistical tax was eliminated and the effective tariff rate fell 
from 12.8% in 1994 to 9.2% for the first half of 1995.
The Foreign Investment Regime and the Privatisation Process
As mentioned earlier, the bulk of the Argentine restructuring programme was 
implemented from April 1991 onwards. Although the privatisation process began 
earlier, the resurgence of foreign direct investment (FDI) since 1991 gave an added 
impetus to the process which is noted for its rapidity. Specifically, the renewed 
capital inflows can be attributed to the following changes in circumstances and
33 United Nations: Economic Survey o f  Latin America and the Caribbean 1993, Vol. 1, pg 153 & Vol. 
2, pp. 13-4.
34 Diana Tussie (with Fernanda Tuozzo): “Argentina’s Big Bang Reform: the Interplay o f  MDBs 
and Domestic Actors”, mimeo, Buenos Aires, October 1997 (pg 15).
35 Manuel R. Agosin & Ricardo Fffench-Davis: “Trade Liberalization in Latin America”, CEPAL 
Review 50, August 1993 (pg 44) and “Trade Liberalization and Growth: Recent Experiences in Latin 
America”, Journal o f  Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 37, 3, Fall 1995 (pg 13). For other 
comparative studies see Manuel S&nchez et al: “A Comparison of Privatization Experiences: Chile, 
Mexico, Colombia and Argentina” in Manuel Sanchez & Rossana Corona (eds.): Privatization in Latin 
America (1993), pg 9; Pablo L. Gerchunoff: “The Accelerating Pace of Privatization in Latin America: 
Argentina” in Paul H. Boeker (ed.): Latin America's Turnaround: Privatization, Foreign Investment 
and Growth (1993), pg 18.
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policy: (a) special incentives or systems for foreign investment generally and for 
enterprises operating in specific sectors; (b) economic and political stability, and 
stability in policies governing the activities of transnational corporations; (c) 
attractive Latin American domestic markets; (d) the improved outlook for regional
• 'X f i  .1 •  •integration; and (e) the opportunity to export to developed countries. This increase 
has been concentrated in a handful of countries - Argentina, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico and Venezuela. For Argentina, furthermore, capital inflows were essential 
for the functioning of the Convertibility Plan (through the maintenance of the 
monetary base) and for the financing of an $8 billion budget deficit. The foreign 
investment funds were readily available. Table 3.3 indicates the scale of the increase 
in investment funds channelled to Argentina.
Table 3.3: Net Direct Foreign Investment to Argentina, 1990-1995
(millions of US$)
1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
678 1,836 2,439 4,179 6,305 1,200 3,900
Source: United Nations Economic Survey o f  Latin America and the Caribbean, 1995-96
The change in investor confidence in the early 1990s can be attributed 
principally to three factors: increased macroeconomic stability as a result of 
liberalisation and reform measures; changes in the foreign investment laws; and the 
privatisation process conducted on terms favourable to foreign capital. The first of 
these factors is widely recognised. The attractiveness of investment destinations is 
generally conditioned by the overall orientation of economic strategy and an 
environment of macroeconomic stability, which is usually linked to conditions of 
political stability. A logical concomitant of macroeconomic stability for foreign 
investors is policy consistency, and thus the expectation that there will be no sudden 
changes in policy or law is usually pivotal. However, the domestic implications of
36 A more technical consideration o f the factors influencing FDI movements can be found in United 
Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC): The Determinants o f  Foreign Direct 
Investment: A Survey o f  the Evidence (1992). Also see Carlo Secchi: “Factors Influencing Private 
Investment in Argentina” in Colin I. Bradford (ed.): Mobilising International Investment fo r Latin 
America (1993), especially pp. 180-3.
37 UNCTC: op.cit.,pg 61.
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macroeconomic stability are equally important, and relate to the avoidance of capital 
flight that usually responds to fears of unexpected devaluation or a collapse in the 
financial system.38 For this reason, the external and domestic credibility of exchange 
rate policies is of prime importance. The issues of credibility, the constraints on 
macroeconomic policy options, and the importance of international investor 
confidence are addressed in more detail in the context of globalisation in Chapter 5.
Second, the legal framework that currently regulates FDI has been operational 
since the mid-1970s. Changes under the LEE lifted the requirements of prior 
authorisation for foreign investment in all sectors except national defence, energy, the 
media, education, insurance and finance. A parallel overhaul was implemented in 
conjunction with the Reform of the State, in which the launch of the privatisation 
process allowed for the participation of foreign capital in the electricity, gas, 
telecommunications, postal services and sanitation sectors. The process of 
deregulation and state reform was further boosted on 31 October 1991 with the DDE 
which eliminated most of the restrictions and regulations that were still in place after 
several decades of interventionist state economic policies.39 This followed the 
announcement in mid-October of the Plan Argentina which lifted restrictions on 
domestic and foreign private participation in the oil sector. Further legislation 
included the Tax ‘Amnesty’ Law (no. 24,073) of April 1992, supplemented by 
financial reform measures such as the Central Bank Law of September 1992 which 
established its independence and introduced policies aimed at greater fiscal 
discipline.40 All of these changes were consolidated in the 1993 Foreign Investment 
Law, under which all restrictions on profit remittances and capital repatriation were 
eliminated, and foreign interests were permitted to participate in exploration and 
extraction of oil and gas. As a result of this cumulative legislation, by 1993 the only 
areas of restricted access for FDI were broadcasting and atomic energy 41
38 For an interesting account o f the macroeconomic implications o f capital flight, see Rudiger 
Dombusch: Capital Flight: Theory, Measurement and Policy Issues (1990). Also Manuel Pastor: 
“Capital Flight from Latin America”, World Development 18,1,1990.
39 Latin American Regional Reports - Southern Cone, 21 November 1991.
40 Josd Maria Fanelli & Mario Damill: “External Capital Flows to Argentina” in Jos6 Antonio Ocampo 
& Roberto Steiner (eds.): Foreign Capital in Latin America (1994), pp. 37-39.
41 Daniel Chudnovsky, Andr6s L6pez & Fernando Porta: “New Foreign Direct Investment in 
Argentina: Privatization, the Domestic Market and Regional Integration” in Manuel Agosin (ed.): 
Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America (1995), pp. 43-4.
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Third and most importantly, the privatisation process was the bedrock of the 
reform of the state mentioned at the start of this chapter as one of the principal 
achievements of the Menem government, which is closely linked to the management 
problem in Argentina. The bloated and inefficient public sector, as well as the 
politicisation of the state and economy, constituted a significant brake on 
governments’ capacity for coherent macroeconomic policy-making and the consistent 
implementation of policy objectives. Table 3.4 indicates the major privatisations in 
the early to mid-1990s.
Table 3.4: Principal Privatisations in Argentina
Sector / Enterprise Date Form of Transfer Total
Revenues
(millions
ofUS$)
Debt
Redeemed
(millions 
of US$)
ENTel (telecommunications) 1990 Sale of shares (60%) 3527.9 5000
Aerolineas Argentinas 1990 Sale (85%) 1198.0 1610
Highways 1990 Concession
TV & Radio 1990 Concession
YPF (oil) 1990- Concession
Joint venture 2040.6
Sale of shares 3924 1271.1
Petrochemicals 1990-2 Sale of shares 82.8 139.7
Railroads 1991-3 Concession
SEGBA (electricity) 1992 Sale 3953.6 3706.6
Ports 1992 Sale / concession 13.6
Gas del Estado 1992 Sale 2951.1 3082.1
Obras Sanitarias 1992 30 yrs concession
(waterworks)
Steel 1992 Sale 165.4 41.8
Source: own elaboration from various sources
With the authority of the LEE and the Reform of the State law, the most 
important 'strategic' sectors that underwent privatisation in 1990 included the 
Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTel, the state telecommunications 
company), the national airline Aerolineas Argentinas, and some oil fields owned by 
the state oil company Yacimentos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF). Between 1991 and 
1993, further legislation allowed for the final count of privatised sectors to include
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television and radio stations, oil reserves, the electricity sector, Gas del Estado, Obras 
Sanitarias de la Nation (the Buenos Aires waterworks), national highways, Servicios 
Electricos del Gran Buenos Aires (Segba, electricity), the hydrocarbon sector, 
Ferrocarriles Argentinos (the national rail system), the Buenos Aires subway, ports, 
the water supply, mail services, shipping, the National Savings and Insurance Bank, 
petrochemical and steel plants, and various defence-related industries.42
In the early 1990s the privatisation process (regulated by the capitalisation of 
the external debt) was the principal mechanism by which investment was attracted to 
Argentina. Around 75% of FDI flows between 1990 and 1995 were associated with 
the purchase of interests in privatised enterprises or with subsequent (re)investments 
in these holdings 43 In the mid-1990s, foreign interests accounted for around half of 
the total shares owned by the private sector. As Table 3.4 demonstrates, apart from 
the sizeable increase in volume the profile of FDI flows to Argentina has shifted 
away from an emphasis on the manufacturing sector in the 1970s and 1980s towards 
a concentration in non-tradable public services such as telecommunications, 
electricity, water and gas (with the exception of privatisations in the petroleum and 
petrochemical sectors).44
A brief profile of the investors in some of these sectors gives a clear idea of 
the extent of foreign participation in the privatisation process. In the case of ENTel, 
the offer of 60% controlling interests to purchasers, and the placement of 30% on the 
Argentine and international stock markets, were particularly important in attracting 
FDI. Consortia headed by Telefonica Espanola and STET/France Telecom (after the 
withdrawal of Bell Atlantic) were awarded the contracts for service in the southern 
and northern areas respectively. Aerolineas Argentinas was purchased by a Spanish- 
Argentine consortium led by Spanish airline Iberia, and in the sales of the largest 
electricity companies, SEGBA and Agua y Energia, foreign investment accounted for
42 For more detailed analysis o f the privatisations of key sectors, see World Bank: Argentina’s 
Privatization Process: Experience, Issues and Lessons (1993), pp. 2-3; Pablo GerchunofF & German 
Coloma: “Privatization in Argentina” in Sanchez & Corona (eds.), pp. 253-4; Pablo L. GerchunofF 
(ed.): Las Privatizaciones en la Argentina: Primera Etapa (1992); Ministerio de Economla: 
Privatization o f  Public Enterprises and Services in Argentina (1992), Argentina’s Privatization 
Programme (September 1992) and Argentina: A Growing Nation, pp. 49-74.
43 The figure for 1990-1992 (first 9 months) is around 30%, and 90% for the first three quarters of
1992. See Josd Antonio Ocampo & Roberto Steiner: “Foreign Capital in Latin America: An Overview” 
in Ocampo & Steiner (eds.), pg 10.
44 However, investments in key manufacturing activities increased again in the early 1990s as a result 
of favourable sectoral policies and the re-activation o f domestic demand.
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61% and around 65% respectively. Similarly in the privatisations of Gas del Estado 
and Obras Sanitarias, foreign investors accounted for 63.5% and 56% of shares 
respectively.
By the end of 1993, the process of privatisation was well-advanced: 
controlling interests in 57 companies had been transferred to the private sector, with 
27 public service companies transferred to concessionaires. With regard to the oil 
sector, nine joint venture agreements had been signed relating to primary oil fields 
formerly controlled by YPF, and 86 concession agreements were negotiated on the 
exploitation of marginal oil fields.45 According to figures released at the end of 
December 1993, the privatisation process had generated revenues of US$9.1 billion 
in cash, US$6.8 billion in debt paper at nominal value, and US$3.4 billion at market 
value 46 Significantly, the vast majority of purchases were made by consortia of 
foreign and Argentine firms, in which the former were seen as crucial for the transfer 
of experience and knowledge, particularly with regard to technology and 
management expertise. The composition of Argentine interests, on the other hand, 
reflected an deepening of the concentration of domestic market power among 
already-established business groups such as Techint and Perez Companc. This can be 
attributed to the relative inadequacy of domestic capital markets, especially in the 
early stages, although the fact that many of the privatisations were conducted on the 
Buenos Aires stock exchange contributed significantly to the expansion of the 
activities of these markets.47 By 1995, very few of the 93 major state enterprises that 
existed at the end of the 1980s remained in public hands. Those outstanding included 
the post office, the national mint, three nuclear power plants, two bi-national electric 
power projects and a handful of national banks. Virtually without exception the 
privatisations of these remaining sectors and enterprises were projected for the 
second Menem administration.
45 Santiago F. Albarracin & Stephen R. Dow: “Privatisation of the Argentine State-Owned Oil 
Company”, Journal o f  Energy and Natural Resources Law 13, 2, May 1995.
46 OECD: Privatisation in Asia, Europe and Latin America (1996), pgs 69 & 77.
47 Melissa H. Birch: “Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America during the 1990s” in Werner Baer & 
Melissa H. Birch (eds.): Privatization in Latin America: New Roles o f the Public and Private Sectors 
(1994), pg 104.
48 International Monetary Fund: “Argentina: Recent Economic Developments”, Staff Country 
Report 95/110, November 1995, pg 38.
86
Foreign Debt and the Brady Plan Agreement
The problem of addressing growth performance was complicated by the 
external debt situation. Debt payments involved an enormous transfer of resources 
that limited growth through a necessary suppression of import levels, which in turn 
hurt investment and exports. In addition, the fact that virtually all of the debt was 
public exacerbated fiscal imbalances by limiting the possibilities for spending in 
more productive areas of the economy, which in turn necessitated some recourse to 
inflationary tax and hindered private investment.49 The announcement of the Brady 
Plan in early 1989 constituted something of a departure in international debt policy. 
While the Baker Plan of 1986 had involved an increase in debtors’ obligations 
through the continued provision of fresh money by the commercial banks and an 
increase in the credits available from multilateral financing institutions, the Brady 
Plan, by contrast, was oriented towards debt reduction.50 Both, however, were 
premised on a continued adherence on the part of debtor countries to adjustment and 
structural reform programmes.51
On the strength of the policy reform programme and the Convertibility Plan, 
but after protracted negotiations, Argentina agreed a Brady Plan arrangement in April 
1992, signed in April 1993. At this time, the total external debt stood at around $60 
billion. The provisions of the agreement called for the conversion of $23 billion of 
this total debt in the form of long-term bank claims into ‘par bonds’ with reduced 
interest rates or ‘discount bonds’, reducing the face value by 35%. These bonds, 
according to the provisions of the Brady Plan, would be backed by guarantees 
partially financed by the IMF, World Bank and creditor governments.53 These 
reductions were supplemented by the debt-equity conversions involved in the 
privatisation process discussed above (and presented in Table 3.4), which amounted 
to some $6 billion. Although the prospects for a genuine reduction of debt levels
49 Saul Keifman: “Deuda Externa: Balance de la Gestidn Radical y Perspectivas para el Prdximo 
Gobiemo”, America Latina / International 6, 20, April-June 1989 (pg 248).
50 Keifinan, pg 248.
51 Stephan Haggard & Robert R. Kaufman: “Introduction: Institutions and Economic Adjustment” in 
Haggard & Kaufman (eds.): The Politics o f  Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, 
Distributive Conflicts, and the State (1992), pg 12.
52 William R. Cline: International Debt Reexamined (1995), pg 317.
53 Barbara Stallings: “International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilization and Structural 
Reform” in Haggard & Kaufman (eds.), pg 62.
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were open to question, the main advantages of the Brady Plan for Argentina related 
to the reduction of uncertainty and the increase in capital inflows which would stem 
from the consequent increase in investor confidence.54 This was particularly the case 
in view of the fact that Brady agreements required the parallel signing of an IMF 
agreement. In this case, the 1992 Extended Fund Facility agreement paved the way 
for agreements with the commercial banks, and associated links with the World Bank 
and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). These are discussed at greater length 
in Chapter 6. Table 3.5, in the meantime, gives an indication of Argentina’s external 
debt situation during the period in question.
Table 3.5: Total Disbursed External Debt
(balance at year’s end in millions of USS)
1982 1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
43,634 49,326 58,473 63,314 62,233 58,413 59,123 67,802 79,345 89,679
Source: UN ECLA: Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1996.
The Exhaustion of the Neoliberal Revolution?
To draw attention to the unique successes of the Convertibility Plan and 
adjustment under Menem is not to claim that the economy has been functioning 
perfectly ever since. There are clear problems associated with the currency board 
arrangements created by Convertibility, which generated an increasingly visible 
overvaluation of the currency towards the middle of the decade. Second, the 
Convertibility provisions limit the government’s ability to devalue the currency. The 
government has no choice but to implement spending cuts and other recessionary 
measures in order to address the fiscal deficit. Although this is entirely an intentional 
effect of Convertibility, and relates to the broader objectives of stabilisation and 
adjustment, the political consequences of a steady economic slow-down cannot be 
ignored. Third, the economy becomes more reliant on foreign capital in order to
54 Ricardo Echegaray: “El Transito de Argentina hacia el Plan Brady”, America L atina/ 
Internacional 9, 31, Jan-March 1992.
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finance the deficit and to meet foreign debt payments, in the absence of the monetary 
alternatives vetoed by the Convertibility Law. In other words, growth becomes 
dependent on external capital flows, especially in a situation where (as in Argentina) 
the local savings ratio is below the level of investment required for satisfactory 
economic performance. However, this situation also arises from the fact that since 
1989 (and probably earlier) Argentina has needed to be a net importer of capital in 
order to sustain a reasonably healthy growth rate.
In the light of such underlying structural constraints on Argentine economic 
development, the importance of Convertibility and the foreign investment policies 
introduced by Menem becomes clear. Apart from explicit policy measures to weaken 
the link between inflation and the exchange rate, the effect of external financial 
liberalisation has been particularly important. With the vast increase in the volume of 
capital flows in the 1990s, the exchange rate became dominated by these as opposed 
to the trade balance and global currency relationships.55 The significant increase in 
capital goods imports occasioned by the appreciation of the real exchange rate has 
highlighted the key issue of how to offset the vulnerability of the exchange rate to 
short-term capital flows, and hence facilitate the task of exchange rate policy 
management.56 The strategy traditionally adopted in Argentina, as we have seen, was 
to allow several different exchange rates to co-exist, differentiating between 
commercial and financial transactions, and hence between commercial and capital 
markets.57 However, it is generally accepted that in the longer term the tradable 
sector is likely to be most negatively affected by the above trends, thus contributing 
to the anti-export bias that paradoxically characterised the external sector until the 
mid-1990s.
This reliance on foreign capital does not present significant problems at a 
time when foreign funds are readily available, as in the 1991-94 period. However, as 
Chapter 5 demonstrates in detail, capital can flow out of a country quite as easily as it 
can flow in. Argentina experienced precisely this situation in 1994, as the inflow of 
funds slowed as a result of the overvaluation of the peso and an increase in US
55 For a more technical discussion of these links, see Yilmaz Akyuz: “Does Financial Liberalization 
Improve Trade Performance?” in Agosin & Tussie (eds.), pp. 152-8.
56 See Manuel R. Agosin: “Trade Policy Reform and Economic Performance: A Review o f the Issues 
and Some Preliminary Evidence”, UNCTAD Discussion Papers no. 41, August 1991, pp. 12-3.
57 Ocampo & Steiner: “Foreign Capital in Latin America”, pg 29.
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interest rates at the start of the year. Furthermore, the economy was beginning to 
struggle under the weight of huge current account deficits financed by these same 
sources of capital. The impact of the so-called ‘Tequila’ crisis of December 1994 was 
felt in volatile and sharply reduced international capital flows and increased capital 
flight. The consequent reduction in international reserves raised questions about the 
fate of the Convertibility Plan. In March 1995, continued turbulence in the stock 
markets raised fears of a banking crisis, especially given the uncertain fiscal 
environment.58 In the interests of regaining market confidence, the government 
announced a series of adjustment measures (which included a significant tax 
increase), accompanied by a new agreement with the IMF and other international 
financial institutions. Funds from these sources were used for debt repayments and 
the restructuring of the banking system in order to avoid a Mexican-style collapse. 
The largely positive effect on international confidence was boosted by Menem’s re- 
election in May 1995, although uncertainty among investors continued until the end 
of the year.
Speculation about the fate of Convertibility has continued from this time, but 
appearances suggest that this is a relatively solid feature of the Argentine economy. It 
survived the removal of Cavallo himself in July 1995. Even in the likely event of a 
Peronist defeat in 1999, none of the contending political parties has stated an 
intention to do away with it. In effect, the economic model constructed on the basis 
of the Convertibility Plan appears likely to remain roughly intact, even with the 
concerns about unemployment and welfare issues which arose towards the end of 
Menem’s first term.59 Hence, despite the negative growth in 1995 we can still speak 
of the ‘consolidation’ of reform in Argentina. Most analyses to date have attempted 
to show why the economic model, and the political coalitions constructed to support 
it, are likely to collapse.60 However, contrary to these predictions, it appears that the 
consolidation of Menem’s reform agenda is not merely a short-term phenomenon but 
rather a genuine institutionalisation of a particular orientation, from which significant 
deviation would be costly. Pressure for a revision of the social effects of the model,
58 United Nations: Economic Survey o f  Latin America and the Caribbean 1994-1995, pg 133.
59 Figures reached 21% in December 1995, and hovered around 18% for most o f 1996.
60 For example, Pamela K. Starr: “Government Coalitions and the Viability o f Currency Boars: 
Argentina under the Cavallo Plan”, Paper presented at the 37th Annual Convention o f  the 
International Studies Association, San Diego, California, 16-20 April 1996.
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nevertheless, is likely to increase, and the question is how the model can be adapted 
to accommodate these pressures. Whether or not the Menem coalition disintegrates 
with electoral defeat in 1999, the general orientation of economic policy is likely to 
remain absolutely intact in its fundamental lineaments. It is the contention of the 
thesis that the reasons lie primarily in new dimensions of international influence.
Conclusion
The economic achievement of the Menem administration, therefore, can be 
seen as one of breaking the spiral of crisis that had dominated the Argentine economy 
throughout the post-war period. The government succeeded in implementing a far- 
reaching restructuring package in accordance with a market-oriented set of neoliberal 
economic policies which aimed to achieve unilateral liberalisation and the full 
insertion of Argentina into the international economy. More concretely, the 
government was able to eliminate the inflation regime, as well as the ‘culture of 
inflation’, that had been the principal impediment to economic growth and 
macroeconomic stability for over 40 years. In addition, a semblance of order returned 
to the fiscal situation, the regulatory role of the state was completely dismantled, and 
with it the huge public sector built up throughout the preceding period. These 
observations do not deny the importance of elements of political opposition, nor to 
discount the significant social problems that such a model generated and is likely to 
continue to generate.
The chronological sequence of reform, moreover, demonstrates that the early 
1989-91 period bore many of the hallmarks that may have suggested a similar fate for 
the Menem experiment as for most post-war attempts at reform. The Convertibility 
Plan of 1991, however, dislodged the impending crisis and institutionalised the 
neoliberal agenda to the extent that the economic orientation became consolidated by 
the middle of the decade (despite the negative growth generated by the Mexican 
crisis in 1995). Given that the failure of post-war reform efforts and the recurrence of 
crisis can be traced largely to political factors and the nature of political society in 
Argentina, the political dimensions of reform under Menem are inevitably 
significant. The next chapter deals with the ways in which Menem reconfigured the
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political landscape in order to neutralise the veto power traditionally exercised by 
labour and the military and to incorporate capitalist interests (particularly big 
business) into the mainstream of the decision-making process. However, the chapter 
will further demonstrate that a simple analysis of political structures under Menem 
cannot account for the reversal of the typical patterns in Argentine political economy, 
giving greater importance to the question of how such consolidated reform became 
possible in the 1990s after decades of failure.
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Chapter 4
Depoliticising Argentina?: Power Structures and Political Reform
Apart from the economic restructuring programme outlined in the previous 
chapter, the Menem government is associated with a fundamental change in the 
structure of political interests and the conduct of politics in Argentina. Its political 
strategy of the Menem government fundamentally altered the nature of both state 
and society, as well as the interaction between them, and changed the political 
context in which economic reform was implemented in the 1990s. If, as Chapter 2 
argued, the prevalence of crisis in the post-war period can be traced to political 
pressures on the policy-making system, Menem’s political reform can be seen as an 
important attempt to eliminate the crisis-generating nature of Argentine politics.
The transformation of political power has two inter-connected dimensions. 
The first relates to a reorganisation of political interests, to the extent that 
traditional power structures have been re-drawn through a politically astute 
combination of co-optation and alienation. The traditional ally and support base of 
Peronism (labour) has been systematically disarticulated, while its traditional 
enemies (business and the military) have been incorporated (through processes of 
strengthening and weakening, respectively) into the new scheme of political power 
in Menem’s Argentina. At the same time, the new economic and political models 
have emphasised the primacy of the ‘technocrats’ in policy-making circles which 
serve as a link to external economic agents. The second dimension refers to a 
significant increase in the insulation of the state from societal interests and, within 
the structures of the state itself, the consolidation of a highly presidentialist style of 
government. In policy-making terms, this is characterised by a marginalisation of 
the legislative branch, reinforced by a process which aimed to blur the distinctions 
between judicial and presidential interests.
Given the international and domestic conditions of the late 1980s, it is not 
surprising that the government should have been able to implement such strategies 
and to manipulate political interests. The observations made in the Introduction 
about the politics of crisis and hyperinflation readily explain the demobilisation of 
political society, and become even more persuasive in the context of the condition
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of corporatist interests in the 1980s, as outlined below. However, these 
explanations would predict the resurgence of political pressures on the system as 
hyperinflation was eliminated. It is evident that the dismantling of their influence 
did not become apparent until after 1991: the analysis in this chapter demonstrates 
the relatively high levels of opposition that emerged in the first couple of years of 
the Menem government. On the other hand, at no point in the 1989-95 period can 
we talk of the ‘disappearance’ of the interests that dominated the post-war period. 
As such, the usual explanations of Menem’s success which focus on changes in the 
political landscape do not stand easily as a sole explanation of how sustained 
reform became possible.
The aim of this chapter, then, is to examine the nature of political reform in 
Argentina with particular attention to the chronological unfolding of the process. It 
demonstrates that the process of political reform needs to be explained with 
reference to the concrete policies pursued by Menem rather than just the 
‘contextual’ situation of crisis in the 1980s. Second, it adds substance to the central 
paradox addressed by the thesis: that, contrary to historically established patterns, 
political pressures diminished as economic reform was deepened and consolidated. 
The first section offers a brief overview of the nature of interests in Argentine 
society, building on the analysis offered in Chapter 2. The following sections 
consider the three dimensions of political restructuring under Menem: the 
disarticulation of the traditional veto powers (labour and the military), the alliance 
with business and the technocrats, and the anti-institutionalist inclinations of the 
Menem government.
Interests in Argentine Society and the Decline of Corporatism
At the start of the Menem government in 1989, the political system was still 
dominated by a system of corporatism by which powerful societal interests were 
incorporated into the political system and through which relations between state 
and society were regulated. As Chapter 2 suggested, the high incidence of military 
coups and the resulting political instability created a situation in which levels of 
political representation were significantly reduced. This reduction in
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representation, and hence in possibilities for participation in the political system, 
gave rise to the legitimisation of corporatism as the basis for the organisation of 
political interests, in that the state became easily colonised (or hijacked) by 
powerful interest groups. The result was that, apart from enjoying an immensely 
high level of influence vis-a-vis the state and government, corporatist interests had 
a very high degree of social ‘legitimacy’. These conditions together account for the 
type of impact that such interests exerted on the political system.
By the time of the transition to democracy in 1983, the corporatist system 
was looking decidedly fragile as a result of the policies of the military government. 
The demise of the military regime signified also the demise of corporatism in 
Argentina, and this break with traditional corporatist structures can be seen clearly 
in the strained relations between most of the powerful interests (the military, 
business and labour) and the Alfonsin government throughout the 1980s. The 
failure of the Alfonsin government to successfully manage and channel societal 
interests, and particularly the growing political opposition that most of these 
represented, is an important part of the explanation for the failure of economic 
reform, which ended in the hyperinflation of 1988-9 and profound political crisis. 
Nevertheless, state-society relations throughout the 1980s remained tinged with 
corporatist colours, and similarly the early months of the Menem government 
exhibited some signs of corporatist-style policies of incorporation. This was 
particularly the case, for example, in the domination of the Economy Ministry by 
officials from the multinational Bunge & Bom. Although the system of 
corporatism was dragged down with the military in 1982-3, then, traditional 
corporatist structures remained relatively intact through the 1980s.
One possible way of formulating this is to argue that corporatist societal 
interests survived past their natural death in the 1980s, and that the process of 
reorganisation in the 1990s resembled pulling dead leaves off a twig. Those 
interests that the Menem government needed to court for the purposes of furthering 
the economic project were strengthened in any case by the ‘logic’ of the 
international changes that were taking place, reflected in the behaviour of the 
markets and in the relationship with the international financial institutions. The 
influence of the external environment can also be seen in the shift in the role of the
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military, which can be explained at least in part by the simple disappearance of 
significant military threat in much of the world with the end of the Cold War and 
the change in the nature of international relations. It could be argued, therefore, that 
the internal political context of withering corporatist links, reinforced by the trends 
induced ‘inevitably’ as a result of international change, favoured the establishment 
of the new political model without the government having to try especially hard.
Nevertheless, this overstates the ease with which the Menem government 
was able to implement this type of transformation in Argentina. The reorganisation 
of interests stemmed from very specific policies on the part of the government 
based strongly on personal contacts between the President and the leaders of these 
societal groups. In essence, this was a process of cooptation rather than 
elimination, but the aim of cooptation ranged from neutralisation (in the case of 
labour and the military) to empowerment (in the case of business). The approach 
that emphasises government and presidential strategies is also strengthened by the 
analysis of institutional development under Menem. One of the characteristics of 
the late 1980s was the persistence of conflict between Congress and the executive 
branch. Therefore, it cannot be argued, as in the case of labour and business, that 
this was a case of pulling dead leaves offa twig. The reorganisation of political 
interests in Argentina aimed for the deliberate construction of a new political 
alliance and a new structure of political power which would facilitate the 
consolidation of the economic policy agenda, as well as a strengthening of state 
and presidential power for this (and its own) purpose.
The Disempowerment of Veto Powers: Labour and the Military
Labour and the Trade Unions
In the light of these observations, the weakening of the labour sector 
worked on a number of levels. The first concerns the effects of economic reform on 
political and economic actors: the types of neo-liberal economic policies pursued 
by the Menem government inevitably entailed the dissolution of the corporatist ties 
between the state and the unions. As the number of state employees was drastically
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reduced as a result of the privatisation process, the membership of the unions 
similarly diminished, and with this their position of bargaining strength. This was 
preceded by a large number of redundancies, particularly in companies such as 
YPF, that entailed significant financial packages as incentives. More generally, 
changes in the structure of the economy and the move away from development 
models based on industrialisation involved changes in the nature of the labour 
market. As a result unions in the services and commercial sectors became 
significantly more influential than the ‘traditional’ unions representing industrial 
areas of economic activity. As such, the weakening of the unions can be explained 
in part with reference to the effects of economic change in Argentina.
There were also structural features of the union movement which played an 
important part in determining its strengths or weaknesses during a time of radical 
reform. The first was the undemocratic nature of union management: bosses were 
essentially a reflection of the political system rather than representative of 
members’ interests.1 In addition, the labour movement by the start of the 1980s had 
been significantly battered by the effects of the military’s free-market economic 
experiment and by the ‘dirty war’, in which workers were associated with Peronism 
and therefore viewed as enemies of the nation. Another useful explanation for 
Menem’s elimination of the veto power of the unions would lie in international 
changes at the end of the 1980s, characterised by the collapse of socialism and the 
end of the Cold War. As one commentator put it, “we were surprised by history”.2 
Put together with the new ideological climate created by Thatcher and Reagan 
through the 1980s, the international context becomes an important part of the story 
of Argentine labour under the Menem government. In effect, union leaders perhaps 
came to the pragmatic decision that Peronism needed to adapt to changing 
international and national realities, much like the PSOE in Spain around the same 
time.
However, these factors only offer a context for the changes in the labour 
sector and its relationship to the government and the PJ. A more accurate picture 
would take into account specific policy measures taken by Menem. The support of 
the labour sector in the 1989 election was demonstrated by its decision to suspend
1 Interview with Jonathan Friedland (Wall Street Journal) Buenos Aires, 27 May 1997.
2 Interview with Julio Godio, Buenos Aires, 26 May 1997.
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all forms of industrial action in order not to jeopardise Menem’s electoral chances. 
As a result, and also in order to avert opposition to the new pro-business economic 
model, Menem appointed pro-government leaders from the ‘Group of 15’ to the 
Labour Ministry, two of which (Jorge Triaca and Jose Rodriguez) were members of 
Menem’s first cabinet.3 This did not prevent the emergence of industrial action in 
the autumn in protest at the government’s privatisation plans, particularly from the 
railway and postal workers.4
Most subsequent labour policies were intended to reduce the influence of 
the unions and to eliminate their stranglehold over the policy-making process, 
propelled by evident public hostility to the unions.5 These measures included 
legislation to restrict the right to strike, applied to sectors providing government- 
sponsored services such as public transport, hospitals, water, gas, electricity, 
telecommunications and education. This legislation was implemented by decree 
(number 16.939/90) on 17 October 1990 following the telephone workers’ strike of 
6 September, but did not prevent railroad workers’ action in February 1991 in 
response to the adjustment package outlined by Cavallo. On both of these 
occasions, furthermore, the government deployed military units in order to protect 
the “freedom and security of the community”6, as well as threats to sack striking 
workers. Further action was staged in 1992 and 1993 by workers in the 
aeronautical sectors.
The effects of these restrictive policies were supplemented by internal 
movements which culminated in the split of the CGT into the pro-Menem ‘San 
Martin’ and the hostile ‘Azopardo’ factions, headed by newly elected Secretary 
General of the CGT Guerino Andreoni and Saul Ubaldini respectively. The 
leadership battle was won by Andreoni. The government, not surprisingly, was able
3 Carlos H. Acufia: “Politics and Economics in the Argentina o f the Nineties (Or, why the future is 
no longer what it used to be)” in William C. Smith, Carlos H. Acufia & Eduardo Gamarra (eds.): 
Democracy, Markets and Structural Reform in Latin America (1994), pg 40; IRELA: “La Argentina 
de Carlos Menem: ^Del Gobiemo de la Crisis a la Crisis del Gobiemo?”, Dossier no. 33: Madrid, 
July 1991 (pg 18). Triaca was the first Labour Minister in the Menem government.
4 “Unions angered by divestment plans”, Latin American Regional Reports - Southern Cone, 12 
October 1989.
5 For example, three days after a spate of strike action by teachers, railway workers and telephone 
workers in April 1990, the government organised a mass rally at which the extremely high turnout 
was taken as evidence o f public sentiment against the unions. See “Menem gets tough with state 
workers”, Latin American Regional Reports - Southern Cone, 31 May 1990.
6 ibid., pg 18.
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to further weaken the influence of the latter by befriending the leadership of the 
CGT-San Martin, and by implementing measures that sought to institutionalise the 
importance of the pro-Menem factions. For example, in August 1990 the CGT-San 
Martin was officially recognised as the only legal union in Argentina. In the 
meantime, the influence of Ubaldini and the hostile factions declined and their 
appeal became limited to the most radical elements of the union movement, even 
though Menem’s attempts to remove Ubaldini by offering him various positions 
outside Argentina failed. Nevertheless, the pro-Menem CGT still showed itself to 
be effective in pressing its wage demands in late 1989 and throughout 1990.
In the early 1990s, the government also managed to secure the ‘support’ of 
the labour sector by appealing to the financial self-interest of the leaders. This was 
achieved primarily through the management of the system of Obras Sociales (the 
health insurance system) which is financed through an obligatory 8% annual 
payroll contribution, and which involves for the unions an annual sum of some 
$2.5 billion. A rather cynical but probably accurate view holds that only around 
20% of this sum is spent on the provision of health care, and that the rest remains 
to be spent at the discretion of the union leaders.8 Apart from the opportunities for 
siphoning off these funds for the purposes of personal gain, this would demonstrate 
that union leaders in Argentina might well be rich (probably as a result of the 
Obras Sociales system), but also extremely powerful.
The other dimension of the economic status of the unions relates to the 
financial difficulties in which the labour movement found itself at the end of the 
1980s. The Obras Sociales were the financial basis of the labour sector, but the 
system suffered from a substantial deficit which was covered by the state through 
the National Health Administration (ANSSAL).9 This has two principal 
implications: first, that the unions had less room for disagreement with the state or 
government as long as it remained in need of subsidies to cover the deficit, and 
second, that the government became able to exert significant leverage based 
precisely on this relationship of patronage. In any event, Decree 1,325 passed in
7 “Leadership battle splits the CGT”, Latin American Regional Reports - Southern Cone, 16 
November 1989.
8 Interview with Jonathan Friedland.
9 Interview with Claudio Lozano (Head of the CTA), Buenos Aires, 13 June 1997.
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1991 prevented unions from collecting contributions under the Obras Sociales 
system, although control of ANSSAL and further subsidies were afforded to the 
pro-reform factions of the fragmented CGT.10 Proposals in 1992 to privatise at 
least part of the health care provision within the system led to a general strike 
which prompted the government to postpone or cancel its plans to introduce 
competition from the private sector. The continuing debate can be attributed to the 
inability of the CGT leadership to implement its preferences within the union 
movement.11
To summarise, the affiliation between labour and the Menem government, 
which facilitated the process of reform outlined above and explains the relative 
absence of genuine opposition to the removal of the unions’ influence, stems from 
three sources. The first is ideological: although there is considerable discontinuity 
between Menemism and Peronism, Menem is still identified as belonging to the 
Peronist political movement. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the opposition to 
Alfonsin can be explained at least in part by the simple fact that the UCR is a party 
of the middle classes, and there is evidence that throughout the 1980s the Peronists 
themselves fomented union opposition in order to further their own political attack 
on the government. The second is political, and refers to the labour sector’s 
traditional dependence on the state, especially in terms of the political status of the 
unions. In this sense, reform ‘from above’ of the corporatist structures was made 
feasible because the state, by its very nature, was the puppet-master of the 
corporatist system itself. The third is economic, and relates to the subsidies which 
the Menem government offered to the unions, and to certain other deals which 
were designed to leave intact the financial basis of the labour movement in return 
for its acceptance of economic change. The crucial factors in explaining the crisis 
of the labour sector under Menem, therefore, relate to the lack or alternatively loss 
of economic benefits, and to the reform of state-society relationships which 
deprived the movement of the financial and political basis for its activism.
The weakening of the unions corresponds both to active policies on the part 
of the Menem government and to the responses of the labour movement itself
10 Maria Victoria Murillo: From Populism to Neoliberalism: Labor Unions and Market-Oriented 
Reforms in Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela, PhD thesis, Harvard University, 1997 (pp 118-9)
11 ibid., pg 119.
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which created the political space for economic and political restructuring. The 
initial strategy of the CGT was one of negotiation, which allowed market-oriented 
and labour reforms to be implemented more quickly in Argentina than in, for 
example, Venezuela or Mexico.12 Furthermore, the split of the CGT created a drop 
in the bargaining power of each faction, until the re-unification of the union in 
1992. This created a vacuum in which it was made relatively easier for the Menem 
government to effect its policies of political re-alignment. However, the unions did 
manage to play a relatively significant role in negotiating the details of the reform 
policies, especially after the re-unification of the CGT in 1992 which was followed 
by the only general strike of the period in question. These negotiations included the 
concession of free wage bargaining in 1993, changes to the reform of the pension
1 3system, and labour flexibility. On several occasions legislation was modified in 
response to the rejection of bills or initiatives by the main unions. The principal 
opposition to the government came from those sectors most affected by 
liberalisation, especially the textiles, metallurgical and automobile sectors. 
Opposition from the public sector arose as a result of the government’s wage 
policies (involving particularly teachers and public employees) and as a result of 
privatisation (involving workers principally in the rail, steel and 
telecommunications sectors).14
From around 1994, union militancy increased quite significantly. This can 
be attributed to the debates on the direction of reform that arose as a result of the 
Tequila crisis and during the expansionary phase of Convertibility, particularly in 
light of high unemployment figures since 1993. In 1994 this was signalled by the 
‘Federal March’ in July which was convened by the opposition factions of the 
union movement. From the time of Cavallo’s departure from the Economy 
Ministry in 1996, the Menem government and its policies had lost the consensus 
generated in the early part of the decade, and the negotiations with the IMF in 1996 
were unique in the degree of participation and debate that emanated from 
previously marginalised societal actors. Nevertheless, this renewed activism is not
12 ibid., pg 94.
13 ibid, pp 107-112.
14 Maria Victoria Murillo: “Union Politics, Market-Oriented Reforms and the Reshaping o f  
Argentine Corporatism” in Douglas A. Chalmers et al (eds.): The New Politics o f  Inequality in Latin 
America: Rethinking Participation and Representation (1997), pg 82.
101
associated with the traditional unionism dominated by the CGT, but rather with 
opposition unions such as the Congress of Argentine Workers (CTA).15 The 
agreement on labour reform between the government and the CGT in 1994, in the 
same month as the CTA-organised Federal March, can be seen as signifying the 
virtual incorporation of the latter into government circles and, therefore, the loss of 
its opposition or bargaining space.16 It is significant that labour reforms are one of 
the areas in which the Menem government was never able entirely to impose its 
preferences, and that this issue continues to dominate the political agenda. 
Therefore, it is inaccurate to talk about the ‘elimination’ of the labour movement: 
the reform process led to an elimination of its veto power and a significant 
weakening of its bargaining position vis-a-vis the government, but not its 
disappearance.
The Armed Forces
The military, by contrast, was more systematically and permanently 
disarticulated. As with the labour sector, Menem’s approach to the Armed Forces 
was one of the ‘smiling villain’: although the military was weakened far more 
under Menem than under Alfonsin, relations with Menem were much better than 
with Alfonsin. As with labour also, Menem’s strategy seems to have been a rather 
unlikely combination of co-optation and alienation, assisted by certain conjunctural 
factors. The first of these relates to a ‘structural’ change in military politics which 
resulted especially from the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
wiped out the raison d’etre of those military establishments whose activities had 
been defined largely in terms of the struggle against communism, and the supposed 
‘triumph’ of liberal democracy stipulated the subordination of military to civilian 
authorities. In this way, the new international environment made democratic rule a 
pre-condition for ‘acceptance’ into the club.
The second refers to the change in the social standing of the Armed Forces 
as a result of the Dirty War and the Falklands conflict. The fact that in the entire 
1930-83 period there was no purely ‘military’ coup indicates the extent of the
15 The CTA was recognised as an official union in May 1997.
16 Interview with Claudio Lozano.
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social penetration of the Armed Forces in Argentina. In 1983, however, the military 
had brought itself into confrontation with the whole of society as a result of 
political failure (the dirty war), economic failure and military failure (the Falklands 
war). On the one hand the traditional alliance between the capitalist classes and the 
military broke down in the face of the military government’s inability to control the 
burgeoning economic crisis. Similarly the Church’s association with the right wing 
of the political spectrum faltered as it became more vociferous in its condemnation 
of repression and the security doctrine of the military junta. On the other hand, 
although the unions and left wing interests were most affected by the dirty war, the 
economic crisis affected all sectors without exception, including the military 
institution itself. In this sense, the case of the military fits well with the argument 
that corporatist interests in the 1980s were largely outliving their ‘natural’ life­
span: by 1983, the Armed Forces were entirely discredited as both a political and a 
military institution, and their role in the 1980s was largely confined to fighting 
their comer on issues such as human rights and the military budget. By the early 
1990s, the situation was compounded by the uprisings at the end of the 1980s, 
which served purely institutional interests rather than any political motivation, and 
the task of the Menem administration was greatly eased.
What was called for, then, was a change of image, which in the event came 
from within and without. From within, the process has been seen as one of the 
‘professionalisation’ of the Armed Forces, to the extent that the Argentine military 
has taken pains to present itself as the model of the new professional outlook of the 
‘new’ Latin American military. In a recent address to the British Royal United 
Services Institute for Defence Studies, the Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant 
General Martin Balza, stated that between 1991 and 1992 the Army conducted a 
“very objective assessment of the situation of the force” which led to a redefinition 
of the values and functions of the Army in accordance with that of the country in 
general. Talking about “new missions, new structures”, he played on the 
‘professionalism’ which can be seen in a new emphasis on military education 
(usually termed ‘cultural modernisation’), the participation of women in the Armed 
Forces (which has not yet been implemented to any considerable extent) and, most 
importantly, the abolition of conscription in favour of the creation of voluntary
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service which came into effect in 1995.17 There has also been a ‘clean-up’ 
operation in the ranks of the Armed Forces, which is linked with a new drive to 
make meritocracy the defining feature of the promotions system.
This explanation, however, is problematic. There have been many instances 
of new ‘professionalism’ in both Argentina and other Latin American countries. 
The aspiration to create a genuinely professional military was shared by Generals 
Aramburu and Ongania in the 1950s and 1960s, although clearly neither achieved 
it. Furthermore, the idea of ‘professionalism’ has been used throughout the 
twentieth century by the military itself as a justification for intervention in politics. 
In its most recent incarnation, ‘professionalism’ is clearly taken to imply that the 
military has seen fit to remove itself from politics, but this is far more readily and 
convincingly explained by the removal of the option of intervention as a result of 
the Falklands fiasco. It is, therefore, more appropriate to see the ‘professionalism’ 
of the military as something of a justificatory rhetorical device used by the 
institution itself, which on this occasion refers to its retreat from politics. The 
argument about changes ‘from within’, however, stands if it is framed in terms of 
‘depoliticisation’ and the acceptance of authority relations (that is, subordination to 
civilian political authority) rather than in the looser terms of ‘professionalism’ 
resurrected once more by the military itself.
From ‘without’, the impetus for change related to policies designed to 
reformulate the role of the military, although clearly, given the caveats mentioned 
in the last paragraph, this was to a large extent internalised by the Armed Forces. 
The 1988 Law of National Defence went some way towards establishing a new role 
for the military, in that it prohibited the participation of the Armed Forces in any 
domestic matters of internal security and limited their activities to the maintenance 
of security from external threats.18 The military’s new role, therefore, was limited
17 “The Argentine Army in the 21st Century”, delivered to the Royal United Services Institute o f  
Defence Studies, 6 November 1996 (reported in the Journal o f the Institute). Although Balza cites 
1991 as the turning point in this self-re-evaluation o f the military institution, it could be argued that 
an inclination towards greater professionalism and the associated commitment to democracy 
predated the early 1990s, as a result o f the ‘identity crisis’ that the Armed Forces experienced after 
1982.
18 The La Tablada uprising of January 1989, however, gave impetus to the creation o f a National 
Security Council (COSENA), which gave the military a legal means o f intervening in internal 
conflicts (decree 327 passed by Alfonsin) - see Julio Villalonga: “Menem y las Fuerzas Armadas” in 
Atilio Bor6n et al: El Menemato: Radiograjla de Dos Anos de Gobierno de Carlos Menem (1991), 
pg 215. The Argentine military presently has two functions that may be seen as indirectly internal:
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to foreign policy exercises, although the result of finding a new role for the military 
“in a country on the end of the world”19 inevitably was perhaps more symbolic than 
genuinely influential in global terms.20 Under Alfonsin the position of the military 
was somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, it was almost completely 
marginalised from the foreign policy-making process, and therefore the role 
accorded to it by the Menem government, even though largely symbolic, was 
accepted as a sign of a changing climate of relations. Ironically, the military has 
been far more supportive of Menem’s foreign policy than either the press or the 
opposition.21 On the other hand, under Alfonsin the military operated as a ‘state 
within a state’, making much of its own military links (independent of the 
government) with the Middle East, particularly Iraq. This adds further weight to the 
argument that the principal change in the orientation of the military under Menem 
relates to a process of depoliticisation and a greater acceptance of authority 
structures.
The most important component of the new role has been the presence of the 
Argentine forces in multilateral military and humanitarian efforts. The government 
decided to send two frigates to the Gulf War in September 1990 (decree 1971/90), 
and in 1991 there was an Argentine presence also in the United Nations missions 
UNIKOM (Iraq-Kuwait), MINURSO (Western Sahara) and UNTAC (Cambodia), 
as well as in the former Yugoslavia from May 1992 as part of UNPROFOR. 
These all aimed to demonstrate the commitment of the Argentine government to 
the Western alliance and particularly the United States, as well as the reformed 
character of the Argentine Armed Forces. Protagonism in regional negotiations on
(a) to provide logistical support in the anti-narcotics effort, although civilian forces are responsible 
for the overall effort, and (b) to provide disaster relief. See Wendy Hunter: “State and Soldier: 
Redefining the Military’s Role in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile”, United States Institute o f Peace 
Peaceworks Series no. 10, October 1996 (pp 14-15).
19 Interview with Carlos Escud6, Buenos Aires, 29 May 1997.
20 In an interview with Rosendo Fraga (Buenos Aires, 2 June 1997), this view was expressed in 
more extreme terms, to the effect that Argentina’s insignificance as a global player made the new 
‘foreign policy role’ virtually irrelevant. Given the participation o f Argentine forces in die military 
and humanitarian ventures outlined in the next paragraphs, however, this interpretation appears to 
be over-stated.
21 Interview with Carlos Escudd.
22 Andr6s Fontana: “Argentina and the Politics o f International Security”, mimeo, Buenos Aires, 
1997 (pg 1). Since the early 1990s, Argentine forces have also been active in various capacities in 
Honduras, Angola, El Salvador, Israel, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Cyprus and Haiti. See Deborah L. 
Norden: “Keeping the Peace, Outside and In: Argentina’s United Nations Missions”, International 
Peacekeeping 2, 3, Autumn 1995.
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nuclear non-proliferation as well as demonstrated commitment to groups such as 
the Missile Technology Control Regime indicate that the military was keen to 
portray itself as fully integrated into the dominant model of military politics in the 
Western Hemisphere.
The main key to Menem’s success with the military, however, can be 
located in certain measures designed to secure the support of the military 
institution. First, the most important policy initiative related to his handling of the 
human rights issue, and specifically in the indultos (amnesties) that were granted to 
military officers. The roots of the Easter Rising of 1987 by the carapintadas lay 
principally in the failure of the Punto Final law passed in December 1986 to stem 
the tensions between the government and the military as a result of the human 
rights trials launched shortly after 1983. By 1987, these had resulted in long prison 
terms for Jorge Videla, Emilio Massera, Roberto Viola, Armando Lambruschini 
and Orlando Agosti.24 On 6 October 1989 Menem passed amnesties (decrees 
1002/89, 1003/89 and 1005/89) for 174 officers involved in the three uprisings of 
the late 1980s, as well as for 39 officers charged for misconduct during the period 
of the dictatorship (including those that ordered the invasion of the Falklands), and 
64 left-wing guerrillas. The full amnesty of 29 December 1990 (decrees 2741/90, 
2742/90, 2743/90, 2744/90, 2745/90 and 2746/90) included pardons for Videla and 
Viola, Martinez de Hoz and the former leader of the Montonero terrorist group, 
Mario Firmenich.25 This was announced shortly after the final uprising of 3 
December, of which the decisive failure was invaluable for securing popular 
acceptance of the government’s military policy which had previously been seen as 
too conciliatory. Although Menem did not have to do very much on this occasion - 
the forces ranged against the rebels within the military institution were
23 For details o f these regional-based initiatives, see, for example, Fontana: op.cit., pp 14-16; Carlos 
H. Acufia & William C. Smith: “Politica y ‘Economia Militar’ en el Cono Sur: Democracia, 
Produccidn de Armamentos y Carrera Armamentista en la Argentina, Brasil y Chile”, Desarrollo 
Economico 34 ,135, Oct-Dec 1994; Jackie Redick et al: “Nuclear Rapprochement: Argentina, Brazil 
and the Non-Proliferation Regime”, Washington Quarterly 18,1, 1995; Rut Diamint (ed.): “La 
Toma de Decisidn en Asuntos de Seguridad: Algunas Experiencias Comparadas”, Working Paper 
39, UTDT, Buenos Aires, May 1997.
24 David Pion-Berlin & Ernesto L6pez: “Una Casa Dividida: Crisis, Fractura y Conflicto en el 
Ej6rcito Argentino” in Pion-Berlin & L6pez: Democracia y  Question Militar (1996) pg 103.
25 Ernesto L6pez: “Argentina 1991: Las Nuevas Oportunidades para el Control Civil” in David 
Pion-Berlin & Ernesto Ldpez: Democracia y  Question Militar, pp 189-90; IRELA: “La Argentina 
de Carlos Menem”, pg 34.
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considerable, largely as a result of the government’s concessions to date - the 
government was able to claim with demonstrable certainty that it had eliminated 
the possibility of further instability in the military ranks.
The principal effect of the amnesty was to remove once and for all the 
raison d’etre of the carapintada faction, which developed fundamentally as a 
response to the trials issue within the more general context of military re- 
evaluation. In effect, the amnesty “removed the flag with which the carapintadas
0f\achieved the internal consensus of the Armed Forces” , even though by this time 
the internal consensus did not amount to much. Nevertheless, the final pardon put 
the seal on the government’s subordination of the military. The clever political 
move can be seen in the fact that to issue an indulto only pardons the officers 
without any sort of intimation that they were not guilty. In addition, the implied 
subordination was disguised in the elaboration of a new foreign policy role for the 
Forces.
Second, although the cause and the Easter Rising of April 1987 provoked 
considerable sympathy throughout the ranks, the majority of military officers 
opposed the carapintadas as an alternative for activities of a more institutional
0 7character. The subsequent uprising of December 1988 constituted the first time in 
25 years that there was open hostility between two factions of the army - in this 
case, the senior ranks in opposition to the activities of the colonels - which 
culminated in the former obeying President Alfonsin’s orders to fire on the
ORrebels. By the start of the Menem government, then, there were three competing 
factions within the Armed Forces: the “parallel army” of the carapintadas, the 
official Army of the ‘liberals’, and lastly the ‘career soldiers’ or ‘professionals’.29 
Menem’s strategy after assuming the presidency was to capitalise on these 
divisions, and thereby to favour the new ‘professional’ wing of the military over 
the (usually hard-line) old guard and the troublesome carapintadas.
One of the first such moves was the appointment of General Isidro Caceres 
as Army Chief of Staff. Caceres in 1988 was in charge of the troops that were
26 Interview with Rosendo Fraga.
27 Fontana, pg 9.
28 Pion-Berlin & L6pez: “Una Casa Dividida”, pg 121.
29 ibid., pp. 94-5 & 106.
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ordered to repress the carapintada rebellion, and from that time was the primary 
conduit through which relations between the senior and junior ranks began to 
improve. Caceres could be located very clearly in the ‘professional’ category 
mentioned above: this resulted not only in the mediation between the liberals and 
the rebels, but also in the elevation of the professional faction to positions of 
dominance within the military hierarchy.30 The appointment of Caceres, therefore, 
and his replacement after his death with another senior officer of similar persuasion 
(Martin Felix Bonnet, in turn succeeded by Martin Balza) corresponded to the 
imperative of eliminating factionalism within the Armed Forces, as well as 
Menem’s priority of re-organising the military into a professional force rather than 
a socio-political actor with substantial veto power over the political process.
The third characteristic of the government’s strategy before and 
immediately after it formally took office was to attempt to establish a relationship 
of confidence with the military, including the carapintadas, based apparently on 
early guarantees that corporatist structures would be maintained. The tone of the 
Peronist presidential campaign emphasised conciliation and pacification, in stark
T 1contrast to the hard line that the Radicals attempted to take on the amnesty issue. 
Moreover, Menem’s favouring of the ‘professional’ wing ran counter to the 
overtures made during the election campaign to the carapintada faction. Before and 
after assuming the presidency, notable officials in Menem’s team as well as 
Menem himself responded to the continuing hostility from carapintada leader 
Colonel Seineldin, at this time under house arrest for his part in the 1988 uprising, 
by conducting regular meetings with him in order to try to elaborate certain 
understandings to mutual benefit.32 In January 1989, for example, a working group 
on military issues was established, to be coordinated by Seineldin and in which 
Cesar Arias (later appointed Under-Secretary for Defence) was to act as the 
government’s link. One account states that Seineldin himself acknowledged that 
from December 1988 he had 52 meetings with 17 officials from the PJ, which
30 ibid., pg 124.
31 Carlos H. Acufia & Catalina Smulovitz: “Militares en la Transicidn Argentina: Del Gobiemo a la 
Subordination Constitucional” in Carlos H. Acufia (ed.): La Nueva Matriz Politica Argentina 
(1995), pg 178.
32 Pion-Berlin & L6pez: “Una Casa Dividida”, pp. 125-126 and New York Times, 22 December 
1990.
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aimed to “sketch out a military policy that would put an end to internal 
confrontations [within the military institution] and stimulate the restructuring of the 
Armed Forces”.33 It appears, for example, that the appointment of Caceres and of 
Italo Luder and Humberto Romero as Minister and Secretary of Defence 
respectively shortly after Menem took office were made on the recommendation of 
Seineldin during two meetings that took place with the President-elect himself.34 
Largely on the strength of these personal discussions, Menem passed the early 
amnesties of October 1989.
Nevertheless, these early conciliatory overtures were not maintained for 
long once Menem was installed in the Casa Rosada. In Autumn 1989, Caceres 
began a thorough purging of the military ranks, by the end of which the carapintada 
faction was eliminated, contributing to the last-ditch protest of December 1990. 
Subsequent military reforms reinforced the emphasis on the professionalisation of 
the Forces. A reduction of around 40% in personnel was announced in May 1991. 
The structure of the Armed Forces altered, as a logical consequence of reductions 
in expenditure and in entry at lower grades, from a pyramidal structure to one 
which bulges in the middle officer ranks and the upper ranks of the enlisted 
corps.36 Cuts in military personnel and civilian personnel employed by the Ministry 
of Defence were seen to be essential to an overall ‘retrenchment’ that aimed to
^7redress the expenditure imbalances that persisted in 1991/2.
Furthermore, the privatisation of enterprises controlled by the military was 
virtually completed by the mid-1990s, although significant exceptions remained 
such as parts of Fabricaciones Militares and the San Francisco weapons factory 
(although these were by this time in the hands of the Ministry of Defence). The 
dismantling of the Condor II missile project, which had been strongly backed by 
the Air Force, was in keeping with the re-definition of the role of the Armed Forces
33 Simon L&zara: El Asalto al Poder: Adores e Intereses en la Crisis Argentina del ‘89 (1997), pg 
266.
34 L6pez: “Argentina 1991”, pg 183; Villalonga, pg 217. For reported details o f the conversations 
between President-elect Menem and Seineldin, see L&zara, pp. 268-9.
35 L6pez: “Argentina 1991”, pg 185.
36 World Bank: ‘Argentina: Public Finance Review: From Insolvency to Growth’, Report no. 10827- 
AR, 11 February 1993 (pg 96). However, although this adjustment may have helped the cause of  
‘professionalisation’, it created an officer corps structure suited to a force twice the size o f the 
Argentine force in the early 1990s. Ibid., pg 100.
37 ibid., pp. 99-102.
38 World Bank: op.cit., pg 95.
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towards external rather than national security. Other reforms implemented a 
significant reduction in military spending in the national budgets. Military 
expenditures in 1993 were still the largest category of discretionary expenditure, 
but comprised less than 2% of GDP in comparison with a figure two-thirds higher 
in the early 1980s.39
Therefore, it is inaccurate to talk about the ‘subordination’ of the ‘military’, 
just as it is misleading to refer to the ‘incorporation’ of ‘business’, as the next 
section will demonstrate. Certainly in the first couple of years of the Menem 
government the military flexed its muscles on several occasions, although by the 
December 1990 uprising Menem had managed to manipulate the chain of 
command in order to ensure the allegiance of the senior ranks. Rather, the process 
is multi-dimensional. One aspect of it is the combination of co-optation and 
weakening or alienation: for example, the military was simultaneously weakened as 
a political and economic actor and co-opted into the support network of the 
government through the achievement of its acquiescence in the restructuring 
programme. The other element in the process concerns the fostering of certain 
‘factions’ within interest groupings to the expense of others. The ‘weakening’ of 
the military and labour refers only to certain hostile factions within these sectors, 
and furthermore refers to the elimination of the traditional veto power of these 
interests.
Incorporation of Interests: Business and the Technocrats
Business
As with the labour sector and the Armed Forces, the shift in the political 
and economic positioning of the business sector must be attributed to a 
combination of the effects of economic change and the results of deliberate 
policies. In the case of business, the link between their increased affiliation with 
the government is clearly based on a coincidence of economic interests: the 
government’s economic policies favoured the business sector, and at the same time
39 World Bank: op.cit., pg 93.
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relied on its support for their success. If the government was concerned to 
implement an economic strategy based on free markets, liberalisation and the 
expansion of private sector activity, then the incorporation of business sectors as 
key allies was indispensable. As with the case of labour also, deliberate measures 
taken by the government were reinforced by the effects of the economic policies 
pursued: privatisation is again a case in point. Therefore, it is possible to some 
extent to see the economic restructuring process as propping itself up after the early 
years, in that structural change induces shifts in the positioning of actors regardless 
of the conscious intentions of governments or the actors themselves. In this sense, 
the reduction of the public sector quite logically favours the expansion of the 
private sector but simultaneously reduces the influence and scope for activity of 
industrial sectors and workers’ unions.
Business became the new oligarchy of the 1990s under the Menem 
government. The domination of the Economy Ministry between 1989 and 1991 by 
the large multinational Bunge & Bom signalled Menem’s intention to court 
business and eliminate the traditional anti-Peronist bias that might disrupt the 
smooth implementation of economic reforms. Throughout this period, Menem held 
weekly meetings with business leaders and consistently consulted them on the 
direction and content of economic policy. As such, the influence of organised 
business interests (particularly in the agricultural sector) was and is less important 
than influence which derives from personal relationships with Menem and, from 
1991, with Cavallo.
The evolution of the new relationship between government and business 
was, however, not as trouble-free as this first reading might suggest. From the early 
months of the Menem administration, the government saw itself largely as 
substituting one group of pressures for another - that is, that the interests of 
business were suffocating its policy-making autonomy quite as effectively as 
labour had previously. This manifested itself primarily in problems of allocating 
the costs of the adjustment which, given the closeness of the affiliation established 
with the business sector, the government found itself unable to effect.40 Two 
mechanisms were utilised for the purposes of creating a distance between the
40 Vicente Palermo & Marcos Novaro: Politico y  Poder en el Gobiemo de Menem (1997), pp. 157- 
62.
I l l
government and business interests: the first was the replacement of Economy 
Minister Rapanelli (of Bunge & Bom) with Erman Gonzalez, who did not 
represent an economic or political interest but rather a general economic 
orientation. The second was a policy shift in the direction of increased monetary 
restriction which had the effect of making the state less permeable to the demands 
of business interests. In this way, fiscal orthodoxy became a political instrument of 
control.41
The persistence of inflation, and particularly the bursts of hyperinflation in 
November 1989 and early 1991, also created a climate of some caution in business 
circles. Although the neoliberal orientation of the economy was welcomed, 
opposition to particular policies remained: as outlined in Chapter 3, for example, 
exporters’ groups vigorously opposed the stable exchange rate in late 1989, and 
expectations of economic crisis early in 1990 prompted state and business firms to 
take measures to defend their resources.42 Through 1990, economic recession 
negatively affected business and industry, and agricultural interests were hurt by 
such policies as the increase in export taxes, leading to strike action in early 1991. 
The legendary alliance between Menem and business, therefore, was stmck largely 
on the basis of the economic stability, low inflation and relatively healthy growth 
afforded by the Convertibility Plan.
However, to refer to ‘business’ as a homogenous interest group is equally 
misleading. Traditionally business divides into three sectors in Argentina. The first 
two are traditional agricultural producers and those that favoured ISI, the latter 
ranging from steel mills to small textiles producers. The third grouping might be 
called ‘state contractors’ and incorporates engineering and construction companies. 
It is this third group which has formed the basis of the ‘new oligarchy’ in Menem’s 
Argentina.43 The ISI-oriented sector was largely eliminated along with the 
development model with which it was associated. The traditional oligarchy was 
able to ‘cash out’, creating a generation of ‘trust fund babies’ that live off the 
family fortune.44 Bunge & Bom, although dominant within government structures,
41 ibid., pp. 163-5.
42 Acufia: “Politics and Economics”, pg 41.
43 Interview with Jonathan Friedland.
44 Interview with Jonathan Friedland.
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were excluded from the privatisation process due to regulations on conflicts of 
interests. As a result of this and of a series of bad decisions in the early 1990s (such 
as the decision to sell the now enormous Lafabril in Peru), the business interests of 
the corporation have not been significantly furthered since the start of the Menem 
administration.
Essentially, the new business oligarchy is composed of those sectors which 
recognised the opportunities for increasing asset values as a result of privatisation 
and economic reform, such as the Perez Companc, Macri, Pescarmona and Soldati 
families, and enterprises such as Techint, Comercio La Plata, and IMPS AT. These 
companies characteristically struck up alliances with foreigners and purchased 
assets, to the extent that the asset base of Comercio La Plata, for example, 
increased five-fold over five years.45 The ‘transnationalisation’ element in the 
Argentine economy therefore really took hold from the start of the 1990s, although 
these companies did have some significant international links before that time: 
Perez Companc, for example, bought General Electric’s Latin American 
Construction Company in 1976, and then ventured into more non-traditional 
sectors in the 1980s, bringing Carrefour to Argentina and entering into joint 
ventures with NEC.46 Even now, however, the only genuinely transnational 
companies in Argentina are to be found in the energy sector (such as YPF and 
Perez Companc), although industrialists like Techint and IMPS AT are increasingly 
active internationally. Crucially, the expansion of the transnational activities of 
Argentine businesses was made possible by the privatisation process which 
produced the necessary asset size and cashflow, as well as partnership 
opportunities for joint ventures, which have become the defining characteristic of 
the transnational activities of the business sector. As a result, virtually without 
exception the most influential businesses in Argentina came to be dominated by 
consortiums consisting of local and foreign capital.
This should not be taken to mean, however, that the composition and 
domination of the business elite is confined to these families and their business
45 Interview with Jonathan Friedland.
46 Interview with Jonathan Friedland. Another example is Bridas (the natural gas industry) which 
had genuine international interests from the 1970s, mainly in the form o f joint ventures. See George 
Philip: Oil and Politics in Latin America: Nationalist Movements and State Companies (1982)
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enterprises. Recent research on the business sector in Argentina suggests that the 
level of ‘rotation’ within the business elite is significantly high: of the 200 biggest 
companies in 1995 (measured according to annual revenues), 97 did not exist four 
years earlier, or alternatively ranked below the 200 mark. These two characteristics 
- the displacement of certain companies and the prevalence of new actors in the 
business arena - are taken to be indicative of the “new types of structuring and 
functioning of the economy”.47 The business profile in Argentina also shifted since 
around 1991, reflecting the decline of industrial companies and public enterprises 
and the rise of new consortiums of privatised public services and companies 
operating in the services sector. In other words, the profile of the business sector 
altered at the expense of firms in the industrial sectors and in favour of companies 
operating in the tertiary (services and commercial) sectors of the economy. The 
other rather obvious point is that the profile of the business sector was altered in 
any case simply as a result of privatisation and the consequent elimination of the 
huge bulk of public sector enterprises.
Put together, then, these changes resulted in a ‘concentration’ of both 
economic power and economic activity in Argentina. With respect to the first of 
these, the business circle which had access to the policy-making arena was 
extremely limited in its scope. With respect to the second, the process of 
concentration can also be seen as a process of polarisation, in which there were 
very clearly winners and losers in Argentine business, with very little space 
between the two. This can be seen in the figures for business performance during 
the 1995 economic crisis: the largest 200 firms increased their revenues by around 
11.3% on the previous year and their aggregated utilities by 29.9%, while the level 
of activity in the Argentine economy fell by 4.4%. This demonstrates a marked 
discrepancy between the performance of the firms comprising the business elite 
(characterised by the concentration of activity and power noted above) and the 
performance of the economy as a whole 48
To conclude, the redefinition of the relationship between business and 
government under Carlos Menem brushed aside two of the most salient tensions
47 Daniel Azpiazu: “El Nuevo Perfil de la Elite Empresaria: Concentraci6n del Poder Econdmico y 
Beneficios Extraordinarios”, Realidad Economica 145, 1996, pg 27.
48 Azpiazu, pg 30.
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that have characterised Argentine politics in the post-war period. First, the 
traditional hostility between business and Peronism was overcome largely by the 
fact that the government became “more papal than the Pope himself’ in terms of 
economic policy49, and that this was an alliance between business and Carlos 
Menem, rather than business and political Peronism. Therefore, to draw business 
sectors into the political and economic process was not exactly a difficult task: 
Menem could rely on the logic of the market and the economic rationale of the 
government’s policies which worked to the advantage of the private sector (and 
especially big business), reinforced by close personal links. In addition, the 
appointment of Cavallo created a legitimacy for the economic model than worked 
to increase the confidence of the business sector in the government’s commitment 
to liberalisation. As a result, the alliance between the government and business 
became one of the most solid features of the new political line-up.
Second, the political and economic history of Argentina suggests that there 
was an irreconcilable opposition between capitalism and democracy. As long as the 
episodes of democratic rule in the post-war period were seen to further the 
inclusion of the militant trades unions and other popular sectors, the interests of the 
capitalist classes were seen as fundamentally threatened by democracy. The 
military interventions, consequently, invariably were supported by capitalist 
interests and equated with the maintenance of stability and discipline as much as a 
‘favourable’ economic inclination. Although the opposition to political democracy 
itself was effectively eliminated in the early 1980s, the experiences of the Alfonsin 
government demonstrated the persistence of tensions between government and 
business.50 Opposition until the 1990s was based on both the political implications 
of such inclusionary styles of government for economic performance as well as the 
political constraints that representation placed on the execution of an economic 
policy acceptable to the business community. The Menem administration was
49 Interview with Gabriel Casaburi (Fundacidn Mediterrdnea), Buenos Aires, 29 May 1997.
50 It should be remembered, however, that business did derive certain benefits in the 1980s from the 
democratic Alfonsin government, the most important o f which were the electoral defeat o f  the 
Peronists and the policy of confronting the unions (although this was ultimately unsuccessful). 
Carlos H. Acufia: “Intereses Empresarios, Dictadura y Democracia en la Argentina Actual” in 
Acufia (ed.): La Nueva Matriz, pg 270.
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clearly the first instance of a genuine coincidence of interests between a democratic 
government and business or capitalist classes in Argentina in the post-war period.
The Technocrats
The dominance of policy circles by technocratic policy makers differs from 
the above categories of interests in that this was not an example of the co-optation 
or alienation of an existing interest in Argentine politics. Nevertheless, the courting 
of the technocrats corresponded closely with the strategy pursued by the Menem 
administration, which aimed essentially to reduce the scope for societal 
participation in or influence over state decisions, to isolate economic policy from 
the political arena of interest group activity (however residual), and to increase the 
centralisation and insulation of the state. The idea is that the installation of these 
‘technocrats’ in senior government positions ensured the ‘rational’ formulation of 
technically appropriate economic policy, without the contaminating influence of 
political pressures.
In more specific terms, high levels of technocratic capacity in a government 
has the effect of reducing the debates about adjustment, with the implication that 
the government has at its disposal a greater range of policy instruments or options. 
This may perhaps be seen in combinations of orthodox and heterodox policies, as 
explained in the discussion of Argentina’s responses to globalisation in the next 
chapter.51 Although this does not preclude debates within the policy-making 
agencies of the state, and economic success is not guaranteed by the presence of 
technocrats in government (as proved by the Alfonsin administration), the situation 
of Argentina in the 1990s suggests that the economists gained the upper ground in 
both state and societal circles.
The dominance in the Economy Ministry of such individuals under Menem 
was not immediate, however. As noted above, for the first eighteen months or so of 
the Menem administration, the appointments to the Economy Ministry were taken 
from the world of business interests, which ensured that state institutions were far 
more permeable to sectoral interests and that they remained “spaces of interaction
51 Stephan Haggard & Robert R. Kaufman: “Estado y Reforma Econdmica: La Iniciacidn y 
Consolidacidn de Polfticas de Mercado”, Desarrollo Economico 35, 139, Oct-Dec 1995 (pg 359).
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and negotiation”.52 The technocratic team that was formed under Menem from 
1991 onwards was headed by Domingo Cavallo, Foreign Minister during the early 
part of the Menem administration. Cavallo was, in many ways, the archetypal 
technocrat. With a PhD in economics from Harvard, and having worked for the 
World Bank in the early 1980s53, he represented essentially the “acceptance of the 
Washington Consensus”.54 He took over the Economy Ministry with no political 
affiliation, with either the PJ or any other party. In this sense, he fits well with the 
‘apolitical’ qualities that are normally attributed to technocrats in government 
positions. There is a suggestion, however, that his appointment was not entirely 
Menem’s preference. Menem’s apparent reluctance to put Cavallo in the Economy 
Ministry was probably brushed aside only as a result of US pressure in the context of 
the political and economic crisis of February 1991, in which Menem’s survival was 
called into question.55 Although it is true that the arrival of Cavallo in March 1991 
made little difference to the neoliberal economic direction which had already been 
established by the Menem government56, as discussed in Chapter 3, his appointment 
marked the start of what we have identified as the ‘consolidation’ phase of reform.
Cavallo and his team were useful to the Menem government in a number of 
ways. First, their arrival was consistent with the foreign policy goal of increasing 
Argentina’s alignment with the West, which depended largely on the success of the 
economic restructuring programme and the expansion of international economic 
relations. Cavallo and the technocratic team, by their nature, were able to contribute 
to external confidence in the Argentine government and the Argentine economy, and 
also to build on personal external links in order to contribute to the integration of 
Argentina into the mechanisms of the international economic environment. Second, 
Cavallo had close contacts with the business environment, consolidated largely 
through a business think-tank established by Cavallo (the Fundacion Mediterranea) 
which conducted a research agenda premised on business interests and accordance 
with the ideal of a globalised international economy. Third, his time as Foreign
52 Palermo & Novaro, pg 296.
53 See Daniel Santoro: El Hacedor: Una Biografia Politico de Domingo Cavallo (1994)
54 Interview with Adolfo Canitrot, Buenos Aires, 28 July 1995.
55 Interview with Adolfo Canitrot
56 Palermo & Novaro, pg 296.
57 Interviews with Gabriel Casaburi & Guillermo Mondino o f the Fundacidn; Palermo & Novaro, pg 
297.
117
Minister created a structure of political contacts, which acted to reinforce the 
legitimacy of the economic model and the new economic team. Moreover, however, 
if the central thrust of the Menem administration’s foreign policy was in fact foreign 
economic policy, then the combination of influence offered by Cavallo would appear 
to have been invaluable.
This, then, was a mainstream, orthodox economic orientation embodied in 
the technocratic team that took over the relevant Ministries with Cavallo in early 
1991. This was not, however, a technification of the state structure in its entirety. 
We have seen already that a trade unionist was appointed Labour Minister. 
Similarly, the Ministries of Health and Defence continued to be organised along 
traditional lines.58 Nor was the technocratic element of the government entirely 
apolitical for the duration of the first Menem administration. One of Cavallo’s 
major frustrations was the lack of support for the reform programme by the mid- 
1990s, despite the alliances that he had constructed over this time with a number of 
PJ and other party representatives in the political arena. The extent of these 
contacts can be seen in concerns over the appointment of Roque Fernandez as 
Cavallo’s successor, which were built on the observation that Fernandez had no 
political base.
‘Government by Decree’ and the Weakening of Institutions
Having examined the re-positioning of political interests, then, we can 
move to a more general assessment of the change in the nature of state power. The 
final part of the discussion relates to the weakening of political institutions in Latin 
America, most notably the legislative branch of government, which acted to further 
consolidate executive power. Taken together, these elements of Menem’s strategy 
(in the general structural and conjunctural context of the early 1990s) comprised a 
weakening of traditional interests, the disarticulation of civil society, and the 
establishment of an anti-institutionalist, centralised and presidentialist style of 
democracy. The following chapters demonstrate the ways in which international
58 Palermo & Novaro, pg 299.
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influences acted to reinforce these trends, on the one hand, and create the space in 
which they could be sustained and consolidated, on the other.
Executive-Congressional Relations
Relations between the legislative and executive branches of government 
during the first years of the Menem government were characterised by the 
consolidation of executive power at the expense of congressional influence. This 
was achieved principally by resort to presidential powers of decree and veto, the 
frequency of which served to undermine the normal functioning of the legislative 
process in Argentina. Although there are constitutional provisions and precedents 
for this kind of decision-making, the first Menem can be distinguished from 
previous governments in two ways: first, by the para-constitutional interpretation of 
constitutional provisions, and second, by the frequency with which these powers 
are employed.
Presidential veto powers are included in Article 72 of the 1853 
Constitution, which provides for both total and partial vetoes although, 
significantly, the latter is the result of a loophole rather than a concrete provision.59 
The constitutional reform of 1994 attempted to formalise this presidential 
prerogative. The contrast between the Alfonsin and Menem administrations is 
marked: Alfonsin vetoed 7.59% (49 laws) of the total legislation passed during his 
government, whereas Menem in the period of his first administration vetoed 13% 
(109 laws). The figures for partial vetoes are even more instructive: in the case of 
Alfonsin, 25% of laws he vetoed were subject to partial veto, while for Menem the 
figure stands at 56%.60 Furthermore, the government has often circumvented the 
constitutional requirement that, in the event of a partial veto, the entire legislation 
is returned to congress for approval. Therefore, under Menem the pattern of 
presidential veto has been dominated by partial vetoes, which are not strictly 
constitutionally legal, and furthermore by the non-observance of formally or 
informally established practices.
59 Ana Maria Mustapic & Natalia Ferretti: “El Veto Presidencial Bajo Alfonsin y Menem (1983- 
1995)”, mimeo, Buenos Aires, 1997 (pg 5).
60 Mustapic & Ferretti, pp. 1-2
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/With respect to presidential decree powers, the 1853 Constitution also 
allows for three types: ‘regulatory’ decrees (referring to laws dictated by Congress), 
‘autonomous’ decrees (in which the president rules on a matter reserved 
exclusively for the Executive by the Constitution) and, on a more informal basis, 
‘delegated’ decree power (in which the Executive controls legislative matters 
delegated to it by the Congress, to which authority properly belongs).61 The two 
most important instances of delegated authority are the LEE (23.697) and the 
Reform of the State (23.696) passed in August and September 1989. These allowed 
the president further authority to issue delegated decrees on certain policy matters 
(such as privatisation) within a specified period of time.62 However, Menem’s use 
of decree powers relies on a format known as decrees of ‘necessity and urgency’, 
which are not part of the President’s constitutional powers of legislation. In this 
case, the executive appropriates powers constitutionally reserved for the Congress, 
justified by situations of crisis which demand extraordinary legislative solutions. 
As with the case of partial veto powers, the 1994 constitutional reform sought to 
integrate legal provision for decrees of necessity and urgency for exceptional 
situations in which normal legislative procedures cannot be followed. Between 
1853 and July 1989, Argentine presidents had issued around 35 decrees, while 
between July 1989 and August 1994, Menem passed 336 ‘decrees of necessity and
f iXurgency’. These related to a range of issue areas, including the decision to send 
Argentine warships to the Persian Gulf and the right to strike legislation of October 
1990.
Menem’s use of constitutional and extra-constitutional presidential powers 
relates to the context of economic crisis. While the Alfonsin government responded 
largely to pressures on the legislative system which arose from the process of 
democratisation, Menem’s style of government departed from the argument that, 
given the nature and extent of the crisis, Congress was not technically equipped to 
deal with the present situation or alternatively that the time required for normal
61 Delia Ferreira Rubio & Matteo Goretti: “Cuando el Presidente Gobiema Solo: Menem y los 
Decretos de Necesidad y Urgencia hasta la Reforma Constitucional (julio 1989-agosto 1994)”, 
Desarrollo Economico 36, 141, April-June 1996 (pg 449).
62 See Mark P. Jones: “Evaluating Argentina’s Presidential Democracy, 1983-1995” in Scott 
Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart: Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America 
(1997), pg 286.
63 Rubio & Goretti, pg 444.
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procedures could be ill-afforded: at the end of the previous session (to 30 
September 1990), only 21% of the proposed laws submitted has been approved by 
the legislature, and 60% had not received the attention of the relevant 
parliamentary commission.64 Furthermore, most of the vetoes and decrees issued 
by Menem related to economic issues, particularly privatisation (including ENTel 
and Aerolineas Argentinas) and various areas of government spending.
The other tactic employed by the government was to favour an ‘all-or- 
nothing’ approach over a case-by-case approach to legislation, in which it sent to 
Congress a number of ‘omnibus’ laws that covered several issues at once: the LEE, 
Reform of the State law and the DEE are the most obvious examples. Passage of 
these laws, therefore, was intended to be the validation of the broad reform 
package, avoiding squabbles over its components. This fits in with the overall 
orientation of the Menem government which strove to create the impression of a 
coherent package which was more than the sum of its parts. The other advantage of 
the ‘all-or-nothing’ approach was that it dodged the risk of the legislation 
becoming bogged down in processes of revision by the legislature, and furthermore 
that it constrained the opportunities for the Congress to serve as a conduit for 
societal and party pressures.65
The impact of the exercise of such presidential powers is clearly 
detrimental to congressional influence and beneficial for the consolidation of 
political authority in the executive branch. Furthermore, the establishment of such 
a relationship reinforces the anti-institutional bias of the political model 
characterised by centralised power and personalist government. The above 
practices served consistently to undermine the authority and legitimacy of Congress 
by weakening, first of all, its capacity to fulfil its legislative functions and, second, 
the internal dynamics of legislative bargaining. There are three further observations 
that arise from the evolution of presidential-congressional relations. First, the PJ 
did not have a majority in Congress until 1995. The difficulties that a minority in 
the Chamber of Deputies posed for the legislative process created conditions in 
which the executive saw itself compelled to resort to decree and veto powers once 
the possibility of closing Congress had been eliminated, along with the short-lived
64IRELA: “La Argentina de Carlos Menem”, pg 8.
65 Palermo & Novaro, pg 257.
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idea of creating an alliance with the Radicals by offering Eduardo Angeloz a place 
in the Cabinet. However, from about 1994 the Congress has become much less 
quiescent and congressional opposition has increased significantly, necessitating a 
greater degree of negotiation. The record from 1995 onwards, furthermore, 
demonstrates that a congressional majority for the ruling party does not necessarily 
equal greater power. The paradox, therefore, is that Congress has more influence at 
precisely the time that it is structurally weakest, contrary to common perceptions 
among Radical party members that the influence of the opposition has steadily 
decreased since Menem came to power.66
Second, the first Menem government was characterised not only by the 
frequency of its recourse of semi-constitutional legislative mechanisms, but also by 
an increase in the level of conflict between Congress and the executive67 
demonstrated by the five instances of congressional ‘insistence’ (that is, when 
Congress insists on the original versions of laws subsequently amended by the
JTQ
executive, for which a two-thirds majority is required). Therefore, it should not 
be assumed that the eclipse of congressional influence was assisted by 
congressional passivity, and the weakening of Congress should be seen in relative 
terms rather than as an absolute loss of power: Congress retains certain instruments 
and areas of influence and even, according to some analysts, exhibits a significant 
degree of stability and continuity.69 On the other hand, throughout the period in 
question the Executive held all the cards in terms of the content of the reform 
package, while the role of Congress became largely reactionary. The process of 
reform was very clearly directed from the Executive branch.
The tensions between the executive and the legislature both increased with 
time and varied according to the issue area addressed by specific legislation. In the 
first couple of years of the government, therefore, the Executive had a largely free 
hand in a context dominated by macroeconomic issues such as privatisation, tax 
reform, economic liberalisation and government spending. Tensions increased on
66 This sort o f  opinion was voiced by a number o f interviewees and friends from the Radical Party.
67 Legislative relations during the 1980s, on the other hand, were characterised by conflict between 
the government and the opposition. Mustapic & Ferretti, pp 10-12.
68 Two o f these ‘insisted laws’ were requested by Menem himself in order to correct errors.
Mustapic & Ferretti, pp. 15-18.
69 Guillermo Molinelli: “Las Relaciones Presidente-Congreso en Argentina, ‘83-’95”, Post Data 2, 
Nov 1996 (pp. 78-9)
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the one hand as a result of increasing disaffection with the Executive’s attempts to 
marginalise Congress in the policy-making process and, on the other, when 
attention turned to issues such as labour reform and fiscal policies towards the 
provinces, and were exacerbated by the unwillingness of the Executive to modify 
its approach in response.70 It is precisely in step with the increasing hostility from 
Congress that the government’s resort to extra-constitutional mechanisms 
increased, with 1991 representing the peak of the use of decree powers. This is 
despite some attenuation of conflict as a result of the arrival of Domingo Cavallo in 
the Economy Ministry, who made numerous statements to the following effect:
To sanction laws is more difficult than to draft decrees of necessity 
and urgency. But the legitimacy achieved through these laws 
produces a greater judicial stability, because it creates awareness of 
far more solid and durable solutions, generating conditions 
conducive to attracting investment and consequently economic
71growth.
Third, the erosion of congressional influence over the reform process does 
not coincide necessarily with a decline in its ability to protect its institutional 
identity.72 This is an important distinction to make in the discussion of the re­
drawing of political boundaries in Menem’s Argentina. Palermo and Novaro argue 
that “although the opposition encountered serious difficulties in achieving any 
influence over the structural reform programme, the same was not the case in the 
defence of democratic institutionality”. This is demonstrated most effectively by 
reactions to the consideration given by the Menem government to closing Congress 
in the style of a palace coup, which was de-railed by media attention and the vocal 
opposition of various politicians including ex-president Alfonsfn, as well as the 
lack of consensus on the issue within the government itself.73 An ‘anti­
institutionalist bias’ refers to the disarticulation of institutional interests, or in some 
cases their re-articulation in order to achieve or further the centralisation of power 
in the Executive and/or to ensure a consistency between the interests of the 
Executive and the inclinations of its ‘backing group’. The balance between the
70 Palermo & Novaro, pp. 260-261.
71 La Nation, 2 October 1991, quoted in Rubio & Goretti: pg 446.
72 Molinelli, pg 79; Palermo & Novaro, pg 265.
73 Palermo & Novaro, pg 264; Rubio & Goretti: pg 445.
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positive and negative (re-articulation versus disarticulation) depends, as we have 
seen in the cases of political interests, on specific circumstances as well as on the 
specific institution or interest in question.
The Supreme Court o f  Justice and the Judiciary
Although executive power became largely consolidated as the locus of 
political authority, the mechanisms by which this process was carried out required 
approval from the Supreme Court, and therefore it was essential for Menem to gain 
its support. The first attempt to achieve this was by trying to force the resignation 
of ‘hostile elements’ in the Court, and the failure of this tactic prompted Menem to 
seek congressional approval for the expansion of its members from five to nine.74 
This was approved by the Senate in September 1989 and by the Chamber of 
Deputies on 6 April 1990, despite the protestations of the Supreme Court itself and 
the vehement opposition of the UCR. Support for this measure was achieved with a 
certain degree of coercion: three days before the law was sanctioned, all the PJ 
deputies received a telegram concerning the special recommendations of the 
national government and the governing party relating to the “essential needs of the
n c
state”, which re-stated the absolute urgency of sanctioning the legislation. After 
various resignations, in the two months following congressional authorisation of 
the initiative Menem appointed six new Ministers to the Court, increasing the 
number to nine.
The fact that these were political appointments created a situation in which 
Menem had majority political support in the Court and therefore increased room 
for manoeuvre with decree legislation. By May 1990, therefore, the Supreme Court 
had been transformed into a staunchly Menemite institution with six of the nine 
justices appointed by the President (by virtue of strong attachments to the PJ or 
Menem himself), in contrast with the situation before the expansion of the Court, 
in which none of the four justices were appointed by the President.76 The 
mechanisms of appointment are congruent with the general pattern of institutional
74 Rubio & Goretti, pg 447.
75 Clarin, 4 April 1990.
76 Jones, pg 284.
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interaction identified above: political appointments to the Supreme Court are
77 _. ■authorised by the Senate with no input from the Chamber of Deputies. The 
upshot of the reform of the Supreme Court was the so-called Peralta decision of 
1990, which authorised presidential resort to decrees of urgency and necessity, and 
further complicated the process of congressional appeal against such legislation, 
already made difficult by the PJ’s majority in the Senate.78
Apart from the co-optation of the Supreme Court, Menem removed “by 
constitutionally questionable procedures” the Attorney General and members of the 
Audit Tribunal (which controls the allocation of public funds), the legal 
representation of the Treasury, the General Inspectorate of Justice and the National
70Office of the Public Prosecutor of Administrative Investigations. Taken together, 
these institutional revisions created a situation in which judicial power and 
executive power in Argentina were much more closely linked than previously, and 
furthermore in which judicial power was far more politicised than was, perhaps, 
desirable. At the very least, this restructuring of the judiciary provided legal 
support for much of Menem’s economic restructuring programme, assisted by the 
weakening of the legislature and the distancing of the national government from 
the provincial governments.
Conclusion
Political restructuring was essential to the successful implementation of the 
government’s economic reform strategies, as well as to the reconstruction of the 
state. Economic change, in turn, was part of the political project in that economic 
development was hampered in Argentina fundamentally by difficulties associated 
with the nature of interests in society. Therefore, the processes of political and 
economic reform are fundamentally linked, with both serving the interests of the 
other. The government’s conception of political reform, however, was largely 
predicated on the need to eliminate the obstacles to economic reform and to the
77 Conversation with Ana Maria Mustapic, 22 May 1997.
78 Jones, pg 286.
79 Catalina Smulovitz: “Constituci6n y Poder Judicial en la Nueva Democracia Argentina: La 
Experiencia de las Instituciones” in Acufia (ed.): La Nueva Matriz, pg 79.
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formulation and implementation of economic policy. This involved the 
disarticulation of traditional veto powers in Argentine political society (labour and 
the military), the co-optation of business, the technification of the Economy 
Ministry, and the weakening of political institutions that potentially could have 
disrupted either the political or the economic reform processes.
However, although the process of depoliticisation, relative to much of the 
post-war period, helps to explain the greater macroeconomic coherence of the 
Menem administration, it is both exaggerated and incomplete as an explanation for 
reform in the 1990s. First, the analysis has shown clearly that neither the 
neutralisation of particular interests (such as labour) nor the construction of close 
alliances with others (such as business) translated into an complete absence of 
opposition. Second, the period clearly divides into two periods, as demonstrated in 
this and the previous chapter. The demobilisation of political and institutional 
interests in the 1989-91 period can be quite readily explained with reference to the 
effects of hyperinflation. The fact that there was no significant or disruptive 
resurgence of interests after about 1992 shows that the ‘logic’ of Argentine politics 
was broken under Menem. What an emphasis on depoliticisation cannot explain, 
then, is why these interests did not re-emerge as the crisis situation was eased. Part 
of the explanation can be found, as suggested in this chapter, in the concrete 
policies pursued by the Menem government during this time, but this in turn sheds 
only limited light on the ways in which Menem was able to implement and 
consolidate this type of political reform.
As a result, it becomes necessary to look elsewhere for explanations of the 
consolidation of both political and economic reform in Argentina, rather than 
seeing each as an explanation of the other. The latter alternative quickly 
disintegrates into a circular argument that misses important questions about the 
dynamics of the reform process. In effect, the questions are the same for political 
reform as for economic reform: how can we account for the consolidation of this 
type of change, and what are the factors that facilitated this rupture with well- 
established patterns in the Argentine political economy? The ‘why’ question is easy 
to answer: the need for far-reaching reform in both the political and economic 
spheres was manifest by the end of the 1990s. The ‘how’ question is more difficult,
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especially in relation to the 1991-95 period. The following chapters demonstrate 
that a convincing answer can be found in the analysis of the international 
dimensions of influence on the reform process, which, it is argued, act as an 
important mediating variable.
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Chapter 5 
Globalisation and State Power
Having established the nature of the political and economic reform 
strategies pursued by Menem, the following three chapters turn their attention to 
the three dimensions of international influence that, the thesis contends, have acted 
to reinforce and propel these processes towards consolidation. These influences 
determined the policy choices of the Menem government, but more importantly 
served to ‘lock in’ the political and economic reform it implemented. As outlined 
in the Introduction, the first is globalisation. The other two - conditionality and 
regionalisation - are conceptualised as being inherently inter-connected with 
globalisation and will be treated as the principal mechanisms by which the 
influence of globalisation is transmitted to developing countries and translated into 
concrete policy outcomes.
Globalisation in the international economy has been equated with the 
increasing redundancy of both states (in terms of actions and choices) and national 
boundaries. Latin American and other developing countries are probably the most 
vulnerable to this type of international change, and also the most conditioned by it, 
particularly if one draws a parallel between processes of globalisation and the 
dissemination of the neoliberal agenda. However, not discounting huge variations 
between Latin American countries, the process of policy-making is usually 
characterised by a high degree of centralisation and the mode of social organisation 
remains in most cases highly statist. The development project, furthermore, 
remains highly dependent on the institutionalisation of certain policies and 
structures by means of state and government action. Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated 
that the reform process in Argentina in the 1990s conforms to both of these 
observations.
In the light of this apparent contradiction, it is the contention here that the 
effects of globalisation have created a ‘paradox of state power’. On the one hand, 
as global finance and transnational actors are increasingly dominant in international 
economic activity, states are seen to be controlled and constrained by markets and
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market-oriented imperatives. Both governments’ room for manoeuvre and the 
range of policy options available in the context of globalisation are seen to be 
vastly reduced, making impossible talk of ‘national’ economic policy or 
autonomous processes of policy choice. This is the result of a fundamental shift in 
the structure of rewards and punishments in the international economy as a result 
of financial and productive globalisation. In this sense, globalisation increases the 
imperative of conformity with the new international policy agenda, and at the same 
time vastly increases the costs of non-conformity. This is ‘locked in’ further by 
such influences as the conditionality provisions attached to loans from international 
financial institutions, as demonstrated in Chapter 6.
On the other hand, this does not imply that states are irrelevant in the 
international economic or political arena. Nor does it imply that policy choice or 
government strategy are redundant concepts, or that policy-makers are ‘Pavlovian 
dogs’1 with reflex responses to an objective set of external conditions and 
incentives. Particularly in the case of countries such as Argentina which are 
concerned with establishing a functioning market economy and the economic 
structures necessary for attracting foreign investment, the role of the state and the 
importance of policy choice is paramount. The state is now concerned with the 
pursuit of competitiveness and the elaboration of strategies aimed at achieving 
credibility in the international arena. Although the traditional functions of the state 
are questioned by the effects of globalisation, then, and the traditional authority of 
the state is challenged by other forms and locations of authority, the role of the 
state in responding to and managing the impact of globalisation remains pivotal.
Thus, paradoxically, the state becomes simultaneously more and less 
powerful under the impact of globalisation. One way of formulating the issue is to 
argue that the state’s autonomy in the international arena has diminished as a result 
of globalisation, while the state’s autonomy in the domestic arena has increased. 
The reduction in the autonomy of the state at the international level acts to increase 
the policy-making capacity of the state at domestic level, even while the process of 
reform closes doors behind itself as a result of the ‘rules of the game’ in the 
globalised economic arena. As such, the power of the national state is increased
1 Diana Tussie: “Globalisation and Conditionality: Struggling to Make a Room o f One’s Own”, 
mimeo, Buenos Aires, March 1997 (pg 2).
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according to the criteria outlined in the Introduction - that is, in terms of the 
implementation capacities of the state and the extent of centralisation.
With respect to the specific case of Argentina, these arguments are used to 
demonstrate the role of international influences in creating the necessary conditions 
for the consolidation of Menem’s political and economic reform agenda. It has 
been argued up to this point that there is a distinction to be made between the 
‘implementation’ and ‘consolidation’ phases of reform. Although the observations 
in this chapter concerning policy choice can clearly be applied to both periods, the 
contention is that the consolidation of reform was facilitated by the described 
effects of globalisation and related international change on state autonomy. The 
process of neoliberal reform that was implemented in the 1989-91 period 
contributed to the progressive ‘internationalisation’ of the state, in which policy 
measures were ‘locked in’ and accorded a certain irreversibility as a result of this 
convergence with the process of globalisation. Once the reform process had been 
more fully developed with the implementation of Convertibility, the consolidation 
of reform was made possible by precisely these international mechanisms.
In effect, the Argentine government very deliberately used international 
constraints to overcome domestic constraints, the latter characterised in this case 
by the crisis of the late 1980s and the pattern of post-war political economy in 
which economic consistency was continually subordinated to political struggle. In 
other words, the government substituted one set of constraints (domestic political 
obligations) with another (international commitments and agreements). In terms of 
political reform, once the economic policy reforms had been ‘locked in’ at the 
international level, the potential leverage of societal interests was sharply reduced, 
and the establishment of a centralised, insulated model of state-society relations 
was facilitated. In other words, the changes associated with globalisation allowed 
for an increase in the autonomy of the Argentine state from the interest-based 
impediments to reform and growth. The ‘consolidation’ phase of reform can 
therefore be distinguished not according to the timing of the onset of globalisation, 
but rather by the ways in which domestic policy change facilitated engagement 
with globalisation and related processes, which in turn allowed for the 
consolidation of the new political and economic orientation.
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\The chronological issue is pivotal to an understanding of Argentine political 
economy in the 1990s. The consolidation of reform stemmed from a genuine 
convergence of interests between the Argentine state and the globalised 
international economy, or between the domestic and the international, from 1991 
onwards. Evidently this sort of convergence was not available during the post-war 
period as a result of Argentina’s choice of development orientation and a consistent 
disjuncture between the Argentine economy and the condition of the international 
economy.2 During the 1980s, domestic economic and political difficulties 
prevented an alliance with international economic agents, and significantly the 
causes of hyperinflation were domestic. In the 1989-91 period, the effects of 
hyperinflation, economic crisis, the government’s populist credentials, and 
President Menem himself all acted to increase the autonomy of the state and allow 
for the implementation of reform. As such, the roots of this autonomy were 
domestic rather than international (relating to globalisation or conditionality, for 
example), and the ‘logic’ suggested by these circumstances would predict the 
decline of this autonomy along with the disappearance of the conditions which 
created it. As Chapter 4 demonstrated, furthermore, the consolidation of reform 
cannot be seen to stem from the destruction of the unions and other social forces. 
The sources of autonomy in the 1991-95 period came from a different quarter - 
international influences - and allowed for the institutionalisation or consolidation 
of Menem’s political and economic restructuring.
This chapter will develop these ideas in the following way, using the 
conception of globalisation outlined in the Introduction. The first section outlines 
the main interpretations of the role of the national state within these processes of 
change and argues for a re-conceptualisation of the relationship between 
globalisation and the state. The second and third sections address the two Tegs’ of 
the paradox of state power, contrasting the constraints on state autonomy as a result 
of conformity with the policy requirements of the globalised political economy 
with the increase in state power at the domestic level. The fourth section further 
refines the theoretical discussion of the relationship between globalisation and the
2 For a fuller exposition o f this ‘disjuncture’. See Colin M. Lewis: “Cycles and Macroeconomic 
Policy since the 1930s” in Colin M. Lewis & Nissa Torrents (eds.): Argentina in the Crisis Years 
(1983-1990): From Alfonsin to Menem (1993).
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state through a more detailed discussion of political and economic reform 
processes in Argentina.
Globalisation and the State
One of the most salient questions generated by these observations, then, 
concerns the impact on the state of these types of international change. The debate 
is now well-established but remains highly divided. On the one hand, the evidence 
clearly points to the fact that the nation-state is a “structured field of action” which 
is poorly adapted to the task of government or governance in the context of 
globalisation. This has led many analysts to posit the need for a “paradigm shift” or 
“new political philosophy” of IR and IPE.3 In some analyses this challenge to the 
former dominance of the national state in matters of national and international 
governance is formulated as the ‘retreat of the state’ or the ‘splintering of the state’ 
either simultaneously with or as a result of the ‘crystallisation of transnational 
structures’.
On the other hand, the state continues to be conceptualised with reference 
to the formulation of strategies that are fundamental to national competitiveness, 
and of mediation between the national and international levels of action and 
interaction (most clearly with regard to managing the more negative domestic 
effects of globalisation). Furthermore, the state is increasingly seen to be the main 
channel through which the maintenance of the global economy itself can be 
achieved. The literature critical of globalisation theory contends that the process of 
globalisation is exaggerated, that international economic activity remains 
dominated by exchange between well-defined nation-states, and that the sorts of 
indicators that are taken to suggest a fundamental change in the nature of 
international organisation and activity do not reflect anything that departs 
substantively from past situations.
3 Philip G. Cemy: keynote lecture to Warwick University ESRC Centre for the Study o f  
Globalisation and Regionalisation conference on “Globalisation vs. Regionalisation: New Trends in 
World Politics”, December 10th-l 1th 1997.
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The State: Obsolescence and Retreat?
The emergence of a global economy has created the situation in which 
progressively international economic organisation is determined by market forces, 
which are beyond the control of national governments. Globalisation is, therefore, 
widely equated with the disappearance of national boundaries and the withering of 
the state, suggested by labels such as the “end of sovereignty” and the “borderless 
world”.4 National boundaries are seen to be dissipated by the dominance of 
transnational actors and forces, and national economic strategies rendered 
increasingly irrelevant by the ‘hegemony’ of international finance and the apparent 
omnipotence of the market. The state thus is forced out of its traditional role as 
agent of economic organisation, in both the national and the international contexts. 
In a report prepared by analysts in the UNDP Human Development Office, for 
example, it is claimed that from a peak in the mid-century the state as an 
“economic entity” is presently in decline, and that globalisation in this respect is 
“the attack from above”. In a passage typical of this sort of view, the report claims 
that
Integration of states into something approximating a single, unified 
international economic system not only has increased their openness 
in a conventional sense, it also has weakened the ability of the state 
to impose its will on other economic actors, notably business firms 
with subsidiaries in a number of countries, employed persons with 
internationally marketable skills and investors with access to 
international capital markets .... International markets have eroded 
political sovereignty; the state increasingly is unable to act 
unilaterally on economic matters and achieve its objectives .... There 
is no turning back from the consequences of liberalisation, market 
processes and technological change .... Supranational forces have 
begun to reduce the state to impotence.5
A more rigorous approach to the issue of the impact on the state of 
globalisation is to examine the ways in which authority in the international political
4 Joseph Camillieri & Jim Falk: The End o f Sovereignty? The Politics o f  a Shrinking and 
Fragmenting World (1992); Kenichi Ohmae: The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the 
Interlinked Economy (1990).
5 Keith Griffin & Azizur Rahman Khan: “Globalization and the Developing World: An Essay on the 
International Dimensions o f Development in the Post-Cold War Era”, United Nations Development 
Programme, November 1992 (pp. 42-3).
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economy is becoming increasingly dispersed among several actors, only one of 
which is the state as traditionally conceived. This is the essence of much of Susan 
Strange’s recent work. Her argument is that “the impersonal forces of world 
markets, integrated over the post-war period more by private enterprise in finance, 
industry and trade than by the co-operative decisions of governments, are now 
more powerful than the states to whom ultimate political authority over society and 
economy is supposed to belong”. Largely as a result of technological change, the 
authority of states has been displaced by the authority of the market, and markets 
are now “the masters over the governments of states” in a reversal of the “state- 
market balance of power”.6 In this way the ability of national governments to 
regulate or compensate is severely and increasingly limited.
However, Strange, in contrast with some other globalisation ‘theorists’ such 
as Ohmae, does not contend that the state has ‘disappeared’ or become obsolete. 
Her argument centres on the notion of the authority of the state, and the way in 
which its dispersion, in her view, has rendered the state “hollow” or “defective” as 
an institution.8 The state is less effective in the provision of fundamental matters 
which the market alone has never been capable of providing, such as personal 
security, stable money, a system of law and a variety of public goods such as water 
and drainage. Governments’ failure to manage the national economy effectively 
should not be attributed to incompetence, but rather governments should be seen as 
“the victims of the market economy”.9
This feeds into the ‘transnationalisation’ research agenda which perceives 
the international political economy to be increasingly dominated by ‘non-state’ 
actors. These are most obviously TNCs of varying descriptions, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and transnational social movements, as well as such 
groupings as international terrorist networks, mafias, drugs cartels, and religious 
communities.10 These groupings of identifiable ‘actors’ are accompanied by the
6 Strange: The Retreat o f  the State: The Diffusion o f  World Power in the World Economy (1996), pg 
4.
7 ibid., pg 78.
8 Strange: “The Defective State”, Daedalus 124,2, 1995 (pg 57).
9 The Retreat o f the State, pg 14.
10 See Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.): Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, 
Domestic Structures and International Institutions (1995); Strange: The Retreat o f  the State; James 
H. Mittelman: Globalisation: Critical Reflections (1996).
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archetypally transnational forces of international finance and banking, and a variety 
of inter- or supra-national institutions. The idea of transnationalisation (or 
transnationalism) is not new11, but nevertheless has assumed new dimensions with 
the expansion of the debate on globalisation. The value of these perspectives is 
hardly in dispute. The point at which these, and the other conceptions outlined 
above, run into some trouble is when the increasing visibility and importance of 
such actors and forces is assumed to displace or invalidate the national state, rather 
than to modify its role and position in the national and international settings.
In effect, the versions of globalisation theory that perceive a ‘withering 
away’ of the state, to whatever degree, feed into a current that may be labelled the 
‘politics of anti-politics’. This can be found quite as much in the IR and political 
science academic literature as in the rhetoric of politicians and institutions 
throughout the world. In Latin America, the recent wave of liberalisation was often 
portrayed as the divorce of politics from economics: indeed, in its most 
conventional formulation, the advantages of liberalisation are seen to accrue 
principally from the removal of politics from the workings of the economy. In this 
way, the forces of the free market are seen to be freed from the political spanner 
which induces such evils as corruption, rent-seeking, protection and inefficiency. In 
the international context, this can be described as a version of “anti-political 
liberalism”.12
As the preceding chapters showed, this was an important motivation for 
reform under Menem. The economic difficulties experienced in Argentina in the 
post-war period have been widely attributed to the effects of excessive state 
regulation, which created a highly politicised economy incapable of functioning 
under the weight of political pressures. Apart from specific reforms aimed at 
reconfiguring the structure of political interests and state-society relations, the 
reform of the state was seen as essential both for increasing economic efficiency 
and for eliminating the arena in which societal pressures could be brought to bear.
11 One o f the most well-known ‘transnationalisation’ analyses is Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. 
Nye (eds.): Transnational Relations and World Politics (1971). See also Keohane & Nye: Power 
and Interdependence (1977) and James N. Rosenau: The Study o f Global Interdependence: Essays 
on the Transnationalisation o f  World Affairs (1980).
12 Paul Hirst & Grahame Thompson: Globalization in Question: The International Economy and 
the Possibilities o f  Governance (1996), pg 176.
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As we have seen, privatisation, deregulation and administrative reforms were the 
most important elements in Menem’s strategy, as well as the placing of policy­
making responsibility in the hands of government technocrats. As a result, the 
bloated state sector was significantly dismantled and consequently ceased to 
perform the political and economic functions with which it had been charged from 
the 1940s. It is precisely these sorts of policies throughout the world, combined 
with the nature of globalisation, which have generated what has been called the 
‘phenomenon of state denial’.13 Globalisation, however, is mistakenly seen as a 
process in which the state is ‘retreating’ or becoming irrelevant, overtaken by 
transnational and non-state forms of authority. We have already seen, furthermore, 
that particularly in the case of Latin American and other developing countries, the 
state cannot be wished away quite so easily.
The Argument for a Re-Conceptualisation
Rather than obsolescence and retreat, the process is one of the reorientation 
of the national state, both institutionally and territorially defined. What is clear is 
that the condition and direction of the world economy in recent years poses a 
fundamentally new situation for governments that John Ruggie has termed 
“disembeddedness”. This is seen to manifest itself in three ways. First, the ways in 
which policy-makers “visualise the basic contours of their world” have been 
fundamentally altered by the trends in the international economy associated with 
globalisation. The “mental maps of spaces and structures” which previously served 
as reference points for those involved in the business of government and 
governance are no longer completely valid and need to be modified to take account 
of new realities. Second, the nature of policy-making has changed so that 
“international as well as domestic economic policy targets are increasingly elusive 
because instrumentalities are no longer effective”. Third, globalisation has eroded 
the “state-society compact” which sustained the post-war international economic 
order and its constituent policy environments. The nature of this ‘compact’ in 
Argentina was outlined in Chapter 2, and the details of its erosion under Menem
13 Linda Weiss: The Myth o f  the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era (1998), 
Pg 2.
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described in Chapter 4. This issue is linked with the question of the ascendancy of 
the neoliberal ideology in the new global order, which is seen to be of increasing 
concern.14
To these sources of disembeddedness, we can add a further dimension: that 
the state is required to compete and co-exist with other, non-state forms of 
authority that globalisation is seen to have created and to perpetuate. Clearly 
globalisation has brought with it a “changing geography of power”15, in which state 
power is supplemented and challenged (but not necessarily replaced) by new 
dimensions of power such as electronic space, transnational social actors, 
‘borderless’ firms, new international legal regimes and the world of highly mobile 
international capital. Therefore, the globalised international arena can be 
conceptualised as a site of competing forms of authority, which intersect and 
interact in both complementary and contradictory ways. The emergence of non­
state forms of authority (in the shape of inter-governmental institutions such as the 
World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), NGOs like Greenpeace 
and Amnesty International, and transnational or multinational corporations such as 
IBM, Philips and Glaxo) co-exist and overlap with the more traditional 
conceptions of authority based in national state structures, rather than creating a 
zero-sum situation in which the advancement of the ‘global’ purportedly occurs 
only to the detriment of the ‘national’.
The role of the national state can therefore be approached in a number of 
different ways. Clearly globalisation has altered the ways in which states are able to 
exercise authority, and the dimensions of economic and social life over which they 
have meaningful control. Economic globalisation has produced a marked reduction 
in both the regulatory role and the regulatory capacity of states as a result of the 
processes of deregulation and liberalisation necessary for participation in the global 
economy. In this sense, it may be that the process of globalisation is producing a 
shift in the capacities of national states and in the nature of state power which
14 John Gerard Ruggie: “At Home Abroad, Abroad At Home: International Liberalisation and 
Domestic Stability in the New World Economy”, Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies 24, 
3, 1995.
15 Saskia Sassen: “Territory and Territoriality in the Global Economy”, paper presented to the 
conference on ‘Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System’, Warwick University ESRC 
Centre for the Study o f Globalisation and Regionalisation, October 31 st-November 1st 1997.
137
/
amounts frequently to a form of “governance without government”.16 The point is 
that the exclusive authority of nation-states has been undermined by recent 
processes of global change, and that nation-states are currently engaged in 
redefining their role and functions in accordance with the demands or opportunities 
posed by globalisation and, furthermore, in response to the development of new
17forms of authority which are not directly linked to governments or states. As 
Ruggie observes, the issue is not about the replacement of the national state by 
non-state actors or institutions, but rather about the changes in the nature of the
1 ftstates system that these are likely to produce.
It is, therefore, misleading to see the forces of globalisation as completely 
‘disembedded’ from the state. It may well be that these new economic actors 
(whether firms, institutions or global markets) rely fundamentally on the survival 
and perpetuation of the state, as this is the only remaining enforcement mechanism 
available.19 At the very least, states are required to create the circumstances or 
conditions in which economic agents can act effectively. Furthermore, the state is 
still the only arena in which the norms and requirements of the global economy can 
be produced and maintained, and therefore economic agents are likely to be 
unwilling to remove it. In this sense, the perpetuation of the global economy relies 
on state strategy for the formulation and implementation of policies consistent with 
its orientation and requirements. Both the process of globalisation and the more 
concrete manifestations of it in the international economy rely on the national state 
to create and re-create the conditions in which it can flourish and become 
consolidated. The nation-state, therefore, remains the primary arena in which 
globalisation is produced, maintained and manifested. Globalisation “entails a 
transcending of exclusive national territoriality yet is implanted in national 
territories and institutions”.20
16 James N. Rosenau & Emst-Otto Czempiel (eds.): Governance without Government: Order and 
Change in World Politics (1992).
17 This refers principally to policy-making authority, and particularly to authority over financial 
markets and macroeconomic policy. See Jan Aarte Scholte: “Global Capitalism and the State”, 
International Affairs 73, 3, 1997.
18 John Gerard Ruggie: “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations”, International Organisation 47, 1, Winter 1993.
19 Cemy: keynote lecture.
20 Sassen, op.cit.
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The new strategic and policy function of states may be best understood if 
we dispense with the assumption that a process which occurs in the territory of a 
national state is necessarily a national process.21 Although statements of this sort 
are extremely common in the literature both on foreign policy and on 
transnationalisation / internationalisation / globalisation, the concept is important 
in the understanding of the relationship between globalisation and state power and 
between the global economy and the state. The processes and results of 
globalisation may be inherently transnational in nature, but there is no necessary 
incompatibility between this and the argument that these processes of 
transnationalisation or internationalisation remain effectively located in the 
territorial and (more importantly) institutional structure of the state. The latter 
should not be misrepresented as the antithesis of the international or the global, but 
rather as a form of authority which is increasingly (although still unevenly and 
often incompletely) re-oriented towards and inserted into the new processes and 
power structures associated with the globalised international environment. 
Simplifications to the effect of “a modem nation-state that is not in serious 
difficulty, let alone in crisis, is one in which the strength of the economy enables it 
largely to determine its own policy on investment”22 ignore the significant changes 
in the state under the impact of global change which have contributed in various 
ways to its strengthening rather than to its weakening, as the following sections 
show. Similarly statements along the lines of “Globalisation: Can the State Strike
O'X •Back?” miss the point in assuming an inherent opposition between the national 
and the international or transnational forces and the nation-state.
This argument gains additional strength when placed in the context of 
legitimacy and, perhaps, in more normative conceptions of the functions of 
governance. It is not necessary to become embroiled in discussions on the impact 
of globalisation on accountability and democracy to argue that the transnational 
agents and structures that presently coexist or compete with states do not (and 
probably will not) possess the same legitimacy as the state, even though the
21 Sassen, op.cit.
22 Geoffrey Hawthorn: “The Crises of Southern States”, Political Studies XLII, 1994.
23 Vincent Cable: “Globalisation: Can the State Strike Back?”, The World Today, May 1996.
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immediate normative appeal of the latter may be in decline or ‘crisis’.24 On the 
other hand, this optimism is contested by neo-Gramscian analyses of current global 
trends, which observe what Stephen Gill has termed a “new constitutionalism”. 
According to this conception, the global system is dominated by “a legal and 
political strategy for separating economic forces and policies from broad political 
accountability, securing management of the economy in the hands of central 
bankers and technocrats responsive to transnational capital”.25 Similarly for Robert 
Cox, although writing earlier than Gill’s more contemporary analyses, the 
“internationalisation of the state” - that is, “the global process whereby national 
policies and practices have been adjusted to the exigencies of the world economy 
of international production” - is seen to “[give] precedence to certain state 
agencies - notably ministries of finance and prime ministers’ offices - which are
97key points in the adjustment of domestic to international economic policy”. The 
main concern for this stream of analysis, therefore, is the ascendancy of the neo­
liberal discourse in international relations, which is seen to be fundamentally tied 
to the process of globalisation. The “new constitutionalism” is about the “locking- 
in” of neo-liberal policies and the self-regulating market in ways which emphasise 
‘rules-based’ or ‘disciplinary’ organisation in the global economy. The question, 
therefore, is how political challenges to the dominance of de-politicised market 
forces can be accommodated.
The present analysis, therefore, sees the situation of the national state as one 
of re-orientation and re-definition, in line with both the demands or opportunities 
created by globalisation for policy-making and governance and the evolution of
24 John Dunn: “Introduction: Crisis o f the Nation-State?”, and other articles in special edition of  
Political Studies XLVII, 1994.
25 Stephen Gill: “Analysing New Forms o f Authority: New Constitutionalism, Panopticism and 
Market Civilization”, paper presented to the conference on ‘Non-State Actors and Authority in the 
Global System’, Warwick University ESRC Centre for the Study of Globalisation and 
Regionalisation, 31 October-1 November 1997.
26 Robert W. Cox: Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making o f  History 
(1987), pg 253.
27 Robert W. Cox: “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory”, Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies 10,2, Summer 1981.
28 Gill: “Analysing New Forms o f Authority” and “Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and 
Disciplinary Neoliberalism”, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 24, 3, 1995. For other 
analyses o f globalisation in the neo-Gramscian vein, see Peter Wilkin: “New Myths for the South: 
Globalisation and the Conflict between Private Power and Freedom”, Third World Quarterly 17,2, 
1996.
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new forms of authority in the global setting. It does not share the view that the 
global economy is a ‘myth’, but it does subscribe to the idea that globalisation 
remains driven by national developments and maintained by national strategies. 
The question of whether globalisation leads to a convergence of national 
institutional structures or policies is, however, more complicated. Zysman argues 
forcefully that “the national institutional foundations of the several market systems 
are neither washed away nor compressed into homogeneous convergence by 
growing international interconnections, or at least not yet.” His view is that 
“increasingly in the years to come, the politics of trade ... will be about reconciling 
differently structured political economies that express different values ... As border 
restrictions diminish, negotiations are increasingly about the domestic operation of 
markets and the arrangements of national institutions”.30
However, although the institutional structures of national states may well 
remain functionally oriented towards the requirements of the individual case, there 
are two ways in which this argument needs to be reformulated. The first is in terms 
of policy convergence. It is highly unlikely that states will cease to be individual 
and specific to the national setting, or that globalisation will contribute to a 
converged form of Kantian perpetual peace in the modem world. On the contrary, 
globalisation contributes as much to divergence as to convergence. Ian Clark’s 
explanation of twentieth-century international politics in terms of the opposing 
forces of globalisation and fragmentation is the best attempt to take account of the 
diverging forces in world order.31 However, his understanding of globalisation 
conflates a number of different perspectives which together do not add up to an 
adequate conception of globalisation. What Clark means by the term 
‘globalisation’, it appears, is in fact ‘integration’, and the analysis works far more 
effectively if the terms are thus altered. For our purposes, then, building on the 
ambiguities of Clark’s terminology, globalisation can be seen to contribute to both 
integration and fragmentation in international politics or the global environment: 
integration in terms of convergence on a particular policy model by those structures
29 John Zysman: “The Myth o f a ‘Global’ Economy: Enduring National Foundations and Emerging 
Regional Realities”, New Political Economy 1 ,2,1996.
30 Zysman: pp 180-1.
31 Globalisation and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century (1997).
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and agents that are driving the process of globalisation, and fragmentation in terms 
of the increasing sub-national conflicts, the tensions between ideas and ideologies 
and increasing levels of inequality, as well as in the above-mentioned context of 
institutional structures and national policy objectives.
There is a strong argument to be made in favour of the idea of convergence 
on a specific set of economic policy objectives, broadly encased in the 
‘Washington Consensus’, but only with the clear understanding that states will 
pursue these within the constraints of domestic institutional structures. While it is 
possible to object to the orientation of the neo-classical economic model that has 
become prevalent in large swathes of the world, the consensus on development that 
has coincided with the end of the Cold War (and, possibly, been propelled by 
globalisation) is remarkable, as is the consequent consensus on the social
'X'Jinstitutions that go with this model. This does not imply, however, that the 
Washington Consensus is uncontested, just as globalisation can be seen to generate 
as much divergence as convergence, and as much conflict as cooperation. The path 
towards the pursuit of these policy objectives, as well as the outcome of the 
policies themselves, remain deeply embedded in the historical and institutional 
structures of the state in question. The caveat, therefore, in arguments about policy 
convergence is that development trajectories still diverge and are likely to continue 
to do so, whether or not the government subscribes wholeheartedly to the policy 
model which dominates the globalisation process.
The second modification of Zysman’s arguments concerns interests, which 
is only implicit in the analysis he offers. National states increasingly appear to be 
converging on a kind of consensus centred around the necessity and desirability of 
consolidating and strengthening the global economy, although crucially this does 
not preclude serious discussions (and disagreements) on the ways in which the 
impacts of globalisation should be managed. There is a commonly-held conviction 
that those countries or actors that do not accept and participate in the new global 
environment will be left behind. Whether or not this is the case is not quite the 
point. What matters is that states and societies increasingly (although still not
32 Barry Gills & George Philip: “Editorial: Towards Convergence in Development Policy?: 
Challenging the ‘Washington Consensus’ and Restoring the Historicity o f Divergent Development 
Trajectories”, Third World Quarterly 17, 4, 1996 (pg 587).
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uniformly in the case of the latter) see their interests as being fundamentally linked 
to the global political economy to the extent that questioning is largely limited to 
the type of participation that should be pursued and the best ways of offsetting the 
negative repercussions of this participation, rather than whether to participate at all.
Having established the continuing centrality of the state, and coming back 
to the ‘phenomenon of state denial’, it is also the contention of the thesis that the 
process of globalisation and the ‘rolling back the state’ have acted to strengthen the 
state in Argentina and elsewhere in Latin America. Although the state has beaten 
its retreat from the Argentine economy, it is clear that the economic gains 
associated with the reform process (based on the ‘dismantling’ of the state) has 
greatly strengthened both its authority and its autonomy. Similarly, globalisation 
has acted to create the political and economic space for the successful installation 
of neoliberal reform and therefore to ‘rescue’ the state from the breakdown of the 
1980s. The following sections develop these arguments in the context of the 
‘paradox of state power’ outlined at the start of this chapter.
The Paradox of State Power
Financial Globalisation and the Advantages o f  Conformity
We have seen that there are important ways in which the ‘power’ of the 
state (in regulatory terms) has been reduced as a result of the autonomous 
functioning of international markets, and that the process of globalisation has 
implied a certain narrowing of available and feasible domestic and foreign policy 
options, especially for Latin American and other developing countries. This can be 
traced to a fundamental change in the structure of rewards and punishments in the 
international economy as a result of the primacy of investment flows and the 
internationalisation of economic activity. This is the primary means by which the 
influence of globalisation manifests itself at the national and policy levels.
This development in the international economy has been termed “embedded 
financial orthodoxy”33 which has been regarded as the successor to the system of
33 See, for example, Philip G. Cemy: “The Infrastructure of the Infrastructure? Toward ‘Embedded 
Financial Orthodoxy’ in the International Political Economy” in Ronen P. Palan & Barry Gills
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‘embedded liberalism’.34 In this conception, finance has become the lifeblood of 
the international economy and, by extension, an essential nutrient for growth in the 
national and international context. The predominance or ‘hegemony’ of 
international capital is seen to have a structural autonomy which carries far greater 
weight than states and in effect controls state actions. This returns to the argument 
relating to the ‘transnationalisation’ of the international economy at the expense of 
state autonomy in policy making terms, creating a new international structure in 
which states and national boundaries are increasingly irrelevant.
It may well be that the new hegemonic power in the post-hegemonic era is 
global finance. Even non-Gramscian analysis can appreciate that finance has 
probably become, or is well on its way to becoming, the foundation of the global 
economic system, or “the infrastructure of the infrastructure”. The rewards of 
liberalisation, both in economic terms and in terms of political capital, have 
become inestimable in comparison with the situation even a decade ago. 
International investment is increasingly directed and driven by risk assessment and 
credit rating, both of which are elaborated on the basis of orthodox economic 
criteria in keeping with the neoliberal orientation of the globalising political 
economy. In policy terms this is embodied in concepts such as the ‘Washington 
consensus’ and the policy prescriptions of international financial institutions. For 
developing countries, these emphasise the importance of trade and financial 
liberalisation, in which the establishment of a favourable and stable exchange rate 
is key. Over-valuation reduces the competitiveness of exports in the international 
marketplace and the relative competitiveness of the export sector domestically. 
Growth is seen to depend on eliminating the anti-export bias of former policies and 
on structural transformations in the economy that encourage productivity, driven 
principally by long-term investment.
In this way, development has come to be equated with the policy 
prescriptions embodied in the Washington Consensus after half a century of
(eds.): Transcending the State-Global Divide: A Neostructuralist Agenda in International Relations 
(1994).
34 Ronen Palan & Jason Abbott with Phil Deans: State Strategies in the Global Political Economy 
(1996), pg 23.
35 Cemy: “The Infrastructure”, pg 227.
36 For a more extensive analysis, see Shigeru Otsubo: “Globalisation: A New Role for Developing 
Countries in an Integrating World”, World Bank, July 1996, especially summary point 20 & pg 6.
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experimentation with development models that emphasised inward-looking 
strategies based on variations of the import substitution idea. Even institutions such 
as the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) that spent much of the post-war period emphasising ISI and closed 
regionalism have started to produce analysis consistent with the new international 
economic orthodoxy: titles of recent publications such as “Policies to Improve 
Linkages with the Global Economy”37 suggest a fundamental acceptance of the 
proposition that the realistic options for pursuing growth and development are 
increasingly few. ECLAC, for example, states that “to make sustainable changes in 
production patterns with social equity, the economies of the region must improve 
their linkages with the international economy” through a comprehensive package 
of trade, exchange rate, export-promotion and “productive development and 
finance” policies.38
We have seen that reform in Argentina was driven by the need to establish 
stability and the ‘right’ policy framework for the attraction of foreign investment 
funds. This involved a move away from inward-looking or heterodox economic 
strategies towards full-scale economic liberalisation and the neoliberal 
restructuring of the national economy. The Convertibility Plan implemented in 
1991 was pivotal in creating the exchange rate and macroeconomic conditions for 
precisely this purpose. Chapter 3 demonstrated the increase in Argentina’s 
dependence on foreign capital, and the mechanisms by which continued growth 
became premised on external capital flows: the Convertibility Law constrained the 
possibilities for financing the deficit and making payments on the foreign debt by 
means of monetary policy. However, we have also seen the huge increase in the 
availability of such funds to Argentina: by 1994, Argentina had become the third 
largest recipient of FDI flows world-wide. This can be attributed to the changes in 
the international financial system associated with globalisation in conjunction with 
the impact of domestic reform. Given the connections between growth and 
international finance in this context, the pursuit of policies which will sustain 
attractiveness to investors becomes increasingly important. These, then, are the
37 ECLAC, 1995.
38 op.cit.: pp. 15-16.
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‘rewards’ available in the globalised international economy for conformity with the 
dominant policy agenda.
In more general terms, the structural constraints on economic development 
outlined in Chapter 3 lend weight to the argument that globalisation offers genuine 
rewards for Argentina, perhaps more than some other Latin American and 
developing countries. The fact that Argentina is a net importer of capital for the 
purposes of sustaining relatively rapid growth makes participation in the processes 
of globalisation, as well as compliance with IMF conditionality (as the next chapter 
shows), of significant utility. Hence, in the Argentine case, ‘submission’ to the 
disciplines of globalisation becomes paramount in order both to produce and to 
sustain growth. The ‘rewards’ on offer, therefore, are both general and specific in 
nature and relate to long-term development objectives as well as short-term 
financing.
Conversely, and possibly more importantly, the costs of non-conformity 
with the new policy ‘consensus’ seem to be the principal incentive for compliance. 
It has increasingly been acknowledged, largely through bitter experience, that 
investment funds can flow out quite as quickly as they can flow in, and that gaining 
and maintaining international confidence has become the key to securing growth 
and solvency. The experience of the ‘Tequila’ crisis in Mexico and Argentina is 
one of the most recent demonstrations of this. As such, the behaviour of foreign 
capital in response to perceived risk in developing countries shows clearly that 
there is a very narrow range of options with which countries can manoeuvre. 
Newspaper headlines such as “Globalisation. It’s not a luxury anymore, it’s a 
necessity” reinforce the idea that there is very little alternative to the adoption of 
policies that coincide with the demands of the international economy. Conveniently 
perhaps, this constitutes a powerful justification for the implementation of such 
policies which has been used routinely throughout Latin America in order to ‘sell’ 
often unpopular adjustment measures to sceptical electorates.
The theoretical problem arises with the empirical evidence which continues 
to demonstrate that despite the new rules of the game, national responses to 
globalisation are far from identical. This is by no means a system which is
39 Wall Street Journal, 26 September 1996.
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operating in the automated manner that neo-classical economists may have liked to 
predict. In the report cited above, ECLAC goes on to state that “there are, of 
course, no universally accepted valid paradigms for improving international 
competitiveness; the experiences of East Asia show that, although there may be a 
common denominator in the general approach, different paths have been taken in 
terms of the details of policy implementation, instruments and institutions”.40 The 
variations in national responses to the challenges of globalisation are rooted in 
distinct institutional structures and historical social configurations of states and 
societies. These fundamentally condition the ways in which policy is formulated 
and implemented, but also the political task of constructing an alternative 
‘compact’ between state and society which will reflect changing international and 
domestic circumstances and requirements. In Philip Cemy’s terms, the common 
influence of globalisation is “multilayered and uncertain”41, and it is precisely the 
task of the nation-state to mediate this uncertainty. This, then, leads us to the 
second leg of the paradox of state power.
The ‘Competition State ’
It was argued above that the pursuit of growth and development have 
become linked to conformity with the policy prescriptions of the neoliberal agenda 
which informs such constructs as the ‘Washington consensus’. These are, in effect, 
the ‘rules’ by which the game is played. The ‘game’ itself, however, is about the 
pursuit of international competitiveness, and conformity with the rules ensures that 
the game is played to maximum effect. As a result of globalisation, then, there has 
been a fundamental change in the nature of competition between states, which now 
involves the re-organisation of the state away from its more traditional ‘welfare’ 
function towards a role that can be classified as the pursuit of national 
competitiveness. Echoing the observation made above about the importance of 
changing interests in conceptions of the state, “the very concept of the national 
interest is expanding to embrace the transnational dimension in new ways: the so- 
called competition state is itself obliged by the imperatives of global competition to
40 op.cit., pg 16.
41 “The Infrastructure”, pg 233.
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expand transnationalisation”.42 The idea of the competition state is characterised by 
two principal elements: (a) an overriding belief that national competitiveness is the 
means of achieving economic growth and improved living standards, and (b) a shift 
from principally demand-side to supply-side measures in governments’ competitive 
policies 43 In the terms used above, these would correspond to (a) the nature of the 
game itself, and (b) the (policy-based) rules by which the game is played.
In broader terms, the traditional bases of the interactions of states in the 
international arena - that is, competition for territory or control over territorially- 
bound natural resources - have been superseded by a new competitive ‘game’ in 
which the rewards are world market shares. The corollary of this observation is that 
“industrial policy and trade policy are becoming more important than defence and 
foreign policy”. In this sense, interactions between states are still premised on the 
search for allies and alliances, but these will be commercial rather than military in 
nature44 Furthermore, allies are not solely other states, but rather are also 
multinational enterprises that are attractive for their ability to raise finance for both 
investment and the development of technology. This can be attributed to the 
burgeoning costs of participation in the competitive international game “whether 
we look at competition from other firms who are also striving for larger market 
shares, or whether we look at governments trying to make sure that the economies 
for whose performance they are held responsible stay up with the competition in 
wealth-creation coming from other economies”.45 This, then, explains the 
perceived necessity for policies which attract international investment as a means 
of competing in the international arena.
Although virtually without exception the activities of states have become 
tied to the pursuit of national competitiveness in the international arena, the nature 
and extent of the influence and role of the state itself remains an area of dispute. 
Strange and others, as we have seen, would claim that the state’s authority has 
diminished or been dispersed, and therefore that the state is a hollow institution 
that is seriously compromised in its ability to perform its traditional, or indeed new,
42 Cemy: “The Infrastructure”, pg
43 Palan, Abbott & Deans: pg 4.
44 Strange: “The Defective State”, pgs 55 & 56.
45 The Retreat o f the State, pp. 9-10.
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functions. Others argue that the state has assumed new dimensions and “new areas
of control” as a result of the imperatives of competitiveness. Crucially, however,
the argument that globalisation is associated with a dispersion of state power,
especially in terms of the ‘loss of sovereignty’ to markets and to global and
regional institutions, is not necessarily incompatible with a revitalisation of the
state from a more ‘national’ perspective46, particularly in developing countries. In
Argentina, although the power of the state was reduced in international terms
(particularly with regard to policy-making autonomy), it increased in the domestic
context as a result of a greater political and economic space for reform offered by
currents of international change.
The Argentine state, therefore, has been strengthened both by this space for
reform and also by the imperatives for state action that globalisation generates.
Apart from the elaboration of competition strategies, the state has assumed new
importance in the management of the impact of globalisation on the domestic
political and economic arena. For example, James Rosenau argued in 1989 that:
Indeed, and ironically, the external linkages withering the state’s 
scope and authority in domestic affairs can also be a source of its 
widening competence in such matters. The shrinking economic, 
social and political distances that have transnationalised global 
affairs and made them ever more complex and interdependent have 
so greatly increased the vulnerability of domestic economies to 
external influences as to render domestic market forces decreasingly 
capable of sustaining stability and progress. So, in order to cope 
minimally with the internationalisation of their market and banking 
systems, states have had to develop institutions and adopt policies 
that extend their competence to intervene in the flow of goods, 
services and money at home. In so doing, however, those very same 
institutions and policies have become dependent on the course of 
events abroad whose vagaries they are designed to manage ... Stated 
differently, an inverse relationship between internal controls and 
external vulnerabilities appears to have emerged as a prime 
parameter within which the modem state must function.47
Rosenau goes on to conclude that the state is thus experiencing simultaneously a 
widening and a withering of its “competence”, and that therefore the focus of
46 Vincent Cable: “The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss o f Economic Power”, 
Daedalus 124,2, 1995 (pp 23-4).
47 “The State in an Era o f Cascading Politics: Wavering Concept, Widening Competence, Withering 
Colossus, or Weathering Change?” in James A. Caporaso (ed.): The Elusive State: International 
and Comparative Perspectives (1989), pp 34-5.
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analysis must be the strategies of adaptation that states employ in order to respond 
to processes of change.48 In this sense, then, the primary function of the state - to 
manage the market or, more accurately in the present situation, the effects of the 
operation of the free market - remains intact, but the demands of this function and 
the nature of the task have been fundamentally altered by the processes of 
international economic change. This was seen clearly in Argentine reactions to the 
Mexican crisis of late 1994, and more generally in its increased autonomy which 
permitted the consolidation of neoliberal reform. The following section outlines 
these points in more detail.
Globalisation, Reform and the ‘Rescue’ of the Argentine State
To give some empirical substance to the theoretical discussion, then, the 
international processes which created a change in the nature of the game and its 
rules coincided in Argentina with wide-scale political and economic reform 
necessitated by situations of domestic crisis. The impetus for reform stemmed from 
a widespread perception of the complete breakdown of the state and its ability to 
manage the markets following the hyperinflation of the late 1980s. In a speech in 
the early 1990s, Erman Gonzalez stated that reform was due to the limitations 
imposed by the market rather than to any ideological or other conviction on the part 
of the government49 In essence, his period in office marked the start of this new 
conception of the inability of the state to fulfil its traditional function of regulating 
and controlling the market, both in national and international terms. These 
perceptions echo the more theoretical arguments advanced in the ‘retreat of the 
state’ hypothesis, as well as the first leg of the paradox of state power.
In this sense, however, it may be that globalisation also provided precisely 
the conditions in which the state was able to publicly acknowledge the need to 
recompose itself. This can be seen in simple terms as an excuse for some of the less 
palatable aspects of adjustment (the ‘blame it on the global’ idea is long established 
in Latin America) or, in more sophisticated terms, as a means by which the state 
became able to redefine its relationship with society through economic and
48 ibid., pp 36-44.
49 Interview with Guillermo Mondino, 5 June 1997.
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political reform. The devolution of some of the traditional aspects of state authority 
to transnational forces (whether international markets or financial institutions) can 
therefore be seen as directly in the interests of the state at the given time rather than 
as a measure that compromises these interests. Put differently, it is clear that the 
Argentine state was well served by the trends associated with globalisation that 
have led to a change in the nature of authority in the global system.
Therefore, in the context of the political and economic exhaustion of the 
Argentine state at the end of the 1980s, globalisation can be seen to have had a 
positive effect, at least in the short term. The term ‘the rescue of the nation-state’, 
borrowed from Alan Milward’s analysis of the development of European 
integration, seems to be highly applicable.50 Globalisation created the situation in 
which the state was able to pursue those reform strategies which would relieve the 
political and economic crisis in which it found itself embroiled. It did so both by 
creating an element of external legitimacy and an impression of external 
compulsion, and also by offering a new basis for political and economic strategy at 
a time when previous development models had been completely delegitimised. The 
‘rescue’ argument, however, hinges on the removal of direct policy-making 
authority from the state to the global level and, as Chapter 7 demonstrates, to the 
regional level. In Milward’s original formulation this referred to perceptions that 
certain policy issues could be addressed better at the regional than at the national 
level, given both the condition of the national arena in the post-war period and, in 
some cases, the nature of the issues in question. In the case of Argentina, both of 
these arguments apply. The national state was also in a condition of crisis (although 
clearly of a very different sort), and its capabilities significantly limited as a result. 
Similarly, globalisation has created the situation in which economic policy and 
development issues are far more effectively addressed through engagement with 
the international economy, as a result of the rewards / punishments structure 
discussed above.
Moreover, the resulting ‘internationalisation’ of the Argentine state in 
accordance with Cox’s formulation mentioned earlier provided the conditions for
50 Alan S. Milward: The European Rescue o f the Nation-State (1992). See also Alan S. Milward & 
Vibeke Sorensen: “Interdependence or Integration? A National Choice” in Milward et al: The 
Frontier o f  National Sovereignty: History and Theory (1993).
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the consolidation (in the 1991/2-1995 period) of the neoliberal reform trajectory 
established in the first couple of years of the Menem government. Put differently, 
domestic necessities and the orientation of the global arena intersected in order to 
produce an environment of compatibility between national and international 
priorities. As such, the direction of reform and specific policy measures were 
accorded an ‘irreversibility’ as a result of their insertion into currents of 
international economic change. The Convertibility Plan is a clear example: 
Cavallo’s suggestions in late 1991 and early 1992 of modifying the exchange rate 
system were effectively vetoed by the hostile reaction of the markets to this 
proposal.51
This, then, cements the central contention of the thesis: that the 
‘internationalisation of the state’ as a result of globalisation and related forms of 
international influence created the possibilities for the consolidation of reform in 
the 1991/2-95 period. The timing of the debate on globalisation in Argentina 
further strengthens this argument. Until about 1993, the political and economic 
discourse in Argentina centred on crisis and reform, and specifically on the concept 
of economic internationalisation, rather than on globalisation as an identifiable 
process in the international economy and Argentina’s participation in it. Although 
it is extremely difficult to define the moment of the ‘onset’ of globalisation, it 
appears that globalisation took hold in the international economy at least a few 
years before the debate took hold in Argentina. This in turn raises the questions of 
why and how globalisation as such became incorporated into political and 
economic thinking in Argentina at this specific juncture.
There are perhaps two convincing explanations for the triggering of the 
debate around 1993 rather than earlier.52 The first can be identified as the European 
monetary crisis of 1992, which fed into an increasingly generalised perception of 
the inability of states to control markets and international capital. Apart from 
ideological currents which emphasised the free market over state intervention 
(particularly the neoliberal discourses of Reagan and Thatcher), the monetary crisis
51 Pablo Gerchunoff & Jos6 Luis Machinea: “Un Ensayo sobre la Polltica Econ6mica despu£s de la 
Estabilizacion” in Pablo Bustos (ed.): Mas Alla de la Estabilidad: Argentina en la Epoca de la 
Globalizacion y  la Regionalizacion (1995), pg 45.
52 These points were suggested to me originally by Guillermo Mondino, and then discussed at length 
with others such as Diana Tussie.
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highlighted the impossibility of regulation by states of international (and national) 
economic activity. We have seen that this was an important part of the rethinking 
of the relationship between state and market in Argentina, particularly in the 1989- 
91 period. The second related factor was the objective observation of the wave of 
FDI throughout the world, which not only reinforced these perceptions of 
international capital but also, through its emphasis on developing countries, 
incorporated a host of new actors into the global economy. As noted earlier, 
Argentina had become the third largest recipient of FDI world-wide in 1994, 
although the effects of the Tequila crisis in December 1994 and throughout 1995 
substantially reversed this position. Significantly, foreign capital was attracted to 
Argentina mainly in connection with the processes of neoliberal reform, which 
gained genuine credibility after the Convertibility Plan. The early capital flows 
associated with the first privatisations were propelled from 1992 onwards by 
important agreements with the IMF and the negotiation of a Brady Plan debt 
reduction agreement in 1992/3.
In Argentina, then, the incorporation of globalisation into thinking and 
strategy was in some ways quite a sudden shift53, which assisted the process of 
structural reform that was already underway. In effect, globalisation created the 
conditions in which the strategy and reform programme of the Argentine 
government could successfully or feasibly be consolidated after the groundwork 
had been laid at the domestic level. This, as argued at the start of the chapter, was 
made feasible by domestic conditions which allowed for a (temporary) increase in 
the autonomy of the state and therefore augmentation of its reform capacity. From 
another perspective, the incorporation of globalisation into the political debate in 
Argentina can be traced to precisely the concerns raised by the Mexican crisis. This 
may reasonably be seen as the start of the real debate on globalisation, as the 
Tequila effect raised all sorts of doubts about the desirability of globalised markets 
with minimal function for the state.
However, neither the ‘rescue’ nor the ‘internationalisation’ of the state 
translated into the ‘disappearance’ of the state from the political and economic 
arena. Here we return to the ‘paradox of state power’. It is contended here that the
53 Interview with Guillermo Mondino.
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functions and capacities of the Argentine state were propelled through a process of 
redefinition by the exigencies of globalisation and international change according 
to changing perceptions of economic and political necessity. Although the removal 
of direct policy-making functions from the state to the international (and regional) 
levels is manifest, this created the conditions in which the state could re-invent and 
strengthen itself at the domestic level, through a recovery of legitimacy and 
coherence and through an increasing insulation from societal interests. Also, the 
Argentine state retained a significant degree of discretionary control over the sorts 
of policies that were pursued in the interests of national competitiveness.
This can be seen clearly in the sorts of policy measures that were adopted as 
responses to the perceived ‘loopholes’ of the globalised political economy. By 
1994, it was generally thought that Argentina needed a mechanism for dealing with 
unfair trade practices. Before this date, as outlined in Chapter 3, several ad hoc 
measures were implemented (such as Cavallo’s application of compensatory rights 
against imports of footwear and clothing in 1993), but it was not until the National 
Commission for External Trade (CNCE) was established that an institutional 
structure was available for assessing and implementing such measures. Complaints 
to date have mainly been made against Brazil and China, with particular reference 
to dumping offences.54 Quite apart from these functions, however, the CNCE was 
the first step in response to a perceived need to establish institutions for the 
purposes of both reinforcing and protecting Argentina’s full-scale participation in 
the globalised international economy. The ‘new institutionalism’ can be seen as 
modelled at least in part on the US system, most notably the Office of the US 
Trade Representative.55 These institutional developments, however, came before 
the onslaught of the Mexican peso crisis, and respond to the evolution of domestic 
political currents as well as to international considerations.
It becomes clear, then, that Hirst and Thompson’s argument that “one key 
effect of the concept of globalisation has been to paralyse radical reforming 
national strategies, to see them as unviable in the face of the judgement and
54 See CNCE: Informe Anual 1995.
55 Interview with Cristi&n Mira & Ana Miura o f La Nation  (External Trade Supplement), 9 June 
1997.
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sanction of international markets”56 is grossly inaccurate, in that it assumes that 
radically reformist national policies go against the grain of economic globalisation. 
Hirst and Thompson’s arguments appear to apply only to those advanced countries 
in which a functioning market economy is already in place, and in which radical 
reforming national strategies would necessarily be in an opposite direction. In the 
case of Argentina and other Latin American and developing countries, the radical 
reform process has been oriented in recent years towards the construction of a 
functioning market economy, and for this reason has moved in a direction highly 
compatible with that of international markets. Markets determine (and narrow) the 
range of policy options available but that reform strategies are not a priori 
‘unviable’. The economic policy revolution in Latin America is certainly ‘radical’, 
and driven and facilitated by globalisation.
Globalisation and Political Reform
As Chapter 4 showed, a combination of the political conditions in 
Argentina at the end of the 1990s and the sorts of economic policies pursued in the 
context of liberalisation contributed to a re-ordering of political alliances, which 
both fed off and reinforced economic reform. The globalisation process created a 
situation in Argentina in which the increasing returns to power derived from the 
success of reform policies acted to augment the capacity of the state to consolidate 
its policy preferences. This situation in large part derived from the use of 
international constraints to overcome domestic constraints by national governments 
and, together with the effects of internal dynamics, facilitated a huge concentration 
of power in the executive and a centralised, ‘exclusionary’ style of government and 
policy-making. It is the notion of increasing returns to power that explains how the 
Argentine state was able not only to re-define its interests and capabilities in 
economic terms, but also significantly to increase the extent of its insulation from 
society. Therefore, globalisation has acted in specific ways (relating to the policy 
structures it promotes) and in more general or indirect ways (relating to its 
reinforcement of centralisation and state power) to propel and consolidate the
56 op.cit., pg 1.
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processes of political reform instigated by the Menem government. We have seen 
that the autonomy necessary for the implementation of reform in 1989-91 was 
afforded by the impact of crisis and hyperinflation. The maintenance of autonomy 
for the purposes of consolidating reform was derived from the influences of 
globalisation. Furthermore, their impact acted to consolidate the changes in the 
Argentine landscape which resulted from a combination of the demobilising effects 
of the crisis and specific purposive policies on the part of the government.
We have seen that the crisis situation in Argentina of the late 1980s created 
significant pressures for neoliberal reform as an alternative to ‘exhausted’ and 
failed policy projects of previous years. In addition, government policy-makers 
were concerned about the collapse in international confidence and the negative 
effects on economic policy that such a withdrawal of international finance entailed. 
Therefore, the economic effects of globalisation acted to alter the constellation of 
interests and the nature of the support coalitions that the government needed to 
court in the interests of international competitiveness and credibility, which have 
become key for continued economic development.
The changes in the international economy and financial system associated 
with globalisation significantly increase the influence and power of the forces that 
favour liberalisation in the domestic (and international) setting. As 
interdependence is deepened and expanded by globalisation, the preferences of 
certain actors become more decisive and also more congruent with the overall 
policy goals of the globalising political economy and reforming states (such as 
Argentina). As such, the weight and importance of actors with foreign ties is 
increased with the imperatives of constructing competitive transnational linkages, 
and the range of interests that are likely to benefit from the state’s liberalisation
C O
policies expands. The interests with foreign ties are likely, as in the case of 
Argentina, to be business and the private sector, technocratic policy-makers and 
financial agents. As a result, at the national level certain groups of actors are
57 Stephan Haggard & Sylvia Maxfield: “The Political Economy o f Financial Liberalization in the 
Developing World” in Robert O. Keohane & Helen V. Milner (eds.): Internationalization and 
Domestic Politics (1996), pg 215.
58 ibid., pg211.
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privileged over others (business over labour being the most obvious example) as a 
result of changes in policy orientation associated with globalisation.
In this way, the conjunction of the influences of globalisation and the crisis 
of the late 1980s created a fundamental shift in the policy preferences of key 
interests in the state and society. In the Argentine context this entailed a 
coincidence of interests between the government and the interests that were 
identified with pressures for liberalisation. However, the imperative for the 
government to court and respond to these interests was reinforced by the dangers of 
not doing so. Globalisation acts to increase the mobility of capital and, as a result, 
the ‘exit option’ of the mobile capital asset holders in the domestic economy.59 
Having experienced the impact of capital flight in the late 1980s as a result of 
hyperinflation, and the threat of similar action in 1990/91, the Argentine 
government was particularly aware of the need to take serious account of the 
interests and preferences of these economic and financial agents. Therefore, 
pressures for reform stemmed both from government and state actors - this was 
essentially a process directed ‘from above’ - and from key economic interests. 
Although the coincidence of preferences was manifest, the shift in the relative 
weight of domestic actors as a result of international change contributed an 
additional incentive for both this coincidence of preferences and for liberalisation 
or reform more generally.
These, then, are some of the ways in which the direct impact of 
globalisation affected political alignments in Argentina and elsewhere. More 
indirect manifestations of this influence can be found in the reinforcing effects of 
international change on domestically-initiated political restructuring. These relate 
to the points made earlier about the international ‘rescue’ of the state, along with 
the particular type of reform in question. The eventual removal of direct policy­
making responsibility from the state, either through its reform or its 
internationalisation, has significant implications for state-society relations. In 
effect, the state is relieved of its role as the principal arena for social and 
distributive conflict. A removal of authority from the state with respect to policy­
making autonomy means a removal of the capacity for action of societal interests.
59 Helen V. Milner & Robert O. Keohane: “Internationalization and Domestic Politics: A 
Conclusion” in Keohane and Milner (eds.), pg 245.
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As a result, a high degree of centralisation of power becomes possible, with 
the manifest effect of neutralising the principal sources of opposition which are 
deprived of an arena for pressing their interests and preferences. The effects of 
globalisation, or the international ‘rescue’, then, are associated with the 
reinforcement of the insulation of the state from societal interests as well as a 
recovery of the competence of the state in implementation terms. According to the 
conceptions outlined in the Introduction, this leads to an overall strengthening of 
state power and the establishment of an ‘exclusionary’ model of state-society 
relations. It can be hypothesised that in situations in which state power is relatively 
more centralised, or in which the state exhibits a high degree of control-oriented 
penetration into the social fabric of the country, the space for the development of 
non-state actors is likely to be significantly less than in a situation characterised by 
a high dispersion or permeability of state power.60 According to Risse-Kappen’s 
formulation, Argentina in the early to mid-1990s (and many other Latin American 
countries) would fall in the category of “state-dominated” domestic structures, 
which are differentiated from “state-controlled” structures found in many 
Communist and authoritarian regimes, and from “stalemate”, “corporatist”, 
“society-dominated” and “fragile” domestic structures.61
In sum, globalisation appears to have the impact of weakening its 
opponents at both the international and national levels. In the case of Argentina, the 
corollary has been a reinforcement of changes in the nature and distribution of 
political power that reflect the roots of the crisis of the late 1980s. This could be 
conceptualised in semi-structuralist terms which would perceive a long-term trend 
towards the weakening of those societal forces that are opposed to the interests of 
global capital. The hyperinflation and other forms of economic crisis produced by 
the prevalence of these interests in policy-making circles (including the Alfonsin 
government in Argentina) in turn are destructive of interests hostile to 
globalisation. This, then, further explains the ‘paradox of state power’: it conflates 
the less autonomous state in international terms and the stronger state in domestic
60 This argument to some extent corresponds to the first hypothesis made by Risse-Kappen, to the 
effect that differences in domestic structures are likely to determine the impact and effectiveness of  
transnational coalitions. Op.cit., pg 6.
61 Risse-Kappen: pp. 23-25.
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terms into a single logic relating to a damaging dysfunction between local and 
international sources of capital. The achievement of the Menem government was to 
eliminate this dysfunction.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the intersection of the processes of domestic 
reform and the increasingly visible manifestations of global change created a 
situation in the early 1990s in which the interests of the state were identified as 
being compatible with and linked to the ‘interests’ of the globalised political 
economy. The dynamics of this interaction determined the direction of reform in 
the 1989-91 period, but also, more importantly, created the conditions in which this 
reform could be consolidated from 1991/2 onwards. The ‘rescue’ of the state 
through its increasing internationalisation accorded an element of irreversibility to 
the economic policy orientation, and also contributed to the consolidation of a 
political model in which the autonomy of the state vis-a-vis society was enhanced. 
As such, the influence of globalisation simultaneously ‘weakened’ the state 
through the imposition of constraints on the government’s policy-making latitude, 
but also strengthened it at the domestic level through the creation of a political and 
economic space for the consolidation of reform.
At the theoretical level, this chapter has argued that the idea of state versus 
globalisation is not a constructive dichotomy. It has built on the debate between 
ideas of the ‘retreat’ of the state versus the ‘competition state’ to demonstrate that 
there are significant ways in which this type of influence increases certain types of 
state autonomy. Similarly, globalisation may well be a process driven by economic 
factors and, arguably, one which relies on a degree of economic policy 
convergence, but it remains rooted in the political construct of the nation-state 
despite the development of new forms of non-territorial and non-state authority.
These observations prompt further questions relating to the concrete ways 
in which the influence of globalisation is transmitted to national arenas and 
translated into policy outcomes. In addition, the preliminary points made in this 
chapter about the converse relationship of influence - the role of the national state
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in maintaining and consolidating the global order itself - require further analysis. 
These questions are addressed in relation to the second and third dimensions of 
international influence - conditionality and regionalisation - which are considered 
to be the main transmission mechanisms of globalisation as well as the main 
mechanisms by which the national and the international are brought into 
interaction. From the perspective of national reform efforts, furthermore, these are 
considered to be the principal means by which the political and economic changes 
are ‘locked in’ at the international and regional levels, thus creating the space for 
their consolidation.
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Chapter 6
Globalisation, Conditionality and Reform
This chapter is concerned with the ways in which the influences of 
globalisation gave rise to specific sets of policy outcomes in Argentina, and the 
ways in which the influences of globalisation and conditionality are interconnected. 
It argues that the influence of globalisation is transmitted to developing countries 
principally through the mechanisms associated with the activities of the 
international financial institutions (IFIs)1 and the conditionality packages 
associated with the financial assistance they offer. Conditionality is in many ways a 
concrete manifestation of the broader parameters of influence discussed in the 
previous chapter, and one of the principal means by which these international 
influences are incorporated into national policy-making agendas. As stated in the 
Introduction, therefore, the analysis aims to treat the identified dimensions of 
international influence as more than a simple contextual backdrop, and contribute a 
more specific conception of the concrete and dynamic ways in which these 
influences operate.
From a ‘national’ perspective, conditionality acts to reinforce or ‘lock in’ 
the policy orientation of national governments and to ensure the adoption of policy 
measures consistent with the ‘interests’ of the globalised political economy. As 
such, loans from the IFIs based on conditionality can be seen as an important part 
of the structure of rewards and punishments outlined in Chapter 5, which compel 
conformity with the neoliberal policy agenda. Furthermore, relations with the IFIs 
and compliance with conditionality constitute an essential dimension of the 
‘internationalisation of the state’ by which, it is argued, the conditions were created 
for the consolidation of reform from 1991/2 to 1995. This is concrete example of 
the ways in which the government deliberately sought to make its reform measures 
irreversible: the possibilities for a significant policy shift are greatly reduced by 
commitments to international institutions or agents. Similarly, the
internationalisation of the state acts to remove decision-making authority from
\
1 The term ‘IFIs’ is taken here to refer collectively to the multilateral development banks (World 
Bank and IDB) and the IMF.
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national political agents to international financial agents and domestic technocrats 
with significant foreign ties. As such, conditionality lent an additional impetus to 
the process of political reform in Argentina by promoting various forms of state 
power.
The chronological perspective is again pivotal. It is certainly the case, as 
this chapter demonstrates, that the direction of reform in the first couple of years of 
the Menem administration was informed by the perceived need to curry favour 
with the international financial community. However, despite several stand-by 
loans in this time, relations between the Argentine government and the IFIs were 
only genuinely reactivated in 1992 with the negotiation of an Extended Fund 
Facility (EFF) agreement and the subsequent signing of the Brady Plan agreement 
with the commercial banks. This paved the way for a situation in which, as we 
have seen, it was as much in the interests of the government to lock its agenda into 
a series of international obligations as in the interests of the IFIs to demand this. 
Significantly, this sort of marriage of convenience had not been available until this 
time: tension between the IFIs and most Latin American countries during the 1980s 
meant that the option was not open to Alfonsin. It is the contention here that the 
coincidence under Menem of interests between the Argentine state and the agents 
of the international economy, made possible by the process o f  globalisation, 
generated the climate for better relations with the international financial 
community.
We can also return at this point to our two-fold classification of the 
problems of the post-war political economy of Argentina, the first of which was 
associated with (mis)management. We have seen that the consistent relegation of 
macroeconomic policy coherence stemmed principally from the prevalence of 
political struggle, which complicated the task of governance and economic 
management. At times of crisis, specifically, the IMF was called in to ‘put out the 
fire’ by imposing a set of relatively restrictive policy requirements and an 
additional compulsion for macroeconomic policy consistency. As soon as it left, 
however, the familiar political constraints emerged and hampered the possibilities 
for compliance. Relations with the IFIs in the 1990s were part of precisely this 
attempt to overcome the management problem in the Argentine political economy
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by imposing the requirements of greater economic and fiscal discipline. It is also 
the case that, as a result of globalisation, the IFIs were a far more central and 
constant part of the development and reform process, rather than being ‘called in’ 
in situations of crisis. The increasing ‘governance’ dimensions of conditionality 
over the last five years or so also slot easily into this framework.
The chapter is organised as follows. The first two sections set out the broad 
theoretical backdrop against which an assessment of the Argentine experience can 
most usefully be made. The first outlines the theoretical propositions concerning 
the relationship between globalisation and conditionality. The second outlines the 
innovations which have characterised the lending operations of the IFIs in the 
1990s, with particular emphasis on the concept of ‘governance’. The following 
sections aim to build on these theoretical propositions and the threads of the thesis 
outlined above in order to offer an empirical analysis of the Argentine case. The 
third part of the chapter offers a general assessment of Argentina’s experience with 
conditionality under the Menem government and a brief overview of Argentine 
relations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and Inter- 
American Development Bank (IDB) in this period, with an emphasis on the timing 
of the major agreements relative to the major policy initiatives outlined in Chapter 
3. The fourth part draws out the specific implications of conditionality for 
economic and political reform in Argentina, and demonstrates the pivotal role it 
played in the consolidation of the political and economic orientation. Special 
attention is paid to the issues of state power and the ‘internationalisation’ of the 
state.
Dimensions of the Globalisation-Conditionality Nexus
Conditionality is the primary conduit through which the influence of 
globalisation is transmitted to developing countries.2 The terms of financial
2 Influence is exercised through a variety of informal channels (such as the Trilateral Commission or 
the Bilderberg conference) and official bodies (such as the OECD, Bank for International 
Settlements and IMF. See Robert W. Cox: “Global Restructuring: Making Sense o f the Changing 
International Political Economy” in Richard Stubbs & Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (eds.): Political 
Economy and the Changing Global Order (1994), pg 49. In the case o f Latin American (and other 
developing) countries, however, the contention is that the IFIs are the principal conduit for the 
transmission o f the influences in question.
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agreements between IFIs and developing countries are designed to propel 
appropriate policy reforms in countries participating in the international economy. 
These fall under the broad headings of liberalisation and deregulation. The aim of 
the IFIs in the late 1980s and the early 1990s was to ensure that countries adhered 
to the ‘rules’ of the globalisation ‘game’, described in the previous chapter as 
embodied in such policy constructs as the ‘Washington consensus’ and the 
neoliberal agenda that informs it.
The relationship between globalisation and conditionality, however, is more 
complex than the simple ‘transmission link’ argument suggests. Conditionality 
creates those conditions which are essential to the maintenance and consolidation 
of the process of globalisation and the changes associated with it. Globalisation is, 
in essence, dependent on the establishment of a global policy consensus which in 
turn lends itself to policy harmonisation. The operation of a ‘globalised’ 
international economy depends on the reinforcement of common ‘rules’ by which 
the participants play. This can be seen, for example, in the ways in which 
multilateral trade regulations attempt to create convergence in order to maintain an 
open and non-discriminatory international trade regime. Similarly, the globalising 
world economy brings with it a new development paradigm, according to which 
countries must engage in significant reform efforts if they are to achieve national 
development goals. The achievement of the policy convergence on which 
globalisation rests is, in the case of developing countries, principally the domain of 
the IFIs. Conditionality, therefore, is a significant means by which the process of 
globalisation is sustained, as well as a means by which the influence is transmitted.
These arguments share certain foundations with now familiar assertions 
regarding international cooperation and regime-building, most notably Keohane’s 
theory of cooperation based on common interests between countries. Similarly, 
recent analyses of governance in the globalising international environment argue 
that a degree of transnational domestic and foreign policy convergence is likely 
both to facilitate the task of governance and to generate changes in the nature of 
governance, on the assumption that “it is more difficult to form regimes or to 
anticipate governance at the international level if the internal operating principles
3 Robert O. Keohane: After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
( 1984).
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of actors are radically different”.4 In the present discussion of globalisation, this 
would translate most clearly into some degree of economic policy harmonisation 
and, more fundamentally, a global convergence in economic thinking. These then 
contribute to the construction and maintenance of a new international order based 
on the ‘globalisation’ of a particular set of economic and political values.
The relationship between globalisation and conditionality, then, can be 
formulated in broader terms. Conditionality stands at and acts as the interface 
between the global and the national. It serves as a conduit for the influence of the 
global on the national, and at the same time creates the national conditions on 
which the maintenance of globalisation depends. It is not the case that globalisation 
and conditionality are simply ‘twin’ external pressures: the role of conditionality 
and the levels at which it operates are more complex. Although clearly for the 
countries concerned conditionality is an external force, in the context of 
globalisation and the evolution of the global economy conditionality becomes a 
nationally-rooted mechanism as well as an external pressure. The impact of 
conditionality acts not only on national policy but also on the development of the 
globalising international arena. The usual focus on the impact of conditionality in 
particular domestic settings, then, should be supplemented by an appreciation of 
the interaction between conditionality and the ‘global’ as a result of the changes in 
national environments influenced by the former.
Furthermore, globalisation has acted to feed the conditionality process by 
impacting on the perceptions of policy-makers and societies in the countries in 
question. Globalisation in recent years created an environment which signalled an 
express need for change as a prerequisite for participation. In this sense, as the 
previous chapter showed, globalisation created the conditions in which 
domestically-initiated reform processes (in turn encouraged by the activities of the 
IMF and World Bank) could progress and flourish. Globalisation, therefore, created 
an opportunity for reform but also, more importantly, the context in which 
unsavoury austerity measures could be sold to sceptical national electorates. The
4 Thomas J.-Biersteker: “The ‘Triumph’ o f Neoclassical Economics in the Developing World: 
Policy Convergence and Bases of Governance in the International Economic Order” in James N. 
Rosenau & Emst-Otto Czempiel (eds.): Governance without Government: Order and Change in 
World Politics (1992), pg 104.
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perception of the changing international environment created the assumption of a 
need for change on which governments and technocrats could capitalise in order to 
achieve domestic consensus for their reform projects.
This consensus in turn parted the seas for the IFIs which during the 1980s 
had struggled with hostility and non-compliance. If countries were concerned to 
implement these types of reform in any case, then the task of ‘complying with’ the 
preferences of the IFIs was fundamentally altered as interests converged on a 
common goal. At the same time, one of the major weaknesses of conditionality was 
redressed. The design of structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s was 
characterised by a failure to consider national differences in historical and 
institutional structures as well as political realities: for the purposes of policy all 
countries were considered to be the same.5 Explanations for the failure of structural 
adjustment often focus on the issue of ‘ownership’ according to which the success 
of adjustment lending depends on perceptions that conditionality and reform are 
nationally-rooted processes rather than external impositions.6 Previously, genuine 
commitment to structural adjustment was seen to be undermined or easily 
“negated” by conditionality.7 The World Bank has subsequently come to the 
opinion that “the vital challenge is to build home-grown commitment mechanisms, 
rooted in domestic institutions”.8
In summary, the relationship between globalisation and conditionality is 
conceptualised as follows. On one level, globalisation and conditionality act in 
conjunction with each other in order to promote a significant degree of policy 
convergence. The relationship is two-way: on the one hand conditionality is the 
primary conduit through which the influences of globalisation are transmitted, and 
on the other conditionality creates the policy conditions in which globalisation can 
be sustained and furthered. Conditionality, therefore, is seen to stand at and act as 
the interface between the national and the global. On another level, globalisation
5 See comments on a lecture in 1992 by the Chief Economist o f the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in Stephen Gill: “Knowledge, Politics and Neoliberal 
Political Economy” in Stubbs & Underhill (eds.), pg 83.
6 For a discussion o f ‘ownership’ and its replacement with ‘dialogue’, see Daniel C. Milder:
“Foreign Assistance: Catalyst for Domestic Coalition Building” in Jo Marie Griesgraber &
Bernhard C. Gunter (eds.): The World Bank: Lending on a Global Scale (1996).
7 Owodunni Teriba: “The Challenge o f Africa’s Socioeconomic Development” in Griesgraber & 
Gunter (eds.), pg 6.
8 World Bank: World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World, pg 60.
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has assisted the conditionality process by creating a shift in the perceptions and 
assumptions of national policy-makers and electorates. This shift has two major 
implications: first, that globalisation created an opportunity for reform and the 
conditions in which reform became politically acceptable, and second, that 
globalisation contributed to the emergence of a coincidence of interests between 
national states and the agents of the international financial system which has 
allowed for the more effective operation of conditionality and adjustment.
The Changing Nature of Conditionality: The Concept of Governance
In the 1990s there has been a fundamental change in the activities and 
orientation of the IFIs, which has been accompanied by a shift in perceptions of 
their operations both within the institutions themselves and in the countries with 
which they interact. A notable feature of this process of revision was seen in the 
increasingly cooperative rapprochement between the institutions themselves, after a 
period of tension in the 1980s. Although the activities of the World Bank and the 
IMF had consistently been closely integrated for much of the post-war period, with 
the exception of the late 1980s9, in the early 1990s a closer relationship was 
established also with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)10 as the 
emphasis shifted away from structural adjustment towards developmental 
objectives.
The changes have taken two principal forms in the recent period. First, 
there has been a shift away from the inflexibility of structural adjustment loans to a 
more ‘interactive’ style of negotiation and cooperation. Recent research emphasises 
the significant leeway allowed by agreements with IFIs for autonomous 
government policy as well as politically-charged decision-making.11 The IFIs
9 These differences were manifested most sharply in the case o f  the 1987 Trade Policy Loans to 
Argentina, in which the Bank acted unilaterally without consultation with the IMF for the first time. 
See Diana Tussie & Mirta Botzman: “Sweet Entanglement: Argentina and the World Bank 1985-9”, 
Development Policy Review 8, 1990.
10 Diana Tussie: The Multilateral Development Banks: Volume 4: The Inter-American Development 
Bank (1995), chapter 6. For a more general perspective on the evolving relationship between 
regional development banks and the World Bank, see Roy Culpepper: The Multilateral 
Development Banks: Volume 5: Titans or Behemoths? (1997), pp. 41-44 and chapter 5.
11 Diana Tussie: “Globalisation and Conditionality: Struggling to Make a Room o f One’s Own”, 
mimeo, Buenos Aires, March 1997.
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concern themselves principally with establishing negotiated targets often 
associated with significant policy reform, but increasingly associated with more 
mainstream economic performance issues following the implementation of the bulk 
of major structural reforms in the early 1990s. Increasingly, therefore, the concern 
is no longer privatisation and trade liberalisation but rather with targets for the 
fiscal deficit and issues such as labour flexibilisation and the ‘modernisation of the 
state’. This new agenda has been termed the ‘second generation’ of structural 
reforms.
The second and most important element of the new orientation of
conditionality is the concern with a functioning civil society, the rule of law and
1 ^
respect for private property that are seen to be essential for economic efficiency. 
This has given rise to changes emphasising greater attention to administrative, 
institutional and legal structures and practices as integral parts of the economic 
reform process. This is incarnated most visibly in the rubric of ‘good governance’ 
developed by the multilateral development banks (MDBs) in the early 1990s, 
which became the rallying cry of the revamped IFIs. These, according to the IMF’s 
Interim Committee, should now concern themselves with advancing “good 
governance in all its aspects, including insuring the rule of law, improving the 
efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption”.13 
Although there is no explicit claim relating to the type of political regime that best 
serves these objectives, economic growth is seen as dependent on the quality of 
governance and this, predictably, is taken to be best enhanced by a system of 
political democracy.
One possible explanation for this shift can be found in the perceived failure 
of structural adjustment exercises in the late 1980s. As Latin American (and 
African) countries one by one relapsed into economic crisis and hyperinflation 
towards the end of the decade, the need became apparent for a redefinition of the 
activities of the IFIs in relation to developing countries, and a reassessment of 
received wisdom concerning the dynamics and causes of crisis in these countries.
12 Harold James: “Globalization and the Changing Character o f the International Monetary Fund”, 
paper presented to the conference on ‘Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System’, 
Warwick University ESRC Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, 31 October-1 
November 1997.
13 ibid.
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This re-thinking of policy was prompted most specifically by the situation of 
African countries of the late 1980s, seen by the World Bank to be a “crisis of 
governance” rather than one of predominantly economic dimensions.14 According 
to the Bank itself, the relatively healthy growth figures for developing countries 
from 1965 to 1980 concealed “deep-seated problems of governance” that only 
became exposed with the widespread economic crisis of the 1980s. The problems 
of structural adjustment lending, furthermore, were taken as indications of the 
importance of “further improvements in the institutional framework for 
development management”.15
More general clues concerning the roots of the re-orientation of the IFIs in 
the late 1980s can be found in several areas. Leftwich, for example, suggests four 
reasons for the resurgent equation of democracy with development.16 The first is 
the goal of legitimising the concept of conditionality that suffered, as mentioned in 
the previous section, from low levels of commitment on the part of borrowing 
countries and from the failures of structural adjustment throughout the 1980s. The 
second is the hegemony of neo-conservative political ideas, which explicitly relate 
the concern with democracy to the over-arching concern with markets and 
economic growth: the former is seen to be a pre-requisite of the latter, and vice 
versa, as in traditional modernisation theory. This was assisted by the third 
explanatory factor, namely the collapse of communism and the new possibilities 
for ensuring the ascendancy of a single set of ideas that were seen to have achieved 
dominance on both a theoretical and on an empirical level with the end of the Cold 
War. Lastly, Leftwich refers to the impact of pro-democracy movements in various 
parts of the developing world (including Latin America).
However, we can contend that the most important reason for changes in the 
activities of the IFIs and the nature of conditionality relates to the changing nature 
of the international economic structure in which they are rooted. These changes
14 World Bank: Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long-Term Perspective 
Study (1989). This was the first important publication to consider the question o f governance in the 
lending strategies o f the IFIs.
15 World Bank: Governance and Development (1992), pg 4. For an ‘in-house’ analysis o f the 
reasons for the poor results o f recent Bank programmes and the re-orientation o f  Bank practices as a 
result, see Robert Picciotto & Rachel Weaving: “Un Nuevo Ciclo de los Proyectos en el Banco 
Mundial”, Finanzas & Desarrollo, World Bank, December 1994.
16 Adrian Leftwich: “On the Primacy of Politics in Development” in Leftwich (ed.): Democracy and 
Development: Theory and Practice (1996), pp. 10-15.
169
stem mainly from the market processes of globalisation which, perhaps 
paradoxically, necessitate attention to the political and institutional contexts of 
national policy. Globalisation in this sense is as much a political phenomenon as a 
process of ‘marketisation’ of the international economy. According to this 
interpretation, then, the increasing politicisation of the IMF and related institutions, 
which formerly were constrained by provisions which precluded involvement in 
the political aspects of a country’s activities, can usefully be understood as an 
inevitable result of the new national and international imperatives thrown to the 
fore by globalisation.
The concept of governance, then, adds a new dimension to the discourse of 
policy-based lending. The World Bank clearly stands for the principles of the 
market economy and the ‘neutral’ state in which, according to liberal theory, 
competing conceptions of the public ‘good’ can be pursued. The governance 
dimension contributes the new belief in significant parts of the World Bank that 
such a neutral and effective state depends fundamentally on a “corresponding 
liberal public sphere” characterised by an increasingly empowered civil society and 
enhanced technical and institutional effectiveness (particularly with reference to the
17judiciary). Clearly, the idea of governance is operationalised as a set of measures 
that are essential to the more general economic process, rather than as an explicit 
concern with political and institutional development.
In the interests of neutrality, the Articles of Agreement of both the IMF and 
the World Bank explicitly prohibit intervention in the political and social life of the 
countries with which they deal, and furthermore do not allow officials to take 
political factors into account in formulating policy packages and negotiating 
agreement. According to a recent memorandum issued by the General Council of 
the World Bank, the Bank is not permitted to be influenced by the political nature 
of a member country, to interfere in partisan politics, to act on behalf of an 
industrial member country to influence the political system or behaviour of a 
borrowing member, to be influenced by political factors that do not have direct
17 David Williams & Tom Youngs: “Governance, the World Bank and Liberal Theory”, Political 
Studies XLII, 1994 (pp. 93-4).
170
economic implications, or to be influenced by possible reactions by member
•  1Rcountries to policies or judgements.
In the new context of ‘governance’, this has been slightly modified. The 
same memorandum identifies governance issues as relevant when placed in the 
context of order and discipline in the management of national resources.19 The 
IMF, similarly, recognises that while “it is legitimate to seek information about the 
political situation in member countries as an essential component in judging the 
prospects for policy implementation”, its activities “should not be influenced by the 
nature of the political regime of a country, nor should it interfere in domestic or 
foreign politics of any member”. In essence, “the IMF’s involvement in governance 
should be limited to the economic aspects of governance”, and good governance is 
seen as a means of ensuring market confidence, in turn essential for the 
maintenance of capital flows and investment.
This attempt at maintaining the essentially apolitical nature of World Bank 
and IMF operations contrasts with the less constrained political options available to 
the IDB and other regional development banks (RDBs). The IDB enjoys a number 
of advantages in this respect. First, it has always had the image of a more 
‘benevolent’ lending institution, particularly relative to the IMF and World Bank. 
Second, as a result of the fact that it is a regionally-rooted institution, it has 
appeared always to enjoy a greater degree of trust from member governments and 
regional societies, which was heightened also by its traditional emphasis on 
politically sensitive areas such as judicial and legislative processes. Third, it has 
not been associated with structural adjustment programmes or the more 
controversial packages peddled by the other IFIs.21 As a result, the IDB has been
18 Ibrahim F.I. Shihata: The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays (1991), pp. 79-84; 
World Bank: Governance and Development (1992), pg 5; David Gillies: “Human Rights, 
Democracy and Good Governance: Stretching the World Bank’s Policy Frontiers” in Griesgraber & 
Gunter (eds.): op.cit.. For an earlier critique o f the neutrality issue in the context o f structural 
adjustment, see Richard Swedberg: “The Doctrine o f Economic Neutrality o f the IMF and the 
World Bank”, Journal o f  Peace Research, 23, 4, 1986.
19 Governance and Development, pg 5.
20 James: op.cit.
21 Paul J. Nelson: “Transparencia, Fiscalizacidn y Participacidn: La Implementacidn de los Nuevos 
Mandatos en el Banco Mundial y el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo”, Serie de Documentos e 
Informes de Investigacidn no. 199, FLACSO, Buenos Aires, June 1996, pp. 5-6.
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able more explicitly to include a political agenda in its lending programme which
22
enjoys a greater degree of legitimacy and acceptability.
The World Bank, in contrast, having no regional identification and having 
found its new activities to be increasingly dominated by the regulation of policies 
adopted by governments (in areas such as the use of natural resources, 
dissemination of information and environmental assessments), has extended its 
‘apolitical’ stance in parallel with the expansion and deepening of its 
conditionality.23 The good governance school of thought has, however, given the 
lie to much of this rhetoric. Increasingly over the course of the 1990s, the World 
Bank and the IMF have made unprecedented incursions into sensitive political 
issue areas in the countries with which they presently interact. For Argentina and 
other developing countries, the 1990s have been characterised by the emergence of 
non-technical criteria for lending and performance assessment. Furthermore, it is 
precisely this new agenda that has revitalised the ailing IFIs themselves.24
The other clear effect of the expansion of the IFIs’ agenda and scope of 
activity has been further to dim the distinctions between the global and the 
domestic and, more importantly, to reinforce the state’s role as the transmission 
link between these two arenas of activity. On the one hand, the good governance 
rhetoric legitimises the IFIs’ concern with political issues that are seen to underpin 
the new international order by presenting them as concepts and practices that are 
fundamental to economic performance and development. In this sense, the 
argument made earlier that the process of globalisation is very essentially political 
gains further strength. On the other hand, as the state is the primary point of contact 
between a borrowing country and the international organisation with which it is 
dealing, as well as the focus of negotiating activity, it acts as the main mechanism 
through which the country is brought into the fold of the globalisation ideology and 
its empirical manifestations. This feeds into the concept of the 
‘internationalisation’ of the state.
22 Similarly, the EBRD has the promotion o f liberal democracy written explicitly into its charter. 
See Geoffrey Hawthorn & Paul Seabright: “Governance, Democracy and Development: A 
Contractualist View” in Leftwich (ed.), pg 75.
23 Nelson: op.cit., pp. 5-6
24 Diana Tussie: “Argentina’s Big Bang Reform: The Interplay o f MDBs and Domestic Actors”, 
mimeo, Buenos Aires, October 1997 (pg 22).
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Argentina and Conditionality
The impact of conditionality in the national context, then, may be seen as 
two-fold: first, conditionality is concerned with state policies which may be 
rewarded by access to international financial resources; and second, it is concerned 
with creating “the institutional mechanisms for mobilising the necessary domestic 
consensus” on which acceptance of and compliance with conditionality depends. 
The success of conditionality is determined first and foremost by the nature of the 
domestic setting into which it is inserted, and also by the ways in which policy­
makers are able to use international agreements to manipulate domestic interests 
while at the same time using the changing domestic alignments of interests 
outlined in Chapter 4 to open up new possibilities for bargaining in the
*)f\international arena. This process is supplemented by the more direct forms of 
influence exercised by the MDBs in neutralising potential sources of opposition, 
which are described later in this chapter.
The success of reform in Argentina and elsewhere, then, was made possible 
by a conjunction of propitious circumstances: on the domestic level these were 
created by the economic and political crisis of 1988-9 that created the space for the 
types of political and economic reform outlined in Chapters 3 and 4; on the 
international level these were created by the process of globalisation and the 
changing structure of rewards and punishments associated with participation in the 
international economy (outlined in Chapter 5). The crisis of the state changed 
perceptions of state capacities to control markets and perform its traditional 
functions, and opened the way for the development of a new conception of the 
relationship between the state and the market consistent with the conceptions 
promoted by globalisation and the IFIs. This conjunction (and juncture) created a 
consensus in favour of reform which changed the nature of the interaction between 
the government and the IFIs on the one hand, and between national policy and 
conditionality, on the other.
It is clear that the political reforms introduced by Menem eased the task of 
ensuring acceptance of agreements with the IFIs. The fact that decision-making
25 Tussie: “Globalisation and Conditionality”, pg 5.
26 ibid., pg 4.
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authority had been deliberately centralised in the executive branch and the 
presidential circle (to a much greater extent than under Alfonsin) facilitated the 
task of formulating and implementing appropriate reform policies. Reforms to 
legislative and judicial roles reinforced this concentration of policy making and 
agenda-setting power in the figure of the president and, circumstantially, in the 
technocratic team with which he associated himself. Similarly, the PJ’s initial 
majority in the congress neutralised the impact of the opposition. Institutionally, 
therefore, the setting for the consolidation of reform policies associated with IFIs 
and conditionality was about as conducive as it possibly could be in Argentina.
The changing relationship with key domestic interests under the impact of 
political and economic reform affected the ways in which the relationship with the 
IFIs was modified, and also was a result of the imperative of mobilising domestic 
support for the agreed programmes. The neutralisation of labour and the 
incorporation of business, for example, created circumstances in which the 
government could effectively by-pass the sorts of social bargaining processes with 
which the previous administration had struggled. Together with legislation granting 
the executive enhanced decree and veto powers (described in Chapter 4), the 
process of implementing policies consistent with international agreements relied 
essentially on the mobilisation of consensus within the ruling party which, for a 
time, prevailed.
This is not to argue, however, that the government was able entirely to 
ignore the demands of domestic interests. The measures described in the previous 
chapter which appeared to go against the grain of liberalisation were implemented 
in order to offset some of the negative effects of the external environment, and to 
alleviate increasing political pressures in the run-up to important elections. These 
measures were particularly important in 1993 and 1994 as the debate of 
globalisation and its impact began to unfold in Argentina. Nevertheless, in the early 
years of the Menem administration the experience of economic crisis under the 
Alfonsin government had produced a dramatic shift in popular expectations, and 
created an environment in which there was both an awareness of the need for 
drastic change and a willingness to accept the new policy programme. The 
consensus, therefore, to an extent existed independently of the efforts of the
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Menem government or the IFIs to create it. The role of the IFIs was largely to 
mobilise the resources necessary for its maintenance and consolidation once it was 
already underway.
Crucially also, however, a closer relationship with the IFIs was a deliberate 
part of Menem’s strategy aimed at increasing domestic room for manoeuvre, 
especially after the creation of the initial space afforded by the crisis. In this way, it 
is possible to argue that conditionality not only acted as the primary conduit for the 
influences of globalisation but also was chosen, in the national setting, as the 
“transmission link of a new economic paradigm”.27 In the same way that the 
influence of globalisation and the associated rhetoric increased the latitude with 
which the government could implement its preferences in the domestic context, 
conditionality and the working relationship with the IFIs provided both another leg 
of support for the reform process and an added dimension of external legitimacy, 
based largely on protestations about necessity (given the domestic crisis) and 
inevitably (given the changing nature of the international environment). Most 
importantly, these factors allowed for the consolidation of the reform process from 
1991/2 onwards.
These observations return to the theoretical propositions made about the 
relationship between globalisation and reform at the start of the chapter. On the one 
hand, conditionality had the effect of imposing (during the 1980s) or reinforcing 
(from the early 1990s) a set of policies consistent with the neoliberal orientation of 
the global economy and with the ‘interests’ of the globalisation process itself. On 
the other hand, globalisation created the circumstances in which an alliance with 
the agents of the international financial system were perceived by policy-makers to 
be beneficial for the purposes of creating the domestic consensus on which the 
success of the reform agenda depended. Therefore, conditionality acted to convey 
the principal influences of globalisation in policy terms, and also to sustain and 
consolidate the domestic processes of reform underway in Argentina at the time. 
Furthermore, however, conditionality has acted to reinforce the political 
reorganisation of the Argentine state and society in conjunction with the reforms 
instigated by the Menem administration and the impact of globalisation on state
27 Tussie: “Argentina’s Big Bang Reform”, pg 7.
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capacities and political interests more generally. The chronological unfolding of 
relations with the IFIs demonstrates their centrality in the process of sustaining and 
consolidating reform, once the domestic crisis had allowed for its implementation.
Argentina and the International Monetary Fund
At the time of Menem’s election, Argentina did not have an existing 
agreement with the IMF and relations with the World Bank were tense as a result 
of the decision not to disburse the second tranche of the Trade Policy Loan (TPL). 
Although Argentina had met the targets for the second disbursement in terms of 
trade policy, serious difficulties in other areas of the liberalisation process were 
jeopardising progress more generally defined, and funds were withheld on the basis 
of macroeconomic policy failings despite satisfactory trade policy performance. 
This came at the end of a difficult decade in relations between the IFIs and 
Argentina (as well as Latin American countries more generally). As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, the Alfonsin government had expected that relations with the IMF 
would have been dictated by a mutual concern for the survival of the democratic 
transition, and that this would have compelled special treatment for Argentina. 
When this was not forthcoming, the process of collaboration with the IMF in the 
series of adjustment plans was severely compromised, and led to a complete 
breakdown in the late 1980s.
In an Economic Policy Memorandum submitted to the IMF in September 
1989, the government stated that it considered “the re-establishment of normal 
relations with Argentina’s external creditors” to be of genuine importance, 
reminding the Fund at the same time that although “the government believes the 
policies described in this Memorandum are adequate for reaching the objectives of 
the economic programme ... [it should be remembered that] Argentina is coming
28 For a detailed analysis o f the TPL experience, see Diana Tussie & Mirta Botzman: “Sweet 
Entanglement”; Tussie: “Globalisation and Conditionality”. See also ‘Report and Recommendation 
of the President o f the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to the Executive 
Directors on a Proposed Loan in an Amount Equivalent to US$500.0 million to the Argentine 
Republic for a Trade Policy and Export Diversification Loan’, Report no. P-4483-AR, World Bank, 
19 May 1987; ‘Report and Recommendation o f the President o f the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Second Trade Policy 
Loan in an Amount Equivalent to US$300.0 million to the Republic o f Argentina’, Report no. P- 
4858-AR, World Bank, 3 October 1988.
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out of a period of hyperinflation and the strong restraint of inflationary movements 
is inevitably risky. Besides, the structural reforms contemplated by the government
•  29are very ambitious and include measures in areas that have few precedents”. The 
content of the Memorandum in question is a clear indication of the government’s 
commitment to a set of policies in keeping with the neoliberal agenda espoused by 
the IFIs. Apart from the predictable issues of privatisation, inflation stabilisation 
and trade liberalisation, the government emphasised its plans in areas such as tax 
reform (for which a bill was expected to be passed by the end of 1989), public 
sector spending (including the establishment of a commission comprising the 
Economy and Finance Ministries to regulate the finances of public firms), and 
social policy.30
Argentina signed a stand-by agreement with the IMF in October 1989, 
which was notable for the depth of the fiscal adjustment package contained in the 
conditionality provisions.31 The government’s commitment to the agreed fiscal 
targets appeared to be reinforced with the ratification of the LEE and the Reform of 
the State laws in the previous August. However, the eruption of hyperinflation in 
late 1989 complicated the negotiations and led to revisions in the timetable and 
provisions of the agreement. The Letter of Intent that was approved in May 1990
'XOcontained even harsher restrictions than the original , largely as a result of the 
heightened caution of the international financial community and the perceived need 
for a truly radical stabilisation and restructuring of the economy.
A second stand-by was agreed in June 1991 for the period 29 July 1991 to 
30 June 1992.33 It was envisaged that this loan agreement would be the precursor to 
an EFF or similar medium-term package. The conditions agreed for the stand-by
29 Economic Policy Memorandum to the International Monetary Fund, Republic o f Argentina, 
September 1989.
30 In the area o f social policy the government planned to supplement the existing National Food 
Programme (PAN) with a programme to provide ‘coupons’ to certain groups, o f which there would 
be around a million beneficiaries, financed by taxation on the large firms’ 1988 sales revenues.
31 Ricardo Echegaray: “Deuda Externa Argentina: Las Negociaciones a Partir del Gobiemo 
Menem”, America Latina / Internacional 7 ,25 , July-Sept 1990 (pg 355); “Argentina ‘returns’ to the 
world financial fold”, Latin American Regional Reports - Southern Cone, 16 November 1989.
32 Echegaray: op.cit., pg 356; “Argentina seeks to unblock IMF standby”, Latin American Regional 
Reports - Southern Cone, 19 April 1990.
33 The breakdown o f the stand-by loan was as follows: SDR 195 million to 1 December 1991, SDR 
390 million to 1 March 1992, SDR 585 million to 1 June 1992. Confidential letter from the Minister 
of Economy and the President o f the Central Bank o f Argentina to the International Monetary Fund, 
EBS/91/107, 28 June 1991.
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involved targets specified for the following areas: (a) the combined deficit of non- 
financial public sector and the BCRA; (b) the cash deficit of the non-financial 
public sector; (c) treasury outlays; (d) the net domestic assets of the BCRA; (e) net 
international reserves; and (f) the external arrears and the external debt of the 
public sector. Under the agreement, the stand-by would be instantly nullified if 
Argentina was to intensify or impose new restrictions on payments and transfers 
for current international transactions, introduce any new multiple currency practice, 
conclude any new bilateral payments agreements that were inconsistent with 
Article VIII, or impose / intensify import restrictions for balance of payments 
reasons. A last proviso made by the Argentine government was a commitment to 
consult with the Fund on any new policy initiative. As a result of this agreement, 
the World Bank unblocked the second tranche of the 1988 TPL after waiving the 
condition of the lowering of import duties on manufactured goods.34
In the Economic Policy Memorandum relevant to the negotiations for the 
stand-by, several issue areas stand out. The first concerns the reform of central 
government. In January 1991, budgetary authority was withdrawn for all 
government entities and all policy-making functions were consolidated in the 
Economy Ministry. In May 1991, the government approved plans for new 
administrative structures in which 97 out of 185 national directorates were 
disbanded. The Ministry of Public Works was incorporated into the Economy 
Ministry, making the latter’s function of budget and management supervision even 
more important. Future plans for decisions affecting the Secretariat of the 
Presidency and the Ministries of Education, Defence and Justice were also 
mentioned. In the area of labour and employment policy, the government planned 
to be supported by World Bank funds in launching initiatives concerning 
employment reduction, revision of public sector salary structures, and the 
introduction of effective budgeting and expenditure controls. Decree number 2476 
of November 1990 established a three year programme for reducing employment in 
national administrative bodies by around 122,000 positions, equivalent to more
34 Latin American Regional Reports - Southern Cone, 13 September 1990.
35 Economic Policy Memorandum attached to the Confidential letter from the Minister o f Economy 
and the President o f the Central Bank o f Argentina to the International Monetary Fund, 
EBS/91/107, 28 June 1991.
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than 20% of the existing total. In January 1991, 21,000 contracted employees were 
made redundant, and by June 1991, this number had doubled.
1992 Extended Fund Facility Agreement
The 1992 financing plan was the most important loan agreement, and 
clearly the culmination of the above ‘carrots’ with which the IMF had encouraged 
neoliberal reform in the first couple of years of the Menem government. On 31 
March 1992 the Board of Governors of the IMF approved an EFF package of SDR 
2,149 million over three years. Significantly, and in line with earlier observations 
about increased cooperation between the various IFIs, the IMF on this occasion had 
a supporting cast in the World Bank and IDB. The former remained committed to 
agreements with Argentina to support public sector reform and the restructuring of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and loans relating to the health and electrical 
energy sectors, financial sector reform, capital markets and SOEs were being 
negotiated at the time of the IMF agreement. The World Bank had committed $3 
billion in loans to Argentina over the five years prior to the IMF agreement, around 
50% of which was provided as adjustment lending in support of trade liberalisation 
and reform of SOEs and the public sector. The remaining 50% had been granted in 
support of public investment, especially in the power sector and provincial and
* \fkmunicipal infrastructure.
The IDB, after a period of two years between 1987-1990 in which no new 
loans were authorised, had recently approved loans supporting public sector 
reform, reform of national electrical companies, and financing for micro­
enterprises and credit lines for the financing of exports.37 In 1991, the lending 
programme had been sharply expanded and loans for a total of $879 million had 
been approved, 60% of which was aimed at restructuring federal government and 
strengthening the financial system at the provincial level.38 Further plans existed to
36 Communication dated 23 June 1992 to the International Banking Community from Lewis T. 
Preston (President o f the World Bank).
37 Communication dated 18 June 1992 to the International Banking Community from Enrique V. 
Iglesias (President o f the Inter-American Development Bank)
38 Inter-American Development Bank, Plans and Programs Department, Programs Division I: 
Argentina: Country Programming Paper, March 1992 (pg 18).
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promote private and social investment and to improve the fiscal situation of 
provincial governments, and loans were earmarked for the electrical sector and the 
environment. Furthermore, co-financing arrangements had been agreed between the 
Bank and the IDB for public sector reform.39 For the IDB, policy in the 1992-4 
period was intended to focus on the design and implementation of “structural 
economic policy reforms”, for the purposes of which the IDB intended to 
concentrate on sectoral loans in the short term.40
Argentina’s financing needs for the 1992-4 period were expected to be met 
by the net capital inflows from multilateral creditors (including the IMF), debt 
relief and access to new credits from official bilateral creditors, private capital 
inflows (including those derived from repatriation and privatisation), interest 
savings from additional debt conversions in the context of privatisation and the 
planned financing package from the commercial banks. In effect, Argentina was 
seen to be seeking the support of the IMF, World Bank and IDB to support its own 
resources, and the international banking community was urged by the IMF to 
support the programme and restore normal relations with Argentina on this basis 41
The objectives for the 1992-4 plan were four-fold: to maintain domestic 
inflation at international levels, to sustain strong economic growth in order to re­
establish external credibility, to normalise the external debt situation, and to 
conduct a process of liberalisation to dismantle the barriers imposed by years of 
excessive state regulation. These four goals would, according to the Economic 
Policy Memorandum associated with the agreement, be achieved by means of the 
following policy measures: a fiscal policy compatible with long-term fiscal 
solvency; a monetary policy that avoided Central Bank loans and remained 
constrained by the 1991 Convertibility Law; privatisation to reduce inefficiency 
and debt and to expand the role of the private sector; and the maintenance of 
Convertibility backed up by structural reforms and economic opening.42
39 Communication dated 23 June 1992 to the International Banking Community from Domingo 
Cavallo (Economy Minister o f the Republic o f Argentina); IDB: Argentina: Country Programming 
Paper, March 1992 (pp. 18-19); Tussie: The Inter-American Development Bank, pg 74.
40 IDB: Argentina: Country Programming Paper, March 1992 (pg 19). Significantly, although just 
about all loans in 1992 were policy-based, in 1993 the profile had shifted entirely to investment 
loans. See Tussie: The Inter-American Development Bank, pg 72.
41 Communication dated 19 June 1992 to the International Banking Community from Michel 
Camdessus (Managing Director o f the International Monetary Fund).
42 ibid.
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The EFF agreement involved explicit measures that affected political and 
economic actors in Argentina. Fewer conscriptions meant that the total number of 
members of the Armed Forces fell from 190,000 in 1984 to 117,000 in 1990 and 
98,000 in 1991. Military spending was reduced from 3.3% of GDP in 1988 to 2.5% 
in 1990-1 due to reductions in equipment purchases and operating costs and strict 
control of salaries. New staff reductions were anticipated in the documents relating 
to loan negotiations with the IMF in early 1992, along with 30 out of 33 public 
enterprises controlled by the Ministry of Defence. Revenues from the latter were to 
be used to finance the restructuring of the Armed Forces, including the 
capitalisation of retirement programmes.43 Similarly, in the case of labour, the 
DDE of 31 October 1991 introduced greater flexibility into labour markets and 
allowed for the decentralisation of negotiations concerning collective bargaining 
arrangements. The agreement with the IMF involved a commitment to continue the 
labour flexibilisation process for the period of the agreement.
The timing of the 1992 agreement is important. It followed the 
demonstration of the government’s commitment to reform in the Convertibility 
Plan, and acted to reinforce the consensus with Argentina (at least in elite circles) 
of the necessity and desirability of maintaining its policy path. In this way, the 
1992 agreement was the first step in the ‘consolidation’ phase of Argentine reform 
which aimed to ensure the continuation of the economic policy model. As such, the 
1989-91 reforms were ‘locked in’ to a set of commitments with the IFIs, thus 
increasing the costs of a reversal of the overall orientation and particularly the 
Convertibility Plan itself. The negotiation of a medium-term commitment with the 
IMF led to a spate of other possibilities for the consolidation of reform, such as the 
Brady debt reduction deal, loans from the other IFIs and the reinvigorated flows of 
foreign investment to Argentina from this time. The fact that all of these 
developments, as well as the agreement itself, were premised on the economic 
policy measures encapsulated in the Convertibility Plan is clear evidence of the 
‘irreversibility’ element mentioned above.
43 Economic Policy Memorandum to the International Monetary Fund, Republic o f Argentina, April 
1992.
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The 1995 ‘Rescue'Package
The existence of an IMF agreement, however, does not prevent the 
emergence of economic difficulties and the consequent need to renegotiate the 
terms of conditionality arrangements. The government’s surprise decision in 
September 1994 not to draw on the final two disbursements of the EFF negotiated 
in 1992 came at a time when Argentina’s ability to meet the fiscal targets for the 
third term was in doubt. There appear to have been a number of justifications for 
the decision. First, Cavallo was of the (probably mistaken) opinion that Argentina 
had reconstructed its credit in international capital markets to the extent that it no 
longer needed to avail itself of IMF funds which in any case were not the best on 
the market.44 Second, by breaking with the IMF the government gained 
significantly more policy latitude, especially given the frequency of the IMF’s 
monitoring operations. The government was reported to have claimed that it 
needed “greater freedom in economic decisions” and Cavallo stated that “we would 
like the IMF to continue to supervise the performance of our economy, but we do 
not want to go on sharing the decision-making process”.45 Third and most 
importantly, the very fact that the achievement of the targets was in question 
encouraged the government to ‘jump before it was pushed’, in that credibility 
would have been damaged far more if Argentina had been forced to negotiate a 
waiver with the IMF.
The trade off, therefore, was to seek alternative voluntary forms of finance 
in order to protect internal and external confidence in the viability of the 
Convertibility Plan. More fundamentally, a confidential Economy Ministry report 
is said to have stated that “it would be an important sign of Argentina’s progress 
under this programme and of the success of re-integration into the international 
capital market if the last disbursements were not made”.46 Nevertheless, the 
government recognised explicitly that IMF agreements had an important ‘trigger
44 El Economista, 30 September 1994.
45 “Argentina refuses IMF loan instalments”, Latin American Regional Reports - Southern Cone, 20 
October 1994.
46 El Economista, 30 September 1994.
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effect’ on the World Bank and IDB47: the approval of the IMF was absolutely 
necessary in order for the development banks to make financing available to 
Argentina and to ensure the continuation of the Brady Plan agreement.
In the event, the government’s confidence in its ability to secure sufficient 
financing from alternative sources to the IMF lasted for a very short time. The 
Mexican peso crisis of December 1994 had a severe impact on Argentina’s access 
to funds in the international capital markets throughout the following year, and 
Argentina was forced to return to its customary creditors. In March 1995 the 
government requested from the IMF an extension for a fourth year of the existing 
EFF and the disbursement of the remaining $420 million on which Cavallo had 
declined to draw, as well as a waiver of the targets that had not been met in order to 
allow the remaining loan purchases to be made. The root of the difficulties, 
according to the Argentine government, lay in the area of public sector finances: 
the overall surplus was not achieved as a result of the slowing of fiscal revenues in 
the second semester and higher than projected spending, particularly in the social 
security system. Some of the shortfall was attributed to the disappointing reduction 
in tax evasion, and the impact of the Mexican crisis was seen to be fundamental48
The proposals relating to fiscal policy included a 3% increase in VAT and 
an expansion of the VAT base and a number of commercial policies which 
included a temporary surcharge of 3% on imports, which rose to 10% for imports 
of capital goods and technology from outside Mercosur, and further increases on 69 
articles exempt under the Mercosur agreement. New spending cuts were envisaged, 
particularly in public servants’ salaries as part of a $3.3 billion austerity 
programme.49 Significantly, the measures did not include taxes on fuel, cigarettes 
or alcohol in the interests of the 14 May elections.50 In addition, the government 
appeared keen to fit in with the non-technical orientation of the IMF by 
emphasising the importance of structural reforms, particularly in the labour
47 El Economista, 23 & 30 September 1994. This became particularly important after the Mexican 
crisis in view o f the fact that the Bank and the IDB were principally engaged in offering financial 
assistance for the provincial restructuring, which was seen as crucial to addressing the fiscal 
difficulties exacerbated by the Tequila effect. See El Economista, 13 January 1995.
48 Economic Policy Memorandum to Michel Camdessus and the International Monetary Fund from 
Roque Femdndez and Domingo Cavallo, dated March 1995.
49 Reuters, 10 March 1995.
50 Reuters, 14 March 1995.
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sector.51 This cause was assisted by the congressional approval in March 1995 of a 
law giving greater flexibility to small and medium sized enterprises (of up to 40 
employees) with respect to employment conditions and the hiring of temporary 
workers.
The $11.1 billion financing plan included an IMF loan of $2.8 billion ($2.4 
billion in new funds plus the outstanding $420 million), with $2 billion also from 
leading local businessmen and foreign banks, and a projected $4.4 billion fiscal 
surplus that would be achieved in part through further austerity measures in the 
domestic economy.52 The remainder came from loans from the MDBs. The World 
Bank and IDB at the time of the negotiations with the IMF were apparently 
‘actively’ engaged in elaborating a programme for the privatisation of provincial 
banks and further provincial and municipal reforms, although these loans were 
made explicitly contingent on the prior signing of an IMF agreement.53 On 4 May 
1995 the board of the World Bank approved two loans totalling $275 million for 
the privatisation of provincial banks and the streamlining of the public sector.
Fifteen out of the twenty provincial banks were to be privatised or closed, 
in the interests of redressing the negative effects and potential long term 
implications of the Mexican crisis. Banking reforms aimed to reduce the likelihood 
of financial collapse in the light of the vulnerability of Argentina’s highly 
dollarised economy to swings in capital flows, and further structural reforms were 
seen as essential for maintaining the credibility of the economic programme after a 
hiatus in mid-1993 in which legislative approval and the implementation of certain 
reforms were deferred, and the reversal of the fiscal surplus in late 1994.54
Working on the assumption, therefore, that the fall-out from the Mexican 
crisis represented the first real test of the Convertibility Plan, the World Bank 
emphasised its own role in “supporting Government efforts to deepen the
51 Economic Policy Memorandum to Michel Camdessus and the International Monetary Fund from 
Roque Fem&ndez and Domingo Cavallo, dated March 1995.
52 Reuters, 14 March 1995 & 24 March 1995.
53 Latin America Weekly Report, 16 March 1995. Note that Menem and the government were at the 
time rather more convinced that the World Bank money would be immediately forthcoming, and 
claimed more than a month before the IMF agreement that the Argentine financial situation was 
“totally under control”.
54 Memorandum o f the President o f the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to 
the Executive Directors on a Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the 
Argentine Republic, Report no. 14278-AR, 10 April 1995 (pp. 9-10).
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adjustment process, particularly in provincial reforms, banking reforms, and 
reforms to improve the competitiveness and institutional base of the Argentine 
economy”. Provincial reform would be the most immediate priority, with the 
Provincial Reform Loan, Provincial Development Project II and the Municipal 
Development Project II, in addition to two loans for the reform of the banking 
sector (Provincial Bank Privatisation Loan and the Bank Reform Loan).55
Conditionality and Argentine Economic Reform
The ways in which conditionality and the lending operations of the IFIs has 
influenced the direction of economic policy is relatively straightforward in practical 
terms and obvious from the above analysis. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the 
IFIs have espoused an orthodox set of economic prescriptions that are embodied in 
concepts such as the Washington Consensus. The reasons for the greater success of 
adjustment lending in the 1990s have already been discussed. Rather than 
rehearsing the familiar arguments concerning the orientation of macroeconomic 
policy, then, the economic impact of conditionality will be addressed in the context 
of the arguments concerning globalisation which are the main focus of the chapter.
Throughout the documentation produced by the various institutions relating 
to loans in the period under examination, the twin goals of credibility and 
competitiveness are the recurring themes. IDB documentation on Argentine 
lending operations in 1992, for example, makes particularly clear the arguments 
advanced in Chapter 5 and at the start of this chapter. Long-term growth was seen 
to hinge not only on improvements in key economic sectors in the domestic context 
but also, more fundamentally, on a set of external constraints that revolved around 
the issues of credibility. The most important of these was the consolidation of a 
stable macroeconomic framework, which was “key to restoring confidence and 
increasing private investment upon which renewed growth depends”.56 The 
consolidation of growth and competitiveness was seen to depend on continued 
structural reforms, especially at provincial level, in the financial sector (including 
social security), and in the labour sector. On a broader level, as we have seen,
55 ibid., pp. 17-18.
56 IDB: Argentina: Country Programming Paper, March 1992 (pp. 9-11).
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growth was seen to be absolutely dependent on improved access to foreign 
financial resources, the majority of which would be from private sources. Capital 
flows, in turn, depend on the maintenance of investor confidence in the 
government’s ability to maintain stability and continue the restructuring of the 
economy.57 In addition, “integration with regional and world economies” is seen as 
the fundamental means by which Argentina will be able to modernise its 
productive resources and become economically competitive in both the domestic 
and the external settings.58
Similarly, in the World Bank documentation relating to the 1995 loans, the 
re-establishment of credibility after the Mexican crisis is the dominant theme. The 
agreement of the EFF with the IMF was seen to be “in order to reassure domestic 
and international investors”, for the purposes of which the restoration of a fiscal 
surplus and continued structural reforms were seen to be key, particularly in terms 
of the financial infrastructure (especially the provincial banking system), labour 
legislation, and civil service reforms to “reduce or stabilise personnel 
expenditures”.59 Structural reforms were presented in the light of the second theme: 
competitiveness, according to the Bank, “will depend on reforms in labor markets 
and health financing, continuing measures to deepen financial markets, and 
investments to exploit the opportunities presented by MERCOSUR”, which would 
be supported by lending operations in conjunction with country dialogue and 
‘economic and sector work’ (ESW). Particular emphasis would, according to Bank 
reports, be given to improving governance with lending for the purposes of 
legislative and judicial reform.60
An additional observation can be made on the basis of more recent relations 
with the IFIs. The Argentina government in late 1995 requested World Bank 
assistance in the export-led development strategy adopted for the next five years, 
specifically in re-orienting exporter support programmes.61 Both internally and
57 ibid, pg 10.
58 ibid, pp. 10-11.
59 Memorandum of the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to 
the Executive Directors on a Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the 
Argentine Republic, Report no. 14278-AR, 10 April 1995 (pp. 10-15).
60 ibid, pp. 21-3.
61 World Bank Staff Appraisal Report: Argentina, Enterprise Export Development Project - Report 
no. 14959-AR, Public Sector Management and Private Sector Development Division, Latin 
America and Caribbean Regional Office, 2 November 1995 (pp. 14-15).
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externally, the so-called ‘second reform of the state’ which involved the deepening 
of the reform process, was seen as essential in order to “generate the conditions of 
internal and external confidence to stimulate a process of real and financial 
investment that would bring Argentina out of the current recession”. Effectively, 
financial support was available, but conditional on a credible programme that 
involved the deepening of existing reform processes.
These statements clearly illustrate the points made in Chapter 5 concerning 
the changing structures of rewards and punishments in the international economy 
(and the impact of this on economic policy options), as well as the closer 
coincidence of interests between the Argentine government (and those of other 
Latin American countries) and the international lending institutions. The effects 
manifested themselves in two principal ways. First, the processes of economic 
reform initiated by the Menem government were reinforced by the funds made 
available by the IFIs, by the credibility attached to the existence of an IMF 
agreement from the perspective of international investors, and by the conditionality 
packages negotiated between the government and representatives of the relevant 
organisations. Most specifically for our argument, however, economic reform in 
Argentina was consolidated by the impact of increasing engagement at the 
international level. The increasing ‘internationalisation’ of the state from the early 
1990s onwards located an important element of policy-making responsibility at the 
international level, in this context through the locking of the policy orientation into 
a set of contractual obligations. As such, the state autonomy necessary for 
sustaining reform in the 1991/2-95 period was derived from a set of international 
commitments through which, voluntarily and intentionally, the Argentine 
government chose to constrain its own policy-making latitude.
These arguments, furthermore, clearly demonstrate the ways in which 
conditionality can be seen to stand at the interface between the global and the 
national. On the one hand the influence of globalisation is transmitted and 
concretised through the mechanism of conditionality, creating the impetus and 
imperative for economic reform. On the other hand, this impetus is at least equally 
generated at the domestic level, and the impact of conditionality is often one of
62 El Economista, 24 November 1995.
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reinforcement rather than initiation. The principal effect, therefore, was to create 
and additional legitimising support for the domestic processes of economic 
restructuring. Second, the process of globalisation itself is facilitated by the degree 
of economic policy convergence occasioned by what may be termed the process of 
‘assisted reform’ in Argentina and elsewhere. The degree of policy convergence 
generated by the coincidence of interests between the reform-oriented national state 
and the international financial institutions facilitates and sustains the process of 
economic change at the global level. This is particularly the case in developing 
countries that are engaged in the sorts of reform processes that would facilitate 
insertion into the global economy and the possibilities for reaping the ‘rewards’ of 
access to finance and investment. Given that the participation of developing 
countries in the mainstream of global economic activity has increased so 
significantly in recent years (as described in Chapter 5), the maintenance of policy 
convergence becomes even more pressing.
Governance, State Power and Political Reform
There are a number of different ways in which the connection between 
conditionality and political reform operates. The most basic can be deduced from 
the above empirical analysis of the major financing agreements with the IFIs, in 
terms of the direct impact of conditionality on the economic status of certain 
groups of political actors. It is less clear whether this is an inevitable result of the 
types of economic orientation pursued, or rather a result of the broader political 
agenda of the IFIs or, more abstractly, the neoliberal economic agenda incarnated 
in the mechanisms of globalisation.
The above analysis mentions in the context of the loan agreements certain 
provisions relating to the military and labour. Reforms relating to the former were 
justified on two principal grounds. First, democratisation and demilitarisation 
necessitate and justify cuts in military spending, which by extension serve to 
diminish the importance and capabilities of the military institution. This also has a 
regional dimension expressed, for example, by Michel Camdessus:
In times when many countries in the region are negotiating
agreements on economic and trade cooperation, when border
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problems are being resolved in a spirit of cooperation, is it not 
logical to propose that this is the moment for the countries of Latin 
America, individually and collectively, also to reduce military 
spending?
Second, the notion of cuts in military spending is explicitly linked to the concept of 
governance. The World Bank, for example, professed itself to be “interested in 
military expenditures because of their crowding-out effect on development 
spending”.64 Similarly, the IMF presented cuts in military spending as a way to 
“permit a transfer of human and financial resources to activities that help 
development and reduce the problem of poverty”.65
The IFIs’ approach to labour has been entirely consistent with the neoliberal 
orientation of conditionality and reform processes, focusing on issues of labour 
flexibilisation which act to reduce the collective bargaining powers of the unions, 
eliminate centrally-imposed restrictions on hours, wages and working conditions, 
and locate decision-making authority at firm level rather than governmental level. 
However, as labour reform (unlike military reform) is not principally a matter of 
spending policy, conditionality has usually been limited to ensuring a commitment 
on the part of the government to continued structural reforms which increasingly 
over the course of the 1990s have been defined in terms of the labour sector.
Along with the emphasis entailed in economic reform on the business 
sector and financial agents, then, conditionality has acted to reinforce and 
‘legitimise’ the Menem government’s restructuring of political interests in 
Argentina. This has been both an implicit reinforcement, in the sense that by 
writing such commitments into agreements with IFIs the government locks in its 
own position against societal and institutional opposition, and also more explicitly, 
in statements that effectively legitimise the type of democracy conducted by the 
Menem government. For example, Michel Camdessus stated in 1991 in the context 
of military spending that “transferring resources to more productive uses will 
require firm political leadership in many countries”.66
63 Address to UN ECLA, Santiago, Chile, 29 November 1991.
64 Governance and Development, pg 46.
65 Michel Camdessus: address to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C., 13 November 
1991.
66 ibid.
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There is, however, another dimension to these considerations of political 
reform, which relates to the relationship between state power and civil society. This 
is particularly important for the line of argument presented in the thesis, 
particularly in the context of the ‘paradox of state power’. The concern with the 
modernisation of the state was set out in the World Bank’s 1997 World 
Development Report. The approach to the state in this report moved forward from 
the statist model of development that prevailed during the 1960s and 1970s and 
from the idea of the minimalist state of the 1980s towards one which emphasises 
the effectiveness of the state in the current international context. The report argues 
that the lesson of such key developments as the collapse of the ‘command-and- 
control’ economies of the socialist bloc, the crisis of the welfare state, the role of 
the state in East Asian development and “the collapse of states and the explosion in 
humanitarian emergencies” in various parts of the world is that “state-dominated 
development has failed, but so will stateless development”. Therefore, there is an 
urgent need for “rethinking the state” and situating the present debate in terms of 
effectiveness.
The Bank’s concern with the state mainly refers to the legal and
administrative conditions necessary to ensure the continuation of the market-
dominated development model in the current context of globalisation. In essence,
this concerns the creation of a “benign policy environment” in order for countries
“to benefit from competitive market forces”.69 One of the Report’s main premises
is that countries are involved in a “high-stakes race against time”70 for the
achievement of credibility, which is seen as the crux of the current situation. Apart
from national policy measures (such as Argentina’s Convertibility Law),
agreements with the IMF and the World Bank are presented as an important means
of achieving this credibility in the global arena. The Bank argues that:
In the short run, while weak domestic institutions are being 
reinforced, stronger ties with external actors - for example, through 
stabilization programs with the IMF - can help governments signal 
their commitment. In the long run, however ... the vital challenge is
67 op.cit., pp. 23-5.
68 ibid., pgs 1 and 25.
69 ibid., pp. 45-6.
70 ibid., pg 51.
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to build home-grown commitment mechanisms, rooted in domestic 
institutions.71
On the national level, then, the World Bank is concerned to “lock in good 
policies”, by two alternative mechanisms if the institutional setting is thought to be 
inadequate: either by moving responsibility for the implementation of such policies 
from governments to the private sector and civil society, or to “specify the content 
of policy in precise rules, and then lock in these rules using mechanisms that make 
it costly to reverse course.72 These “instruments of restraint” include internal 
institutional arrangements (such as judicial independence and the ‘separation of 
powers’ idea) and external mechanisms (such as international agreements and 
binding conditionality agreements with the IFIs themselves).73
Such instruments can be seen to work in ways that involve a clear 
separation of the economic and the political, and therefore act to reduce the 
responsiveness of the state to social actors. The concentration of economic power 
in the hands of the private sector is seen by the Bank as one solution for poverty 
and social dislocations, and is clearly consistent with the argument that in the 
current market-dominated environment, authority is often exercised by agents that 
are not democratically accountable. The Bank’s suggestion of a devolution of 
implementation responsibility to civil society does not imply involvement in 
decision-making processes. According to one reading, then, the project of the 
international financial institutions is about the marginalisation of participatory 
democracy in an attempt to lock in the ‘new constitutionalism’ of “a political and 
legal strategy for separating economic forces and policies from broad political 
accountability”:
One way to understand many of the measures discussed by the 
World Bank is as part of a strategic effort to contain social and 
political conflict through limiting democracy and preventing a 
second Polyanian double movement... Market civilisation tends to 
naturalise neo-liberalism through reinforcement of individualism 
and consumerist projects of desire. The World Bank is attempting 
systematically to co-opt and channel forces of civil society in a 
strategy of trasformismo: a tactic to legitimate the attenuation of
71 ibid., pg 60.
72 ibid., pgs 5 and 50.
73 ibid., pp. 99-101.
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democracy in economic policy by increasing participation in safely 
channelled areas.74
It may well be the case that as a result of the “greater weight and
nc
representation” of capital the democratisation process is being restrained. In 
Argentina and other developing countries, the mechanism by which this occurs, 
aside from the concentration of economic power in the hands of non-accountable 
agents, is the coincidence of interests between the state and those institutions and 
individuals associated with international finance and business. In other words, 
Gill’s argument that the policies of the IFIs are creating a separation between the 
political and economic needs to be modified along the following lines: that the 
predominance of capital as a result (or manifestation) of globalisation in the 
international economy is accompanied (in the case of Argentina and similar 
countries) by an increasing coincidence of interests between the holders of 
economic power and the holders of political power, and therefore results in a 
separation from civil society rather than ‘the political’ more broadly defined.
This goes against some of the rhetoric of the institutions themselves. Much 
is made of the link between ‘social’ issues such as education and poverty 
alleviation, along with the role of national governments in promoting these ends, 
and democracy. The Managing Director of the IMF, Michel Camdessus, has been 
heard to state explicitly that the threads of the concept of ‘good’ growth (that is, 
growth which is sustainable and socially responsive) “come together in the demand 
for efficient management of the machinery of the state, which can only achieve its 
highest form and serve man’s highest aspirations when ‘economic democracy’ and 
‘political democracy’ go hand in hand”. The increasing attention to social actors 
in negotiations with the financial and development institutions has led to their 
increased involvement in the negotiations themselves. This is an important 
mechanism by which social actors that previously may have been hostile to the 
types of change that currently characterise the global arena and, more particularly,
74 Stephen Gill: “Analysing New Forms o f Authority: New Constitutionalism, Panopticism and 
Market Civilization”, paper presented to the conference on ‘Non-State Actors and Authority in the 
Global System’, Warwick University ESRC Centre for the Study o f Globalisation and 
Regionalisation, 31 October-1 November 1997.
75 ibid.
76 Address to the UN ECLA, Santiago, Chile, 29 November 1991.
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the consequent changes in the domestic context, are incorporated into the process. 
As with the strategies employed by Menem, this process of incorporation and 
inclusion does not necessarily mean greater influence, but rather a significant 
neutralisation of opposition. This, in turn, contributes to the construction of the 
convergence of ideas and policy on which, it is argued here, globalisation depends.
The new emphasis placed on the empowerment of civil society by the IFIs 
is therefore a selective concept that aims fundamentally to reinforce the structural 
reforms necessary to perpetuate the market economy model. The idea of 
reconstructing civil society steers away from “ethnic or other affective or 
community groups” towards contractual groupings such as professional 
associations, NGOs, trade unions and business organisations. As such, the IFIs are 
empowering precisely those groups in society that are likely to support and demand 
the sorts of technical reforms that are deemed desirable and necessary for the
*7*7consolidation of a market economy and a ‘neutral’ state. The development of the 
modem civil society is therefore seen to refer to the “narrative of capital” which 
replaces (and has replaced) the “narrative of community”, the nature of which, 
according to the IFIs’ conceptions, hinders the development process.78
This process of selective incorporation, furthermore, returns to the new 
ideas about ‘ownership’. In order for ownership to be a realistic prospect, there has 
to be a critical mass of support in the country in question. In other words, the 
concept depends on the existence of a group which is prepared to ‘own’ such 
agreements or processes. The most obvious of such groups in Argentina would be 
the technocratic policy-makers in government circles, reinforced by business 
sectors. The presence or absence of this type of ‘ownership structure’ perhaps 
accounts for the differential impact and outcome of conditionality across countries 
or regions. The incorporation of conditionality into the broader economic process 
in Argentina can be seen in this light as facilitated by the political restructuring 
process and the convergence of interests between the holders of economic and 
political power.
77 Williams & Young, pg 96.
78 P. Chatterjee: “Response to Taylor’s ‘Modes of Civil Society’, Public Culture 3 ,1990, quoted in 
Williams & Young, pg 96.
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This is not to argue that the state has become synonymous with the market. 
As argued in Chapter 5, the state is still the locus of political power, in that it is the 
state (or more accurately the executive branch in the Argentine / Latin American 
case) that retains primary responsibility for the formulation and implementation of 
policy. The above arguments are intended to reflect that it is misleading to see the 
state and the market as competing entities. The impacts of globalisation and 
conditionality have created a separation between the state and civil society as well 
as between the economic and the ‘political’, and the external influences are no 
longer seen solely as hostile elements with which the state must contend. Alliance 
with international finance and the multilateral institutions is now a matter of policy 
choice. Although it is true that states have few realistic options aside from 
cooperation with the IFIs and conformity with the policy measures ‘demanded’ by 
the globalising international economy, it should not be assumed that there is a 
fundamental divergence of interests. As the previous discussion of globalisation 
demonstrated, the interests of the state in Latin America and elsewhere in the early 
1990s came to be defined as closely linked to the interests of the global economy 
and those institutions assumed to serve it.
On a basic level, then, the conditionality attached to loans from the IFIs 
served to reinforce the exclusionary nature of Argentine politics under Menem, and 
to underwrite the reorganisation of political interests which entailed the 
subordination of labour and the military and the elevation of business to a position 
of significant influence. However, the introduction of the concept of good 
governance and the stated preoccupation of the MDBs with the empowerment of 
civil society complicate this interpretation. The apparent incompatibility between 
the rhetoric and the reality of the concern with democracy and civil society may 
well be in part a function of the nature of Latin American governments prevalent in 
the early to mid-1990s. The neo-populist orientations of presidents such as Menem 
and Fujimori in Peru clearly militated against the implementation of the World 
Bank’s ideals at the time. For instance, its insistence on the ‘reinvigoration’ of the
70state and the establishment of a functioning and professional bureaucracy sat 
uncomfortably with Menem’s manipulation of national institutional and legal
79 World Development Report 1997, pg 166.
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structures. Furthermore, traditional patterns of relations with regional governments 
characterised by highly centralised patterns of decision-making place significant
  OA
hurdles in the way of the decentralisation policies advocated by the MDBs.
The evolution of the activities of the IFIs in the mid-1990s nevertheless 
adds further weight to the argument that the impact of conditionality and 
globalisation in the first Menem administration acted consolidate the centralisation 
of power and the establishment of an ‘exclusionary’ type of democracy. Although 
issues of socio-economic inequality and participation remain far from satisfactorily 
redressed, the MDBs have concerned themselves with those domestic sectors 
excluded by the forces of globalisation and reform. In this respect, the activities of 
the MDBs can be seen to act as ‘policy catalysts’ in the areas of social reform.81 
Nevertheless, few of the programmes and loans involved appear to have had a 
direct impact on the course of government policy, in that the linkages were 
established between the MDBs and provincial governments rather than the central 
government apparatus. In this way, it may be that the MDBs were (and are) acting 
not as policy catalysts but rather as a stopgap for overcoming the shortcomings of 
the neoliberal model institutionalised in recent years. Up to the mid-1990s, there 
had been little significant change in government policy as a result of the MDBs 
emphasis on civil society.
On the other hand, the dynamic can be presented differently. By focusing 
on those sectors excluded from the mainstream of the present development model, 
the World Bank and IDB effectively focus on the most important sources of 
opposition to the continuation of the neoliberal pact. Therefore, in line with the 
arguments made above, the role of lending and the associated conditionality was 
(and is still) to bring excluded sectors into the prevailing economic and political 
environment, and thereby to neutralise opposition to it. The direct lines of 
communication established between MDBs and sectors of civil society or 
provincial banks did little to address the main issue: that is, the separation 
established in the first part of the decade between state and society. The concern of
80 Some o f these may well be resolved in time, especially with new opposition elements such as the 
FREPASO party established in 1995 that base their political campaign on precisely the same issues 
o f accountability and effectiveness as the World Bank’s documentary rhetoric.
81 Tussie: “Globalisation and Conditionality”, pp. 10-11.
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the MDBs with civil society to an extent excused the government from having to 
make significant changes in the orientation of policy by providing a cushion (or 
perhaps wall) against the main potential sources of damaging opposition.
Effectively the strategy of incorporation is all about the rewards of 
cooperation rather than hostility. As a result of the new availability of funds, “civil 
society sectors and provinces initially reluctant to globalisation and conditionality 
are tempted to accept new terms of modernisation”.82 In this way, the objectives of 
central governments and IFIs remain largely unaltered. As with the Menem 
government’s strategy of political reform, there is a fine dividing line between 
incorporation and neutralisation. The question of poverty alleviation, furthermore, 
is seen as part of the same process of removing the potential threats to the 
economic and political model.
However, this should not be understood as a process of ‘cooptation’ as 
much as a process of ‘consensus-building’. The success of the economic model in 
developing countries like Argentina depends ultimately on assessments of its 
performance on the part of the affected population. Despite the increasing 
alienation of the policy-making environment (or state) from the demands of 
electorates that can be observed in Argentina, the point stands that what is at stake 
is the institutionalisation of a new set of ideas about development. In the Latin 
American and African contexts especially, the early stages of institutionalising a 
new discourse of development was vastly assisted by the scale of economic and 
political crisis in the late 1980s and the perception that alternative models of 
development were exhausted. However, the role of the IFIs, as the primary 
transmission mechanisms for the influences of the globalisation process, were far 
more pivotal in the consolidation of reform in Argentina, and of the new 
development paradigm after the initial crisis conditions had faded.
Conclusion
In sum, the above observations substantiate the basic claim of this chapter: 
that conditionality and the IFIs simultaneously serve the interests of the national
82 ibid., pg 11.
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and the international. Globalisation depends on the acceptance and 
institutionalisation of the current dominant discourse of development, and the 
policy convergence that this acceptance will generate. The conditionality packages 
of the IFIs act as the transmission belt for these ideas between the global and the 
national, and at the same time act to encourage and reinforce the sorts of policies 
that are consistent with the orientation of the international economy and essential 
for competitive participation in it. A further function, as we have seen, has been 
adopted along the way in the shape of attempts to offset potential deviations from 
this acceptance occasioned by political and economic exclusion. By channelling 
funds to the potentially or actually disaffected, the MDBs give governments the 
additional breathing space required to consolidate reform, while the IMF channels 
resources to the state in order to facilitate the process of reform from above.
As we have seen, the principal breathing space for early reform efforts in 
Argentina was provided by the government’s own elimination of hyperinflation. 
The activities of the IFIs picked up speed only after the reform process had been 
implemented, and the comments therefore refer to additional impetus for the 
consolidation of already-established policy change. As such, it appears that the key 
function of the IFIs in Argentina was to maintain the consensus constructed around 
the reform process at a time when the emergence of opposition was most likely. 
The orientation of economic reform was ‘locked in’ to a set of binding agreements 
at the international level, as a result of which the discretionary control of the 
national state over the economy was significantly reduced. Here we can return to 
the ‘paradox of state power’: although the autonomy of the state was diminished as 
a result of these actions, its autonomy at the domestic level was increased, thereby 
facilitating the consolidation of reform in the post-implementation period. The 
‘internationalisation’ of the state’s policy-making functions, furthermore, enabled 
the consolidation of the political orientation of the government and strengthened 
the centralised and ‘exclusionary’ nature of Argentine politics under Menem.
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Chapter 7
Regional Integration, State Power and Reform
The third identified dimension of external influence on Argentine reform is 
regional integration. Regionalism and regionalisation are usually conceptualised in 
the literature as policy outputs, and have been described earlier in the thesis as 
elements of the economic restructuring programme carried out in Argentina. The 
development of the regional market was fundamental to the resolution of the 
second bottleneck identified at the start of Chapter 3: the persistence of economic 
stagnation in the post-war period can be attributed primarily to a crisis in the export 
economy. This stemmed both from the inward orientation of Argentine 
development (and the consequent damage to the external sector) and also a lack of 
international markets for Argentine exports. As Tables 7.1 and 7.2 demonstrate 
below, the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur) provided opportunities for 
a significant expansion of exports and thus a basis for the liberalisation of the 
economy.
This chapter is not concerned, however, with the factors that explain the 
emergence of regionalism in the Southern Cone or elsewhere, and does not propose 
to examine the evolution of the Mercosur. These issues have been addressed more 
than adequately elsewhere and are not relevant to the present discussion.1 Rather, it 
is concerned with the ways in which regionalism acts as a policy input as well as 
output, and the ways that regional integration impacted on the processes of political 
and economic change underway in Argentina from the start of the 1990s. To this 
end, regionalism is conceived as an important source of international influence, and 
to be closely related to globalisation. Therefore, the regional dimensions of change 
will be analysed from a more ‘outside-in’ perspective that aims to show how the
1 For a review o f the literature on regionalism, see Andrew Hurrell: “Explaining the Resurgence o f  
Regionalism in World Politics”, Review o f International Studies 21,4 ,1995.  For general accounts 
of the evolution o f Mercosur, see, for example, Luigi Manzetti: “Argentine-Brazilian Economic 
Integration: An Early Appraisal”, Latin American Research Review XXV, 3, 1990 and “The 
Political Economy o f Mercosur”, Journal o f  Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 35,4,  
Winter 1993-4; Daniel Chudnovsky & Fernando Porta: “On Argentine-Brazilian Economic 
Integration”, CEPAL Review 39, December 1989; The Economist, 12 October 1996: “Remapping 
South America: A Survey o f Mercosur”; Aldo Ferrer: “Mercosur: Trayectoria, Situacidn Actual y 
Perspectivas”, Desarrollo Economico 35, 140, January-March 1996.
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nature of regionalism both reflects and reinforces processes of endogenously- 
rooted change in member countries. In other words, the approach employed in this 
chapter demonstrates how the policy outputs that give rise to the construction of a 
regional bloc feed back into the loop to become a policy input, or alternatively to 
create the context and conditions in which domestic processes of reform in 
Argentina could be sustained and consolidated. It aims, therefore, to complete the 
circle in the analysis of regional integration.
The focus of the chapter, therefore, will be on the influence and impact of 
regionalism on political and economic change in Argentina, and specifically on the 
relationship between certain types of regional integration and state power. It argues 
that regionalism in the Southern Cone has acted (and been designed) to ‘lock in’ a 
specific economic policy paradigm and to consolidate changes in the nature of 
political power in Argentina. In this sense, the processes associated with the three 
strands of international influence - globalisation, conditionality and regionalisation 
- have combined to facilitate and consolidate processes of economic and political 
change in Argentina. Most importantly, however, these international influences 
have been used very deliberately for precisely this purpose by the Argentine 
government. This is easiest to see in the case of regionalisation as the process is 
constructed through the purposive policies of the member states, and also in the 
case of conditionality, in terms of the deliberate pursuit of closer links with the 
international financial institutions.
It is also argued that regional integration has acted to strengthen the state, 
contrary to arguments which suggest a diminution of state power as a result of the 
devolution or ‘pooling’ of sovereignty to the regional level. These arguments, 
therefore, build on those made throughout the thesis concerning the ‘rescue’ and 
‘internationalisation’ of the state and the ‘paradox of state power’. We have seen 
that the imperatives of participation in the globalisation process (in terms of 
maintaining competitiveness and credibility for the purposes of attracting foreign 
capital flows) and conditionality agreements with the IFIs had the effect of 
reinforcing the orientation of the political and economic models in Argentina. By 
similar mechanisms, policy measures implemented in the context of interstate 
agreements acquire an element of irreversibility, and are ‘locked in’ far more
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tightly as a result: once policy measures such as tariff liberalisation are established 
at the regional level, national governments’ direct control over policy is sharply 
diminished. Authority is thus removed not only from the state but also from 
societal influence. Moreover, regionalism acts to shore up a degree of support and 
consensus from domestic actors that may be achieved otherwise only with 
considerable difficulty. The advantages of economic change are more readily 
perceived through the benefits of increased access to neighbouring markets, and 
political opposition is offset by the regional rather than national focus of economic 
activity.
Furthermore, the highly statist and governmental nature of regionalism in 
the Southern Cone had the aim and effect of reinforcing the concentration of 
political power in the state and the exclusionary style of decision-making 
characterised, in the Argentine and most other Latin American cases, by a high 
concentration of authority in the executive branch. Regional integration in 
Mercosur is highly govemmentalist and elite-dominated in both its institutional 
structures and in the practical forms of participation in the process. As a result, it 
fits plausibly with liberal intergovemmentalist theories of integration developed 
with reference to European integration, which hold that integration will be the 
result of bargaining between governments that are responsive to specifically 
national interests and preferences. As such, the type of regional integration in 
which Argentina is involved reinforced the ‘exclusionary’ nature of the policy­
making process and allowed for a consolidation of a centralised political system.
Once again, the chronological perspective is pivotal for an understanding of 
these dynamics. The Mercosur was established formally in 1991 after a period of 
increasing cooperation between Argentina and Brazil. Although the timing had 
little to do with economic policy measures such as Convertibility and more to do 
with democratisation in the region, the development of the Mercosur from 1991 
coincided with what we have identified as the ‘consolidation’ phase of Argentine 
reform. The possibility for the re-emergence of economic crisis, then, which might 
have been predicted from post-war patterns, was offset by the rapid expansion of 
the export base as a result of the regional integration initiative. Furthermore, as we 
have seen above, the ‘internationalisation’ or perhaps ‘regionalisation’ of the state
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in this context acted to consolidate the economic and political orientation from 
1991 onwards.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. The first three sections develop 
the first layer of the argument outlined above. The first offers a conceptualisation 
of regionalism and its relationship to globalisation, with particular attention to the 
different ways in which both act to implant and consolidate a neoliberal policy 
agenda. The second gives empirical substance to these arguments through a 
discussion of policy change in Argentina. The third embellishes these arguments 
with a further application of ‘rescue’ hypothesis to the case of Argentina. The 
following sections develop the second layer of the argument. The fourth and fifth 
sections analyse respectively the institutional structures of the Mercosur and the 
pattern of Argentine actors’ participation in the regional integration process. The 
sixth draws on theories of European integration to argue that Mercosur corresponds 
strongly to intergovemmentalist models of integration, which also shed further 
light on the relationship between regionalisation and state power in Argentina. The 
seventh section adds the final dimension to the argument with a brief consideration 
of the impact of regionalisation on the military and the broader question of 
democratisation. The final section offers some conclusions on the linkages between 
regionalisation, state power and reform processes in Argentina.
Table 7.1: Mercosur Trade (in millions of US$)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 A90-6
Intra-Mercosur
Exports
4.12 5.10 7.21 10.02 12.04 14.38 16.90
Growth Rate 23.6 41.4 39.0 20.2 19.4 17.5 309.5
Total exports 
from Mercosur 
countries
46.43 46.21 50.48 54.04 62.12 70.40 75.85
Growth Rate -0.5 9.3 7.1 15.0 13.3 7.7 63.4
Intra-Mercosur 
exports / Total 
exports (%)
8.9 11.0 14.3 18.6 19.4 20.4 22.3
Source: Argentine Embassy in Brazil (from CPC, Buenos Aires)
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Table 7.2: Evolution of the Structure of Mercosur Exports to the W orld (in
percentages)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Intra-Mercosur 8.9 11.0 14.3 18.6 19.4 20.4 22.3
European Union 31.1 32.0 30.3 26.8 27.0 25.6 24.3
United States 20.7 16.9 17.1 17.6 17.5 15.3 14.6
Rest of LAIA 7.1 9.0 18.6 10.3 9.9 9.7 9.5
Rest of the World 32.2 31.1 19.4 26.8 26.2 29.0 29.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Argentine Embassy in Brazil (from CPC, Buenos Aires)
Globalisation, Regionalisation and the State
The regionalisation of the world economy, and particularly the pace of this 
process, are not in dispute. According to the WTO, for example, 109 regional 
agreements were notified to the GATT between 1948 and the end of 1994, and 
around 30% of these were signed between 1990 and 1994. The debate centres 
largely on the relationship between the twin processes of globalisation and 
regionalisation which, although neither is a novel development, are seen both to 
characterise the contemporary international political economy and to have assumed 
a much greater dynamism and significance over the last ten or fifteen years.
The debate, on a simple level, divides into two camps. The first sees 
globalisation and regionalisation as complementary and parallel developments in 
the international system, which are mutually reinforcing and inherently connected. 
According to this conception, regionalisation “intersects with globalisation and one 
cannot be understood in the absence of the other”. The alternative position holds 
that regionalisation and globalisation are contradictory forces that pull in opposite 
directions. Regionalisation is the antithesis of the integrative project of 
globalisation, and becomes a response to the detrimental national effects of the
2 The Economist, 16 September 1995.
3 Richard Higgott: “Globalisation and Governance: Accommodating Regionalisation and 
Localisation”, mimeo, University o f Warwick, February 1997 (pg 16).
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globalisation of economic activity. Therefore, regionalisation is seen as a protective 
mechanism used by states that works against the consolidation of a globalised 
international economy.
On the one hand, then, regionalisation may be seen as a ‘building block’ for 
globalisation, especially if the latter is equated with the development of 
multilateralism in the international economy. According to this position, 
regionalisation becomes a form of “limited globalisation”.4 If liberalisation and the 
lowering of tariff barriers to trade are more easily accomplished at regional level, 
the formation of regional blocs contributes to the opening of international trade and 
therefore to the maintenance of the principles of globalisation / multilateralism. 
Viewed from a ‘macro’ perspective, then, the sum of regional blocs constitutes a 
basis for the globalised international economy.
In a related vein, regionalisation may be seen as the principal mechanism by 
which globalisation is made ‘administratively’ manageable. Multilateral trade 
negotiations are increasingly less feasible given the number of participants5: if 
regions participate in the multilateral system as blocs, the logistics of international 
negotiations become significantly more manageable. Similarly, the process of 
multilateral liberalisation is facilitated if timetables and conditions are negotiated 
(at least in the first instance) at the regional level, as policy harmonisation becomes 
inevitably more viable given the reduced range of interests to be coordinated and 
the greater likelihood of a coincidence of policy preferences between the members 
of a regional arrangement. More concretely, however, free trade agreements 
between countries depart from the principle that barriers to trade should be 
equalised and then eliminated, in contrast to the reciprocal bargaining orientation 
of the GATT negotiations.6
In essence, regionalisation has the advantage over multilateralism of 
counteracting asymmetries of negotiating power or influence, both by narrowing
4 Marjan Svetlicic & H.W. Singer (eds.): The World Economy: Challenges o f  Globalization and 
Regionalization (1996), pg 23.
5 Diana Tussie: “In the Whirlwind o f Globalisation and Multilateralism: The Case of Emerging 
Regionalism in Latin America” in William D. Coleman & Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (eds.): 
Regionalism and Global Economic Integration: Europe, Asia and the Americas (1998), pg 92.
6 Gary Hufbauer & Anup Malani: “The World Trade Regime: GATT, Regional Cooperation, 
Bilateral Confrontation” in Peter Gourevitch & Pablo Guerrieri (eds.): New Challenges to 
International Cooperation: Adjustment o f  Firms, Policies and Organizations to Global Competition 
(1993), pg 295.
203
the scope of particular negotiations, and by increasing the negotiating strength and 
coherence of regional units in the multilateral arena. One of the principal aims of 
regionalism among developing countries, for instance, is the enhancement of 
bargaining power vis-a-vis the stronger countries in the international arena. In 
addition, regionalism capitalises on perceived or actual affinities between member 
countries (especially in terms of economic structures), which lowers the costs of 
adjustment as well as producing policy decisions likely to be congruent with and 
responsive to national circumstances and priorities.
These arguments can be embellished with a recognition of the more specific 
advantages that ‘bloc bargaining’ can offer in the international economy. Regional 
arrangements may be seen to permit the more efficient handling of market access 
issues for developing countries, in that the dominant trading powers are required to 
open their markets more selectively than would be the case in the context of the 
multilateral trading system.7 Therefore, apart from increasing the bargaining 
leverage of member states, the formation of regional blocs and their use as a 
negotiating platform may be seen to offer more concentrated advantages for 
developing countries in their interactions with the major powers in the international 
economy.
Arguments that regionalisation and globalisation have become inherently 
compatible are significantly strengthened by the nature of contemporary 
regionalism. The concept of ‘open regionalism’ modifies the distinction between 
globalisation and regionalisation8, in that, at least rhetorically, regional blocs are 
not concerned with the creation of barriers to international economic activity.9 
Although this assertion does not take into account the uneven trajectory of most 
processes of regionalisation, nor the tendency for instances of ‘hard regionalism’ to 
occur in areas supposedly committed to ‘open regionalism’10, it is nevertheless the
7 Manuel R. Agosm & Diana Tussie: “Globalisation, Regionalisation and New Dilemmas in Trade 
Policy for Development”, UNCTAD Reprint Series no. 74 (from World Competition 15,4, June 
1992), pg 47.
8 Helge Hveem: “The Limits o f Globalization and the Potential o f Regionalism”, paper presented to 
the conference on ‘Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System’, Warwick University 
ESRC Centre for the Study o f Globalisation and Regionalisation, October 31 st-November 1st 1997.
9 See Juan Alberto Fuentes: “El Regionalismo Abierto y la Integracidn Econdmica”, Revista de la 
CEPAL 53, August 1994.
10 See comments on the EAEC, for example, in Richard Higgott & Richard Stubbs: “Competing 
Conceptions o f Economic Regionalism: APEC versus EAEC in the Asia Pacific”, Review o f  
International Political Economy 2, 3, Summer 1995.
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case that regionalisation is not generally perceived to be a mechanism through 
which to oppose globalisation, nor as a process that is inherently antithetical to 
global integration. The case of the Mercosur also demonstrates that the increase in 
regional exports was accompanied by an increase in access to extra-regional 
markets, thus strengthening the prospects for global economic integration. If, 
therefore, open regionalism is the norm, both in rhetoric and in reality, it is at least 
possible in practical terms that contemporary processes of regionalisation and 
globalisation are compatible.
On the other hand, the ‘stumbling block’ hypothesis holds that 
regionalisation is a mechanism employed by national states that see themselves 
compelled to erect defences against the detrimental effects of the economic 
processes involved in globalisation, most obviously with the protection of local 
industry. In this sense, regionalisation is a reactive process that privileges national 
priorities over global trends. This observation is often linked to a vision of 
globalisation and regionalisation as responding to centrifugal and centripetal forces 
respectively.11 Alternatively, regionalisation is seen to have become the most 
dynamic process underway in the international arena, while globalisation 
effectively reached a “plateau” in the early 1980s.12 In both cases the expansion of 
one is seen to be inimical to the expansion or development of the other.
A less stark characterisation might present regionalisation as a ‘bottom-up’
process of change, with globalisation (and multilateralism) as a ‘top-down
process’, the limitations of which may be seen as at least part of the explanation for
11the dynamism of regionalism. Heightened tendencies towards the formation of 
regional blocs may be attributed in part to frustration at the slow pace of GATT 
negotiations in the 1980s and also the relatively cumbersome evolution of 
multilateralism in the international economy.14 In this respect, regionalisation may
11 Charles Oman: Globalisation and Regionalisation: The Challenge fo r Developing Countries 
(OECD, 1994), pp. 33-6; Svetlicic & Singer (eds.), pg 20.
12 Paul Taylor: International Organization in the Modern World: The Regional and Global Process 
(1993), pg 1. This would appear to be primarily the case when globalisation is equated with 
multilateralism. See Oman, pp. 30-32. For an analysis o f the relative underdevelopment o f  
multilateralism, see Tussie: “In the Whirlwind”.
13 Tussie: “In the Whirlwind”, pg 92.
14 See, for example, Tussie: “In the Whirlwind”, and Hufbauer & Malani, pp. 294-5.
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be seen as a response to the shortcomings of globalisation, but not necessarily as a 
force that pulls in the opposite direction.
In some accounts, furthermore, the process of regionalisation is used to 
question the significance of globalisation or the existence of a truly global 
economy.15 The assumption is that regionalisation has emerged as the dominant 
form of economic (and at times) political organisation, and that it can make no 
sense to talk about a globalised international environment when the facts 
manifestly suggest the contrary. The appeal of such a position evidently lies in the 
greater ‘palpability’ of regionalisation as opposed to globalisation: both are 
processes of international change but the manifestations of regionalisation appear 
far more concrete than those of globalisation. Regionalisation, for example, is often 
constructed on the basis of treaties and trade agreements, there is a network of 
formal and informal institutions associated with the development of regional 
integration, the member states of regional arrangements frequently participate as a 
unified bloc in international negotiations, and policy is driven largely by 
intergovernmental decisions. With the exception of multilateral trade negotiations, 
globalisation exhibits none of these palpable manifestations.
This position is attractive for those that uphold the primacy of the state in 
the contemporary international order. Although, as Chapter 5 showed, globalisation 
is driven largely by state actions and state decisions, regional integration is far 
more obviously a statist process, even though a statist approach to the study of it 
sometimes fails to capture the more complex reality. The level of abstraction at 
which the study of regionalism and regionalisation is conducted, therefore, is far 
lower than that which is often necessary for the analysis of globalisation. The 
effects of globalisation are often far clearer than the concrete processes by which 
they are produced.
To pull some of these strands together, in the literature that sees 
regionalisation as a parallel trend to globalisation, the former is assessed broadly in 
three ways.16 The first sees regionalisation to represent the extension of the present
15 John Zysman: “The Myth o f a ‘Global’ Economy: Enduring National Foundations and Emerging 
Regional Realities”, New Political Economy 1,2, 1996.
16 Ronen Palan & Jason Abbott with Phil Deans: State Strategies in the Global Political Economy 
(1996), pp. 58-9.
206
multilateral trading system, in that the regionalisation of international trade furthers 
the process of liberalisation and trade creation in the international economy. The 
second interpretation of regionalisation is essentially political, and holds that 
regionalisation is a political strategy intended to improve member states’ 
competitive position in the world economy. This relies on ideas of the competition 
state analysed in Chapter 5. If the globalisation game is all about national 
competitiveness, the formation of regional blocs is seen as a political means of 
pursuing this goal. Third, regionalisation is interpreted as a structural response to 
some of the problems of globalisation, in that it provides the institutional 
conditions for the expansion of capital. In this way, regionalisation is not perceived 
to be a negative response that aims to counteract the processes of globalisation, but 
rather as a means of making national and regional conditions suitable for 
responding to the opportunities offered by the globalised international political 
economy.
Nevertheless, it may well be the case that globalisation is a “stronger 
structural force” than regionalisation, which “enhances the trend towards 
regionalism to the extent that it diminishes the prospects of individualistic state
1 7responses to international competition and encourages collective responses”. 
Globalisation, therefore, sets the parameters of the possibilities for political and 
economic action and establishes the boundaries of what is ‘acceptable’ or ‘feasible’ 
in the international environment it currently dominates. Regionalisation is a much 
more concrete phenomenon, regardless of whether it is seen as a response to 
globalisation, a parallel process, or a completely independent structural trend.
This chapter argues that regionalisation in the Southern Cone responds to 
the new sets of imperatives created by the process of globalisation in the 
international economy. Chapter 5 showed that globalisation has changed the rules 
of the game to the extent that participation in the international economy now 
depends on the pursuit of national competitiveness and the achievement of 
credibility. The establishment of close cooperative relations with IFIs and 
compliance with macroeconomic targets agreed under conditionality arrangements 
were identified in Chapter 6 as being one of the principal mechanisms by which
17 Higgott: “Globalisation and Governance”, pg 20.
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credibility may be enhanced. The aim of regionalisation, similarly, is to further the 
credibility (and therefore competitiveness) of member states by ‘locking in’, in the 
same way as conditionality, a particular set of economic policies and ideas.
Therefore, regionalisation is seen to be concerned with the implantation of 
the neoliberal policy agenda favoured and necessitated by globalisation. In this 
sense, regionalisation becomes the project of dominant (state) actors who perceive 
the national interests to be tied to participation in the globalisation of the 
international system. The compatibility argument is therefore strengthened by the
1 ftproposition that “regionalising elites are also globalising elites” , especially in 
cases such as South American countries where states and governmental actors are 
the major driving force behind regional integration initiatives. This contributes an 
agency-centred perspective to the broader discussion of the relationship between 
the structural processes of globalisation and regionalisation, and returns to Stephen 
Gill’s points mentioned in Chapters 5 and 6 on the relationship between globalising 
policy elites and disciplinary neoliberalism.
Regional Integration and Policy Change in Argentina
Having established, therefore, the linkages between globalisation and 
regionalisation, whether we choose to see these as parallel or contradictory 
processes, we can begin to construct more specific arguments relating to the 
Southern Cone region of Latin America and the case of Argentina. The adoption of 
‘open regionalism’ is a direct reflection of the preponderance of global imperatives. 
These combine with the processes of economic restructuring and unilateral 
liberalisation pursued to varying degrees in the member countries, the most 
vigorous of which is probably found in Argentina. Clearly the construction of 
regional integration is an attempt on the part of the member countries to improve 
their competitive positions in the globalised international economy both 
individually and as a bloc.
18 Ben Rosamond: “Globalisation, Change and European Integration”, paper presented to the Fifth 
Biennial International Conference o f the European Community Studies Association, Seattle, 29 
May- 1 June 1997.
208
One of the most important effects of globalisation has been to create a 
situation in which “successful implementation of domestic policy adjustment 
increasingly required inter-state negotiated bargains”.19 This policy adjustment in 
turn was occasioned by the changing structures of rewards and punishments in the 
international economy as a result of the same process of globalisation (as argued in 
Chapter 5). As a result, therefore, the political advantages of locating domestic 
adjustment processes in the external environment are most easily achieved at the 
regional level, and the incentives to regionalisation are thus enhanced. It may well 
be that globalisation (rather than regionalisation) was the highest priority for 
Argentina and other Latin American countries, and regionalisation therefore a 
means to an end. There is certainly a suggestion that Economy Minister Cavallo 
himself was never particularly interested in regional integration for its own sake, 
despite a recognition of the importance of the Brazilian market, but rather far more
9flconcerned with the challenges of international opening.
In the case of Argentina, the impetus for trade liberalisation had already 
been established in part by the TPLs agreed with the World Bank in 1987/88 (as 
outlined in the previous chapter). This was reinforced by the economic crisis of 
1988/9, the recurrent hyperinflation until 1991, and then the orientation of the 
technocratic economic team that took over under Cavallo. In effect, the process of 
unilateral opening was reinforced from 1991 with a timetable for tariff reductions 
agreed in the regional forum. Chapter 3 argued that trade policy from this time was 
kept on an ‘even keel’ by such regional commitments. Article 5 of the Treaty of 
Asuncion, which formally established the Mercosur in March 1991, aimed to achieve 
“progressive, linear and automatic tariff reductions accompanied across the board by 
the elimination of non-tariff restrictions or equivalent measures ... with a view to 
arriving at a zero tariff and no non-tariff restrictions for the entire tariff area by 31
91December 1994”. The initial schedule for tariff reductions is shown in Table 7.3
99 Mbelow. In addition to the programme of tariff reduction, the Treaty provided for the
19 Richard Higgott: “Economic Co-operation in the Asia Pacific: A Theoretical Comparison with the 
European Union”, Journal o f  European Public Policy 2, 3, September 1995 (pg 363).
20 Interview with Javier Villanueva, Buenos Aires, 24 July 1995.
21 GATT: Argentina 1992: Trade Policy Review (May 1992), Vol 1, pg 62.
22 ibid., pg 66. Significantly, the agreement allowed for a significant number o f products to be exempt 
from the liberalization scheme: 324, 394, 439 and 960 for Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay 
respectively. These exemptions were subject to a separate timetable o f tariff reductions, which reflected
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establishment of a common external tariff (CET) in the interests of external 
competitiveness, and the introduction of equal tax treatment for products from all
23member countries with respect to local products.
Table 7.3: Mercosur: Timetable for Tariff Reductions
30 June 31 Dec 30 June 31 Dec 30 June 31 Dec 30 June 31 Dec
1991 1991 1992 1992 1993 1993 1994 1994
47% 54% 61% 68% 75% 82% 89% 100%
Source: GATT: Argentina 1992: Trade Policy Review, Vol. 1.
The tariff reduction programme was implemented as planned despite fears 
throughout 1993 that the timetable would have to be revised, and despite minor 
changes to Argentine trade policy in the aftermath of the 1994/5 Mexican crisis (see 
Chapters 3 and 5). The CET was agreed at a summit in Montevideo in December 
1992. Under the agreement, most products were subject to a maximum tariff of 20%, 
with the exception of a relatively short list of goods that operated with a maximum of 
35% to be gradually reduced between the years 1995 and 2001.24 The customs union 
that took effect on 1 Januaiy 1995 was seen as ‘almost’ full : it was agreed that 
between 5-10% of total trade between the four countries would remain protected by 
national tariffs until 1999 in order to lessen the initial impact on uncompetitive 
industries. In addition, a further 10% of total trade composed of ‘sensitive’ or 
‘strategic’ products would only adopt the CET in 2001 (or 2006 for
*yf%telecommunications and information technology products).
A brief analysis of the effects of integration on trade liberalisation and 
investment flows demonstrates the ways in which domestic reform efforts were 
‘locked in’ at the regional level. In Argentina the average tariff rate in mid-1994
the differential treatment accorded to smaller member countries: Argentina and Brazil were required to 
implement annual reductions of 20% from 31 December 1990, Uruguay and Paraguay 10% reductions 
in 1990 and 1991, and 20% thereafter. (Ibid., pp. 67-8).
23 Report o f the Argentine Government to the GATT Trade Policy Review o f Argentina, 4-5 March 
1992. Printed in GATT: Argentina 1992, Vol. 2, pg 33.
24Latin American Regional Reports - Southern Cone, 4 February 1993.
25Latin American Regional Reports - Southern Cone, 29 December 1994.
26 For an account o f the controversies and difficulties surrounding the establishment o f the customs 
union in 1995, see El Economista, 16 December 1994.
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before the implementation of the CET was 18.98% (including the statistical 
surcharge). The average CET by the end of the first Menem administration a year 
later was 12.1%.27 Similarly, regional integration had important effects relating to the 
attraction of investment from both inside and outside the Mercosur network. Intra- 
regional investment flows were augmented by such mechanisms as agreements on 
representation, distribution and productive complementarity, joint ventures, 
participation in the capital structures of existing firms, the creation of affiliated 
companies and the formation of ‘strategic alliances’. Foreign direct investment in 
the region, on the other hand, had more to do with domestic privatisation processes 
than regional integration, as Chapter 3 showed, but nevertheless there has been a 
marked increase in the establishment of local operations by giant transnationals, 
particularly in the automobile, food and drink, petrochemical and textiles sectors.
On a political level, therefore, the simultaneous and mutually reinforcing 
nature of the processes of unilateral and regional liberalisation gave rise to a valuable 
mechanism by which the Argentine government could strengthen support coalitions 
for its policy agenda and thus facilitate the consolidation of reform. Sectoral 
resistance to the adjustment occasioned by such policy shifts was offset by the 
perceived benefits to be derived from increased access to regional markets, and
TOtherefore from integration more generally. In this sense, then, Mercosur may be 
seen as having attenuated the post-implementation difficulties of opening the 
domestic economy. This reduction in the adjustment costs of structural reform (as 
opposed to initial stabilisation) was supplemented from around 1993 by the extra 
cushion provided by abundant inflows of foreign capital, in turn prompted by the 
IMF and Brady Plan agreements.
Hence it may well be the case that most developing countries that seek
'X1integration do so for reasons of domestic discipline , particularly when there is the 
need, as in Argentina and most other Latin American countries at the time, to
27 Roberto Bouzas: “Mercosur and Preferential Trade Liberalisation in South America: Record, 
Issues and Prospects”, Serie de Documentos e Informes de Investigacidn no. 176, FLACSO Buenos 
Aires, February 1995 (pg 17).
28 Inter-American Development Bank / Institute for the Integration o f Latin America and the 
Caribbean (BID / INTAL): Informe Mercosur, no. 1, July-December 1996 (pg 12).
29 ibid., pg 13.
30 Roberto Bouzas: “La Agenda Econdmica del Mercosur: Desafios de Politica a Corto y Mediano 
Plazo”, Integracion & Comercio (BID /  INTAL), Jan-April 1996 (pg 68).
31 Interview with Alfredo Morelli (National Director o f Mercosur), Buenos Aires, 19 July 1995.
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consolidate a sea change in economic policy and the development paradigm that 
informs it. Integration, therefore, is about the enhancement of national 
competitiveness in the globalised international economy and about the 
maximisation of the effectiveness of domestic economic strategies, in addition to 
its association with a particular set of neoliberal policies. However, the arguments 
about the ‘locking in’ of a certain set of policies refer only to a specific set of 
international and domestic circumstances around the start of the 1990s, rather than 
to any general link between integration and neoliberalism. It should be 
remembered, in this light, that integration was originally conceived in Argentina as 
a project of industrial promotion with a heavy sectoral emphasis, rather than as a
n'y
project of opening or liberalisation.
On a broader theoretical level, policy coordination has two major 
purposes. The first is the “accommodation of economic interdependence through 
reciprocal market liberalization”. This coincides with explanations of 
regionalisation as a mechanism for responding to globalisation and increasing 
levels of national and regional competitiveness in the globalised international 
economy. The second is policy harmonisation “in order to assure the continued 
provision of public goods for which the state is domestically responsible”. This 
again links with the arguments made earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 5 
regarding the impact of globalisation on the capabilities of the national state.
Significantly, “where economic interdependence links jurisdictions, 
divergent national policies may undermine each other’s effectiveness. Coordinated 
(or common) policies may therefore result in greater de facto control over domestic 
policy outcomes than unilateral efforts”. When placed in the context of crisis and 
subsequent reform of both the state and the economy, these considerations lead 
directly to the idea that regionalisation acts to ‘rescue’ the state, which can be used 
to add clarity to the arguments developed in this section.
32 Interviews with Jorge Hugo Herrera Vegas (Undersecretary for Latin American Integration), 
Buenos Aires, 17 July 1995 and Alfredo Morelli.
33 Andrew Moravcsik: “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovemmentalist Approach”, Journal o f Common Market Studies 31, 1993 (pp. 486-7).
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The Regional ‘Rescue '  o f the Argentine State
For our purposes, then, the most important element of the relationship 
between globalisation and regionalisation concerns the role of the state, and the 
ways in which each process responds to and impacts on the position of the state in 
the contemporary international environment. In some ways, analyses of both 
globalisation and regionalisation throw up similar conclusions in that in each the 
role of the state is transformed under the impact of international change. The 
difference is that globalisation may be seen to produce these transformations by 
necessitating the redefinition of the relationship between state and market (and 
therefore the redefinition of governments’ functions of management), while 
regionalisation may be seen as a response to the decreasing capacities of the 
national state, particularly in terms of economic policy-making. This responds to an 
assumption in the contemporary context of globalisation that the state is no longer 
the optimal unit for the pursuit of economic growth and prosperity.
It has already been suggested in Chapter 5 that one of the principal effects 
of globalisation is a reduction in the policy-making autonomy of states from the 
perspective of the international environment. Although this is counterbalanced by 
the opening up of space in the domestic context for increased policy-making 
latitude and a consequent increase in state power, the fact that the range of 
available policy instruments has diminished as a result of globalisation in the 
international political economy is largely uncontested, and it is plausible to imagine 
that policy-makers will be concerned to protect this type of autonomy vis-a-vis the 
international system to the greatest extent possible. Some of the specific measures 
implemented by the Argentine government for precisely this purpose have been 
outlined in Chapters 3 and 5. One of the principal mechanisms by which the 
decline of policy autonomy can be arrested, however, lies in regionalisation.34
The broad conclusion to be drawn from the above is that in some ways 
regionalisation may be seen as the intermediary stage in the relationship between 
the globalised international economy and states , which is favoured as a
34 Higgott: “Globalisation and Governance”.
35 Richard Higgott: “Globalisation, Regionalism and Identity in East Asia: Lessons from Recent 
Economic Experience”, mimeo, Warwick University, February 1998 (pg 6).
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mechanism by which states can recover a degree of the policy autonomy lost (or 
sacrificed) to globalisation. Although regionalisation may well be a response to 
the declining capacities of the national state for ensuring economic development in 
the current international environment, regionalisation consolidates the 
‘internationalisation’ of the state which constitutes one of the core concepts of the 
thesis. From a dynamic perspective, the more policy-making functions are located 
in the regional context, at least in terms of the points of reference, the more the 
locus of decision-making authority is removed from the nation-state towards the 
regional or international arena. This is the case even in those arrangements that do 
not feature supranational institutions with discrete policy-making capacities and 
agendas (like the European Commission). One of the principal ways in which the 
Mercosur has influenced policy-making in Southern Cone countries has been 
precisely, as we have seen, to lock in a certain set of policy options and a particular 
set of ideas about development from which member states deviate only with 
difficulty.
In some ways, then, the construction of regional blocs can be seen as an 
attempt to transcend the limits of the beleaguered state, along the lines of 
Milward’s ‘rescue’ idea. This demonstrates that to a large extent the same forces 
that drive globalisation may be seen also to drive regionalisation, especially when 
the discussion is placed in the context of changes in the nature of national states. If 
globalisation is assumed to diminish the economic policy-making authority of the 
state, the advantages of international policy coordination are often increasingly 
apparent to policy-makers. Clearly the most feasible method of regaining the 
authority lost to globalisation, therefore, lies in the construction of regional blocs 
and perhaps in the ‘pooling’ of policy-making sovereignty.
Ideas about ‘pooling’ at the regional level, however, fall into the same trap 
as arguments that equate globalisation with the disappearance of national 
boundaries or the obsolescence of the nation-state. Much depends on whether the 
relationship between regionalisation and the national state is approached from a 
global or regional perspective. From a global perspective, regionalism becomes a 
form of interdependence and transnationalisation, which implies the dissolution of 
the state or, at least, the transcendence of state boundaries. On the other hand, from
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a regional (and indeed national) perspective, the formation of a regional bloc is 
concerned with various dimensions of state-building, such as the construction of 
institutions and the development of forms of “identitive community”.36
The simple fact of membership of a regional grouping of countries 
(regardless of the extent of institutionalisation) does not automatically imply a loss 
of ‘statehood’, or the disappearance of states’ ability to define and pursue the 
national interest in policy-making terms. On a basic level, a coincidence of 
interests (in this case between a group of countries) does not mean the 
abandonment of policy objectives for any or all of the member states of a regional 
grouping. Similarly, in all the regional arrangements currently in operation 
(particularly the newer blocs) a central question refers to how regional priorities 
can be made compatible with the pursuit of more narrowly national interests, in 
cases when these diverge. There is no assumption, therefore, that international 
cooperation at global or regional level will correspond or lead to the elimination of 
conflict between states in any area of national and international activity.
The ‘rescue’ idea, therefore, can be used to argue that regionalism is often a 
mechanism of collective action that has the effect (and function) of strengthening 
the state - in the sense of enhancing the government’s capacity for implementing its 
policy preferences at national level - rather than fatally weakening the principles of 
sovereignty upon which it is constructed. The original statement of the argument 
holds that “without the process of integration the west European nation-state might 
well not have retained the allegiance and support of its citizens in the way that it 
has”, in that following a period of severe crisis the state was able to ‘reinvent’ itself 
partly through the development of the regional arena as a supplementary “political 
alternative to government from the national centre”.38 Its advantages over what at 
the time was called ‘interdependence’, furthermore, lie in the fact that integration is 
“less easily reversed, more exclusive and more law-abiding”, all of which are
36 Taylor, pg 2.
37 Similar arguments are made in ibid., pp. 2-3.
38 Alan Milward: The European Rescue o f  the Nation-State (1992), pgs 3 & 1.
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important in the pursuit of national policy and compensate for any perceived losses
'J Q
of national sovereignty as a result.
After its ‘rescue’ from the crisis of the 1980s, then, the resulting 
‘internationalisation’ of the Argentine state facilitated the consolidation of the 
policy agenda and allowed for a process of sustained and durable reform. We see 
throughout the first Menem administration developments in domestic policy and in 
regional dynamics which contribute to the removal of policy-making authority 
from the national state to the regional level most directly, and in a different sense to 
the global level. If regionalisation is seen as an intermediary stage in the adaptation 
of the national to the global, the argument assumes even greater validity. Similarly, 
it is unlikely that the Argentine government would have been able to sustain 
support for the reform effort and the consensus surrounding the reform agenda after 
the initial crisis period without these advantages offered by the regional integration 
process.
Here we can return to the ‘paradox of state power’. Although the policy 
autonomy of the Argentine state was reduced by the increasing location of 
decision-making functions and economic activity at both the regional and the 
global levels, paradoxically ‘regionalisation’ of policy-making authority and 
economic activity, in connection with the increasing hegemony of the globalisation 
process, contributed to a reinforcement of state power. A reduction in the policy 
autonomy of the state, along with policies directly intended to narrow the scope for 
government action, acted directly to increase the power of the state vis-a-vis 
societal actors and interests, in conjunction with the domestic reorganisation of 
political interests under Menem. Although (or because) authority was removed 
from the state, it was also removed from societal interests, and furthermore the 
state was no longer the principal site for the sort of political pressures that 
bedevilled the Alfonsin government in the 1980s. As a result, the state became able 
to consolidate its political and economic agenda to the extent that it no longer 
mattered whether it retained direct control over such policy-making functions 
subsequently.
39 Alan Milward & Vibeke Sorensen: “Interdependence or Integration? A National Choice” in Alan 
S. Milward, Frances M.B. Lynch, Federico Romero, Ruggero Ranieri & Vibeke Sorensen: The 
Frontier o f  national Sovereignty: History and Theory 1945-1992 (1993), pg 19.
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However, the picture is still more complex. The nature of regionalism in 
the Southern Cone is such that state power is reinforced and societal interests are 
marginalised by mechanisms other than the ‘rescue’ and ‘internationalisation’ of 
the state. This is the subject of the second layer of argument outlined in the 
introduction to this chapter, which addresses the institutional formation and the 
relative weight of state and societal agents in the process of regionalisation in 
Mercosur. Theories of European integration offer useful insights for the analysis of 
the ways in which these dynamics operate.
Regionalism, State Power and Societal Interests
The ‘locking in’ of a particular economic model at the regional level, then, 
has been accompanied by a reinforcement of the dynamics of political change in 
Argentina as a result of the type of regionalism pursued in the Southern Cone. 
Although there is no inherent theoretical link between any particular type of 
regionalism and any particular form of domestic political organisation, we can 
argue that the process of integration in Mercosur influenced the processes of both 
economic and political reform in Argentina in the specific setting of the late 1980s 
/ early 1990s. This influence, furthermore, adds to regionalisation the dimension of 
‘policy input’ that was identified in the introduction to this chapter: apart from 
being a deliberate and purposive set of policy measures on the part of the 
government which had the very explicit goal of ‘locking in’ the new economic 
model, regionalisation can be seen (along with globalisation and conditionality) as 
a dimension of external influence on domestic change. The first task, then, is to 
identify the nature of regionalism in the Mercosur.
States, Governments and Institutions
Mercosur, unlike the European Union, does not have a supranational 
institutional structure. The latter is notable for its moves towards the transfer of 
political authority away from national governmental structures to specialist policy 
communities. In both the South American and Asian regions, states have been
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much more reluctant to devolve such authority to either subnational or 
supranational level due to the much closer linkages in these regions between the 
public and private sectors. The observation, therefore, that “APEC has of necessity 
needed to develop a more flexible and accommodating architecture, which does not 
demand legalistic compliance”40 appears to refer with equal validity to the 
Mercosur.
This is not to claim that the Mercosur is entirely without institutions, but 
rather that its institutional structure (illustrated in Figure 7.4) is entirely and strictly 
intergovernmental rather than supranational (in the European sense). The Treaty of 
Asuncion established that the decision-making process would be entirely 
consensual, and created two inter-governmental bodies: the Common Market 
Council (CMC) and the Common Market Group (GMC)41 The CMC is composed 
of the Foreign and (usually) Economy Ministers of each member country, with the 
function of providing political leadership for the process of integration. Presidency 
of the CMC rotates on a six-monthly basis between the member countries. The 
GMC is the executive agency of the CMC charged with the implementation and 
oversight of the Treaty of Asuncion, the enforcement of CMC decisions and the 
establishment of the timetable for progress towards the common market.42 The 
GMC is composed of a total of eight representatives from each of the member 
countries, which must include representatives from the Ministry of Foreign 
Relations (or equivalent), the Economy Ministry and the Central Bank. Like the 
CMC, the GMC is coordinated from the Foreign Ministries of the member 
countries.
The GMC provides the umbrella for a number of other institutional bodies: 
The Economic and Social Consultative Forum (FCES) composed of representatives 
from economic and social sectors (principally business), the Joint Parliamentary
40 Mark Beeson & Kanishka Jayasuriya: “The Politics o f Regionalism: APEC and the EU in 
Comparative Perspective”, paper presented to the conference on ‘Non-State Actors and Authority in 
the Global System’, Warwick University ESRC Centre for the Study o f Globalisation and 
Regionalisation, October 31 st-November 1st 1997.
41 Much o f the institutional analysis that follows incorporates information collected at the office o f  
the Joint Parliamentary Commission o f the Mercosur (CPC) in Buenos Aires. Much o f this is in the 
form o f internal documentation and reports, supplemented by conversations and interviews with 
officials between April and July 1997. Official documentation can be found in the CPC’s Informe I  
(September 1994).
42 Bouzas: “Mercosur and Preferential Trade Liberalisation”, pg 4
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Commission (CPC), the Administrative Secretariat (SAM) charged with the 
provision of services and operational support to the other bodies as well as 
documentation and the dissemination of information, and the Specialised Areas 
that work on structural issues (such as the Ad-Hoc Working Groups, Special 
Meetings and Working Sub-Groups).43
The CPC was created by Article 24 of the Treaty of Asuncion, as is 
composed of 64 parliamentary representatives from both Chambers of Congress 
(16 from each member country), as well as an equal number of reserves (suplentes) 
designated by each National Parliament. Its function, according to its ‘Constitution’ 
and the Protocol of Ouro Preto, is to monitor the integration process and to inform 
the national Congresses of its progress. It also has a consultative function and is 
required to produce recommendations and proposals on the development of the 
common market and to create sub-commissions for the analysis of pertinent issues. 
It is involved in preparing the groundwork for regional legislative harmonisation 
and is responsible for facilitating the immediate implementation of regional 
directives in the domestic setting. The CPC is characterised by bipartisan 
participation, although for obvious reasons most of the Argentine participants have 
been from the ruling PJ party. At the national level in Argentina, furthermore, a 
bicameral Mercosur Commission was established in 1992 under the auspices of the 
CPC.44 In addition, the Mercosur Trade Commission (CCM), established by the 
Protocol of Ouro Preto in December 1994 and operational since December 1995, is 
responsible for the implementation and progress of common trade policies agreed 
by the member countries, and likewise is composed of representatives from each 
under the general supervision of the GMC. The CCM in turn comprises ten 
Technical Committees, as illustrated in Figure 7.4.
43 BID / INTAL: Informe Mercosur (no. 1), pp. 45-6; Jorge Luccingeli: “Mercosur: Antecedentes, 
Logros y Perspectivas”, Pensamiento Iberoamericano 26, July-December 1994 (pp. 161-4); 
information from the CPC, Buenos Aires.
44 See official documentation in CPC: Informe /, pp. 91-4.
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Figure 7.4
Institutional Structure of Mercosur
Source: own elaboration based on BID / INTAL: 
Informe Mercosur (no. 1, July-Dee 1996)
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Actors and Participation in the Integration Process
It is perhaps useful to draw on a classification that divides the actors 
involved in the integration process into first- and second-level categories.45 The 
first-level group comprises government and bureaucratic actors, political leaders 
and business representatives. The second-level group includes political parties, 
trade unions and social movements. The distribution of influence and authority 
reflects the internal reorganisation of political interests and shifts in the nature of 
political power in Argentina.
The most visible of the first-level actors are, obviously, the Presidents of 
the member countries, which have been described as motivated by personal 
leadership goals, a sense of economic opportunity, and the necessity for the 
projection of their international profiles.46 Virtually without exception the major 
summits between Mercosur countries in the 1990s have been dominated by 
presidential meetings and negotiations. It is also possible that the notable 
coincidence of positions on integration between national presidents has reduced 
even further the need for formal institutionalisation in the Southern Cone.47 The 
strength of presidential commitment is perhaps also reflected in the appearance of 
rather overblown and sentimental literary attempts at extolling the virtues of 
regional unification and Mercosur as the future of the “blessed continent” of Latin 
America.48
Apart from the small bureaucracy of ‘Mercocrats’ which makes up the 
SAM, the integration process in Mercosur is handled by groups of officials in the 
relevant ministries in each of the member countries 49 Therefore, the technocratic 
teams remain located at national level rather than at supranational level as in the 
EU, and they remain politically accountable to their respective governments. The 
Ministries can be seen as responsive to three sets of domestic interests.50 The first
45 This discussion draws on the classification developed in M6nica Hirst: “La Dimensidn Politica 
del Mercosur: Actores, Politizacion e Ideologia”, Serie de Documentos e Informes de Investigacidn 
no. 198, FLACSO Buenos Aires, November 1995.
46 Hirst: “La Dimensi6n Politica” (1995), pg 10.
47 ibid., pg 10.
48 Carlos Saul Menem: Integration Americana (1991)
49 Hirst: “La Dimensidn Politica” (1995), pg 4.
50 ibid., pp. 5-6.
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comprises other state agencies, particularly those concerned with economic issues. 
The second comprises domestic interests that are positively or adversely affected 
by intergovernmental negotiations, particularly business interests. The third refers 
to provincial governments, and particularly with regard to the differentiation (in 
terms of the distribution of costs and benefits) between interior regions and those 
closest to the national borders.51
The business sector identified in the first-level grouping, as in the 
classification offered in Chapter 4, relates to big business that is typically 
transnationally active. Even in the early stages of regional cooperation with the 
Argentine-Brazilian Economic Integration Programme (ABEIP), the process of 
integration attracted participants from the Argentine business sector. The 
leadership of the principal giant corporations (Perez Companc, Techint and Bunge 
& Bom, for example) were declared to be firmly supportive of the process and 
willing to consider the creation of companies of dual nationality. In addition, 
business in both Argentina and Brazil submitted a list of 650 capital goods that 
they would have liked to be traded duty-free.52 In the 1990s, however, this interest 
in regional and transnational networks increased further in conjunction with 
domestic policy change. As with the domestic reform dynamics, those firms that 
were already engaged in the process of unilateral liberalisation stood to gain most 
from regionalisation, and also, not surprisingly, were the least resistant to it.53 An 
important part of the consolidation of business support stemmed from the 
demonstration of the government’s commitment to the reform process involved in 
the regional integration initiative: the locking of economic liberalisation into a set 
of interstate agreements with medium-term provisions for tariff reductions and 
long-term plans for the establishment of a common market added credibility to the 
government’s position.
51 See El Economista, 4 November 1994, for an optimistic account o f the provincial impact o f  
integration.
52 David R. D&vila-Villers: “Competition and Co-operation in the River Plate: The Democratic 
Transition and Mercosur”, Bulletin o f  Latin American Research 11,3, 1992 (pg 272 & fii. 26).
53 For an analysis o f the different responses o f different business sectors, see Andres L6pez, Gustavo 
Lugones & Fernando Porta: “Comercio y Competitividad en el Mercosur: Factores 
Macroeconomicos, Politicas Publicas y Estrategias Privadas”, Documentos de Trabajo del CENIT 
no. 12, Buenos Aires, July 1993.
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The coincidence of interests between big business and the state at the 
domestic level was complemented by a similar coincidence between the activities 
of big business groups and intergovernmental negotiations at regional level. The 
private sector was seen as crucial to the success of integration, and therefore 
representatives (particularly of big businesses) were often involved in talks or at 
least consulted beforehand.54 Business interests, however, remain under­
represented in the Mercosur, despite the formation of the FCES in 1994 and an 
agreement between the principal industrial organisations of the member countries 
(the UIA in the case of Argentina). The preference has remained for informal 
bargaining channels and lobbying activities as opposed to further 
institutionalisation at regional level that would give more formal expression to 
business interests.55 Informal groupings coordinating the lobbying efforts of the 
business sector with economic interests in other Mercosur countries were 
established in Argentina in July 1995 and Brazil in 1994.56
As a result, business interests were articulated through the structures of the 
state, and business participated in the integration process through the channels of 
intergovernmental negotiations rather than on its own terms. The practical 
operation of Mercosur, therefore, acted to consolidate the relationship between the 
state and big business established by the Menem government. Together, therefore, 
these sets of inter-linked state, political and business interests constituted a nexus 
of influence at the regional level that acted to consolidate and reinforce both the 
intergovemmentalist style of integration and the relatively low levels of 
participation from other societal actors.
The second-level actors have been of clearly marginal importance. In the 
case of the parties and unions, particularly, this may be traced in large part to the 
condition in which they found themselves at the start of the 1990s, and further as a 
result of the policies pursued by the Menem government which neutralised the 
influence of both the labour sector and political institutions more generally.
54 Interview with Alejandro Nayfeld, (Mercosur Negotiator, Argentine Foreign Ministry 1991-2), 
Buenos Aires, 19 July 1995.
55 Hirst: “La Dimensidn Politica” (1995), pg 9.
56 The so-called Grupo Argentino and Grupo Brasil. Hirst: “La Dimensidn Politica”, fh. 12. A 
similar organisation (the Grupo Cordillera) was established by Chilean business interests in 
Argentina.
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Although there has been a certain amount of contact and coordination between the 
labour sectors of the member countries, like business the unions continue to 
operate principally through national governmental structures. Similarly, small firms 
were adversely affected by the processes of liberalisation and economic change that 
were consolidated at both the international / global and regional levels. Argentine 
firms encountered serious difficulties in competing effectively with Brazilian 
industries, exacerbating the broader gradual abandonment of industrial strategies in 
Argentina in the 1990s.57 This, according to conventional logic, fits with the 
dynamics of comparative advantage. Political parties, on the other hand, apart from 
the lack of regional or transnational communication with counterparts in other 
countries, have never been divided on the issue of Mercosur or regional integration. 
In Argentina it is seen somewhat symbolically to be a bipartisan project that 
represents the only point of continuity between the democratic governments that 
have held power since 1983, and there is no party in the region that fails to see the 
strategic importance of Mercosur.58 Therefore, the incentives or reasons for any 
sort of mobilisation are virtually non-existent.
Mercosur and Intergovernmentalist Theories o f Integration
In sum, the above analyses of institutions and actors point clearly to the 
highly govemmentalist or ‘statist’ nature of regional integration in Mercosur. The 
composition of the institutions, the nature of negotiations and the channels through 
which participation is driven clearly privilege governmental and state actors over 
societal interests. The representation of the latter, therefore, is likely to be 
influenced by the orientation of domestic governments and dictated largely by 
circumstances. As such, this would be a form of discretionary or selective 
representation that is not formalised through institutional or other structures.
In general terms, regional integration may be classified as both a de facto 
process of structural economic regionalisation and as a de jure process of
57 Hirst: “La Dimensi6n Politica” (1995), pg 14.
58 Interview with Fernando Lahoz, President o f the CPC, Buenos Aires 5 May 1997; Interview with 
Jorge Hugo Herrera Vegas; M6nica Hirst: “La Dimensidn Politica del Mercosur: Especifidades 
Nacionales, Aspectos Institucionales y Actores Sociales”, Serie de Documentos e Informes de 
Investigation no 148, FLACSO Buenos Aires, December 1993 (pg 44).
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institutional economic cooperation.59 The former is linked to the economic change
created or driven by globalisation and refers essentially to structural, market-driven
developments in international trade and investment flows. The latter is an agency-
centred explanation that focuses on the construction of cooperative relationships
between state actors in specific settings. In other words, these two classifications
relate respectively to the private and public levels on which regionalisation
operates.60 Like in the Asia Pacific61, both of these conceptions of regionalism can
be identified in the Southern Cone of Latin America. The combination of these
perspectives leads into the debate between economics and politics in explaining
regional dynamics in the international system.
The difference with the Asia Pacific, however, is that in the Southern Cone
the process of de jure integration preceded the meaningful development of de facto
structural integration between the member countries. Furthermore, de facto or
market-driven integration has historically been far more dominant in Asia than in
either Latin America or Europe. Although the process of de facto  integration has
assumed a dynamism of its own since those early stages, then, the principal
channels for integration remain governmental, and the consensual decision-making
style allows for an ad hoc process of intergovernmental cooperation that directs
and controls any process of market-driven integration. As such, the Mercosur is
clearly an example of what has been termed “regional interstate cooperation”
which is elaborated in the following terms:
Unlike some brands of regional integration, such cooperative 
arrangements are very clearly statist, designed to protect and 
enhance the role of the state and the power of the government. They 
involve a reassertion and extension of state authority as part of a 
process by which states are increasingly willing to trade a degree of 
legal freedom of action for a greater degree of practical influence 
over the policies of other states and over the management of 
common problems.62
59 See, for example, Charles Oman: “Globalisation and Regionalisation”, pp. 34-6; Richard Higgott: 
“De Facto and De Jure Regionalism: The Double Discourse o f Regionalism in the Asia Pacific”, 
Global Society 11,2,1997; Vincent Cable: “Overview” in Vincent Cable & David Henderson (eds.): 
Trade Blocs? The Future o f Regional Integration (1994), pp. 5-6.
60 Richard Higgott: “Globalisation, Regionalism and Identity in East Asia”.
61 Higgott: “De Facto”.
62 Andrew Hurrell: “Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective” in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell 
(eds.): Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order (1995), pg 
42.
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If, therefore, de jure integration is equated with explanations that highlight the role 
of the state and privilege agency over structure, the case for a state-centred 
explanation of the establishment (at least) of Mercosur is strengthened.
Furthermore, regionalism in the Southern Cone can be identified as driven 
by processes of bargaining among elites.63 Negotiations generally are conducted 
between officials at the highest levels of the state bureaucracy, with some input 
(usually in the form of lobbying pressure) from business elites. Returning to the 
earlier contention that “regionalising elites are also globalising elites”, the 
dominance of the state in interstate forms of regionalism reinforces of a conception 
of regional integration which in this case has the effect of strengthening the state 
and excluding serious participation from non-state actors (or indeed from non­
elites). A corollary observation is that this group of regionalising or globalising 
elites is relatively homogeneous, not only in terms of size but also in terms of 
interests: these are precisely those domestic state actors that either identify the 
national interests as being tied to the processes of globalisation or 
internationalisation, or those sectors of the business elite that share this ‘globalist’ 
orientation.
The application of ideas from the literature on European integration to Latin 
American regionalism becomes particularly instructive at this stage, and provides 
additional theoretical insights into the national political implications of 
regionalisation and the impact of integration on ideas about state power.64 The 
Mercosur appears to fit particularly well with intergovemmentalist perspectives on 
integration which developed in response to the inadequacies of neofunctionalist 
theory in explaining and predicting the process of European integration. An 
elaboration on some of the ideas developed in this literature, and particularly of
63 For an interesting account o f elite bargaining in European integration, see Wayne Sandholtz & 
JohnZysman: "1992: Recasting the European Bargain", World Politics XLU, 1, October 1989.
64 For general accounts o f European integration theory, see: Thomas Risse-Kappen: “Exploring the 
Nature o f the Beast: International Relations Theory and Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the 
European Union”, Journal o f  Common Market Studies 34, 1, March 1996; Hurrell: “Regionalism in 
Theoretical Perspective”; Simon Hix: “The Study o f the European Community: the Challenge to 
Comparative Politics”, West European Politics 17, 1, Januaiy 1994; Linda Cornett & James A. 
Caporaso: “‘And it Still Moves!’ State Interests and Social Forces in the European Community” in 
James N. Rosenau & Emst-Otto Czempiel (eds.): Governance Without Government: Order and 
Change in World Politics (1992).
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neofunctionalist, intergovemmentalist and ‘multilevel governance’ approaches, the 
above analysis of the nature of regionalism in the Southern Cone can be 
concretised and clarified further.
Neofunctionalist theory was essentially an incarnation of pluralism, in 
which the actions of a particular state are determined by pressures from a variety of 
societal and bureaucratic actors. In Haas’s famous conception, regional integration 
was concerned with “how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and 
why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the 
factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving 
conflict themselves”, or alternatively “the process whereby actors in several 
distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and 
political activities towards a new centre whose institutions possess or demand 
jurisdiction over pre-existing national states”.65 As such, integration was an 
inherently and fundamentally political process that involved the reconciliation of 
social diversities and the balancing of conflicting societal interests.66 Ideas about 
transnationalism and transgovemmentalism made much of the transborder linkages 
between these categories of national actors and their counterparts abroad.67
The main contribution of neofunctionalism, however, lies in the concept of 
‘spillover’ which envisaged regionalism as a process which assumes a momentum 
of its own. According to this conception, regional integration in certain sectors 
‘spills over’ into others due to technical pressures and the integrated nature of 
modem industrial economies. Furthermore, the idea of ‘political spillover’ (as 
opposed to ‘functional spillover’) predicts that political pressures for continued and 
expanded integration will accumulate within the states concerned, propelling 
forward the process of regional integration. Thus, the suggestion offered by the 
concept of ‘spillover’ that processes of regional integration will be self-sustaining 
rests on a form of economic determinism based on endogenous economic and 
political dynamics.69
65 Ernst B. Haas: “The Study o f Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish o f Pre- 
Theorizing”, International Organization 24, 1970 (pg 610); The Uniting o f  Europe: Political,
Social and Economic Forces (1958), pp. xv-xvi.
66 Michael O’Neill: The Politics o f  European Integration: A Reader (1996), pg 38.
67 Stephen George: Politics and Policy in the European Union (1996), pp. 36-37.
68 George, pg 37.
69 Moravcsik: “Preferences and Power”, pg 475.
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Liberal intergovemmentalism is associated most clearly with Stanley 
Hoffman70 and later Andrew Moravcsik71, and responds to three principal 
shortcomings of the neofunctionalist approach to integration: first, that theories of 
regional integration needed to take into account national responses to international 
interdependence; second, that the development of common policy responses 
deserved as much attention as institutional transfers of competence and authority; 
and third, that unicausal theories were inadequate in the study of European 
integration.72 The (temporary) demise of neofimctionalism following the 1965 
crisis in the European Community can be traced largely to its “underestimation of 
the residual power of nation-statehood”73 and the enduring nature of distinctively 
national concerns that underpins contemporary regionalism.74 As such, therefore, 
the early intergovemmentalist models offered by Hoffman were firmly rooted in 
the realist tradition of international relations theory, according to which states 
remain impermeable and relations between states determined by ‘collisions’ 
between them (along the lines of the ‘billiard ball’ analogy) in an anarchic 
environment.
The basic premise of the liberal intergovemmentalist approach was that the 
EC could be seen as an example of a successful international regime, in which 
states’ behaviour reflected “the rational actions of governments constrained at
7^home by domestic social pressures and abroad by their strategic environment”. 
The approach comprised three elements: (a) the assumption of rational state 
behaviour, (b) a liberal theory of national preference formation, and (c) an
7 fkintergovemmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation. The emphasis, ultimately, 
was on the state as the principal actor in the integration process. Integration was
70 For example: “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate o f the Nation-State and the Case o f Western 
Europe”, Daedalus 95,1966; “Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today”, Journal 
o f  Common Market Studies 21, 1982
71 For example: “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional 
Statecraft in the European Community”, International Organization 45,1991; “Preferences and 
Power”.
72 Moravcsik: “Preferences and Power”, pp. 479-80; George, pg 51.
73 O’Neill, pg 50.
74 Neofimctionalism was also attacked for its neglect o f the wider international environment and the 
role o f leadership in determining policy outcomes.
75 Moravcsik: “Preferences and Power”, pg 474.
76 ibid., pg 480.
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seen as result of interstate bargains, in which national governments are the driving 
forces.
The assumption of rationality, however, is modified in Moravcsik’s 
intergovemmentalism. The preferences of states are not seen to be fixed nor 
defined a priori, contrary to the assertions of realist and neo-realist theories of 
international relations and, consequently, to Hoffman’s approach. Rather, state 
preferences are seen to be determined in the domestic arena and to “emerge 
through domestic political conflict as societal groups compete for political 
influence, national and transnational coalitions form, and new policy alternatives 
are recognized by governments”.77
Like in the Asia Pacific region78, integration in the Southern Cone fits well 
with these theories of liberal intergovemmentalism, particularly in their stipulation 
that integration will be the result of a process of bargaining between national 
governments which will, importantly, respond to specifically national interests 
expressed at the domestic level. We have already seen that in practice the 
Argentine state acts as both the mediator between and the representative of 
(selected) broader societal interests in the context of intergovernmental 
negotiations. This may well be in part a result of the changes in state power that 
have occurred as a result of domestic policies pursued by Menem, but it is also the 
case that the particular model of regionalism that has developed in the Southern 
Cone is essentially state- and elite-dominated. The style is highly 
intergovernmental which militates against a more inclusionary process of 
integration in terms of broad-based and direct participation by non-state actors.
The alternative perspective on participation might be derived from the 
principal challenge in the European literature to intergovemmentalism - ‘multilevel 
governance’ theory - which sees the process of integration as controlled by actors 
other than national governments. Multilevel governance theory argues that, 
contrary to the assumption of the intergovemmentalist approach that collective 
decision-making compromises the control exercised by the national state over the 
integration process, decision-making authority in Europe rests with various actors
77 ibid., pg481.
78 See Higgott: “Economic Co-operation in the Asia Pacific”, esp. pp. 374-5
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at different levels, and the political systems of member states cannot be seen as
• 7Q
separate in the way that intergovemmentalists like Moravcsik would claim.
Although Moravcsik’s approach explicitly does not rest on a vision of the 
state as a unitary actor, the multilevel governance response thus disaggregates the 
nature of political actors in a given context to a much greater extent than 
intergovemmentalism, placing emphasis on transnational linkages between non­
state actors and interests, and the role of supranational institutions in limiting the 
overall decision-making influence of national governments. Therefore, “the 
increasing importance of subnational levels of decision-making and their myriad 
connections with other levels” is a critical element in the debate that is neglected 
by an excessive concentration on national and supranational institutional 
formation.80
Multilevel governance, therefore, is defined as “a system of continuous 
negotiation between nested governments at several territorial tiers - supranational, 
national, regional, and local - as a result of a broad process of institutional creation 
and decisional reallocation that has pulled some previously centralized functions of 
the state up to the supranational level and some down to the local/regional level”.81 
In this way, there has been a shift in the locus of political control in the European 
Union, and the sovereignty of individual states has become diluted as a result.
We have seen, however, that in the case of Argentina and Mercosur the 
possibilities for such overlapping spheres of authority and participation are sharply 
reduced as a result of both the nature of the regionalism concerned and the 
institutional structures and political processes that reflect this general orientation 
towards state-dominated forms of organisation. The absence of supranational 
institutions militates against the location of substantive and autonomous decision­
making authority at the regional level. Although we have argued that policy­
making functions were effectively removed from the direct control of the state, this
79 George, pg 53.
80 Gary Marks: “Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC” in Alan Cafruny & Glenda 
Rosenthal (eds.): The State o f  the European Community (Vol. 2: The Maastricht Debates and 
Beyond), (1993), pg 392.
81 Marks, pg 392.
82 Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe & Kermit Blank: “European Integration from the 1980s: State- 
Centric v. Multilevel Governance”, Journal o f  Common Market Studies 34, 3, September 1996 (pg 
342).
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refers to the consolidation of an economic model through interstate agreements 
rather than to the devolution of decision-making functions to institutions with 
overarching supranational authority.
Similarly, the regional or local dimension does not work particularly well in 
the study of the Southern Cone. On the one hand, as argued in the Chapter 5, the 
development of civil society in Argentina or Latin America in the early 1990s was 
not particularly well-advanced, and transnational networks between non-state 
actors were therefore at best in embryonic form during much of the first Menem 
administration. On the other hand, the consolidation of state power in Argentina 
led to the situation, as we have seen, in which societal interests were represented in 
the integration process only in limited form and only after being filtered through 
government and state channels. Together with the weakening effects of 
globalisation on its opponents (including through such concrete mechanisms as 
conditionality) and problems in the early 1990s between the national and provincial 
governments, the idea o f ‘decisional reallocation’ to the local level does not present 
itself as an accurate reflection of the process of regionalisation in which Argentina 
has been involved.
Therefore, both in our analysis and in the insights offered by liberal 
intergovemmentalism, to privilege the state in explanations of South American 
regionalism (and the participation of individual countries in it) does not appear to 
be misplaced on either the theoretical or the empirical level. Neither the 
supranational emphasis of neofunctionalism nor the ‘decisional reallocation’ 
processes identified by multilevel governance theory work on an empirical level to 
explain or describe regionalisation in Mercosur. The intergovemmentalist 
approach, on the other hand, reflects well the nature of regionalism and interstate 
cooperation in the Southern Cone. The analysis in preceding chapters has shown 
that the strengthening of state power in the domestic arena has not led to the 
disappearance of these interests but rather to a reorganisation of political power 
structures, and this chapter has demonstrated that the state does have to be 
responsive to certain sets of interests in its negotiations at the regional level. In this 
sense, governments may be seen to be acting out the archetypal two-level game
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scenario83, in which international and domestic bargaining processes are closely 
interlinked and negotiators are responsive to the exigencies of both the 
international / regional and domestic settings.
Intergovemmentalist theories argue that regionalism can strengthen the 
state “since the regional integration of previously domestic issues tends to remove 
those issues from domestic controversy and into the arena of executive control”.84 
This reflects the arguments of this chapter that the regional ‘rescue’ of the state 
refers not to the development of supranational institutions (with mandates and 
authority that transcend the nation-state) but rather to economic mechanisms which 
consolidate certain types of economic policy by establishing an element of 
irreversibility through interstate agreements. Furthermore, intergovemmentalism 
accurately describes the negotiating processes by which these decisions are reached 
which, in the case of Argentina, reinforced and consolidated the Menem 
government’s redistribution of political power.
Regionalism, Democratisation and the Military
The only remaining thread of the argument concerns the position of the 
military under the impact of regionalisation and the broader question of 
democratisation. Although the motivations for integration in the Southern Cone 
have become principally economic and market-oriented, particularly in the links 
with globalisation and competitiveness, its origins may be seen to have a 
significant political and security dimension that is closely linked to the democratic 
transition with which early cooperation efforts coincided. The preface to the Act of 
Integration and Cooperation signed on 29 July 1986, for example, established the 
process of cooperation to involve “a new impulse to Latin American integration 
and to the consolidation of peace, democracy, security and development in the
83 See Robert Putnam: “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic o f Two-Level Games”, 
International Organization 42, Summer 1988, and Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson & Robert D. 
Putnam (eds.): Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: 
University o f California, 1993.
84 Cord Jakobeit: “The Theoretical Dimensions o f Regional Integration: Have the Motives for 
Developing Countries Changed?” in Heribert Dieter (ed.): The Regionalization o f  the World 
Economy and Consequences fo r Southern Africa (1997), pg 15.
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Vregion”.85 Along with agreements on nuclear cooperation and non-proliferation, 
and the harmonisation of regional security policies, it is clear that these 
developments contributed significantly to the demilitarisation efforts pursued 
concurrently in both countries.
Like most of the developments in political and economic change identified 
in the thesis, the pro-active / re-active dynamics work simultaneously. In this way, 
the security policies pursued in the regional context were both a result of the 
domestic processes of transition and demilitarisation and a means by which these 
were facilitated or reinforced. Similarly, regional policies are influenced by shifts 
in the foreign policies of the member countries in the 1990s and changes in 
international politics more generally.86 In this way, then, the processes of transition 
in both Brazil and Argentina, and later in Uruguay and Paraguay, made the 
establishment of the Mercosur possible, but were also in turn reinforced by the 
construction of a regional political consensus.
In addition, with the end of the Cold War, the defence of democracy 
became an integral part of the international system, and it became important to be 
able to profess oneself to be democratic in order to participate in the international 
and regional arenas. Therefore, the Mercosur arrangement makes the maintenance 
of a democratic regime a pre-requisite for participation. In addition, the treaties 
negotiated with Spain and Italy in the early 1990s by the Menem government 
included clauses which stated that the agreements were dependent on the 
maintenance of democratic rule, which assumed a particular relevance given the 
series of military uprisings in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The regional reaction 
to the attempted coup in Paraguay in 1996 demonstrates that direct military 
intervention in politics has been complicated significantly by the establishment of 
integration in the Southern Cone.
Furthermore, regional integration bolstered a new orientation in thinking 
about the military and military issues, which ties in with the redefinition of the role
85 Ddvila-Villers, pg 272
86 For a synthesis o f some o f these arguments, see Mdnica Hirst: “Security Policies, 
Democratization and Regional Integration in the Southern Cone” in Democracia, Seguridad e 
Integration: America Latina en un Mundo en Transition (1996); and “Las Relaciones de America 
Latina en los Afios ‘90: Nuevos Desafios y Viejos Dilemas”, Serie de Documentos e Informes de 
Investigacidn no. 148, FLACSO, Buenos Aires, December 1993.
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of the Armed Forces and its subordination to civilian authority outlined in Chapter 
4. Although a concerted common security and defence policy has not emerged in 
the Southern Cone, however, and significant differences in political and foreign 
policy preferences persist between the member countries87, developments at the 
regional level acted visibly to reinforce the processes of political change and 
demilitarisation at the domestic level in Argentina. These are mainly associated 
with the question of the consolidation of democracy and regional stability. In this 
sense, the Argentine government’s project of political reorganisation found further 
expression in new sets of principles and regulations established outside the 
boundaries of the national state.
Conclusion
Regionalisation, therefore, is similar in some ways to conditionality, in that 
it should be seen both as a dimension of external influence and as the result of 
purposive government policy. In this sense, the analyses of regionalisation and 
conditionality can be used to demonstrate the closely interlinked nature of inputs 
and outputs, and also the limitations of drawing too sharp a distinction between 
different levels of analysis. Particularly in terms of economic policy, it has become 
almost impossible to identify any dividing lines, let alone blurred ones, between 
elements that might previously have been considered either ‘domestic’ or ‘foreign’. 
In this sense, the international / regional and domestic levels are absolutely 
interconnected.
Regionalisation acted to reinforce and consolidate political and economic 
reform in Argentina since the early 1990s. As such, it has contributed to the 
strengthening of the state and the consolidation of state power. Although policy 
autonomy was significantly constrained as a result of regional integration (and 
globalisation), the autonomy of the state vis-a-vis societal interests was greatly 
enhanced, opening up the space for a significant consolidation of the political and 
economic changes implemented in the 1989-91 period. In the context of the 
analysis in this chapter, this was a result both of regional dynamics that have acted
87 See Hirst: “Security Policies”.
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to ‘lock in’ a particular economic model and offset potential opposition to it and of 
highly statist / intergovernmental structures of regional relations that are elite- 
driven with limited participation from non-state, non-elite actors. Those groups that 
did participate in the integration process, such as big business, did so through 
lobbying activities and consultation with the national government rather than on 
their own terms.
A corollary to these arguments refers to the frequent and mistaken 
assumption that regionalism depends on a diminution of state strength, along the 
same lines as the ‘pooling of sovereignty’ argument. State strength or highly statist 
political arrangements are seen to militate against the process of regionalisation. 
According to this conception, regionalism necessarily entails a loss of power for 
national states as decision-making and other forms of authority are transferred to 
the regional level. This also coincides with the implications of the ‘rescue of the 
state’ argument, in the sense that it was a crisis of the state that created the 
conditions for the devolution of authority to the regional level. However, rather 
than being seen as an obstacle to regionalism, state strength must be considered to 
be essential to the successful construction of a regional bloc. As Andrew Hurrell 
observes, the most elaborate and dynamic cases of regionalism - that is, the EC, 
NAFTA, ASEAN and Mercosur - have emerged in precisely those regions in which 
state structures remain comparatively strong, and where frontiers and regimes have 
not been called into serious question. Conversely, in regions characterised by weak 
state structures, low levels of state effectiveness, political instability and recurrent 
crises of the state (such as parts of Africa and South Asia), the process of region- 
building or regionalisation has been highly problematic and to date relatively 
unsuccessful.88
The empirical evidence therefore suggests that a high degree of state 
coherence and cohesion favours regionalism, and possibly that state strength is a 
pre-requisite for successful regionalisation. This complements the state-centric 
approach offered by theories of integration such as liberal intergovemmentalism, 
which accord prime importance to national states in processes of regionalisation. If 
integration remains primarily the concern and domain of national states, and
88 “Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective”, pg 67.
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regional negotiations remain dominated by national governments responding to 
domestically-defined national interests, then it follows that the more effective and 
coherent the individual member states involved, the more likely the process of
• • 510regionalisation is to advance and be consolidated, at least in the short term.
Regionalisation, then, is the third and last of the dimensions of international 
influence that have been identified in the thesis. Along with conditionality, it 
represents an important mechanism by which the influence of globalisation is 
transmitted and the interests of a globalised international economy are served. In 
this sense, regionalism is a means by which the national conditions necessary for 
the maintenance of the process of globalisation are created and sustained, as well as 
providing a basis on which states (or countries) can respond to the imperatives and 
opportunities thrown up by international change of this sort. Furthermore, on its 
own terms regionalisation has worked, and been deliberately designed, to ‘lock in’ 
a set of neoliberal policies compatible with the demands of a globalised 
international economy, and furthermore to consolidate a political model based on a 
strengthening of state power vis-a-vis domestic societal interests.
89 It may well be, however, that the development o f the regional bloc following its initial 
establishment and consolidation may lead to pressures for new forms o f institutional organisation 
which involve the construction o f supranational forms o f decision-making authority that 
compromise state power in one form or another. See Hurrell: “Regionalism in Theoretical 
Perspective”, pg 67. This explains clearly resistance in Argentina and Brazil to further 
institutionalisation in the Mercosur.
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions and Perspectives
The Argument
The central research question of the thesis concerned the ways in which 
sustained and consolidated political and economic reform became possible in 
Argentina, when patterns of post-war development would have predicted 
otherwise. The thesis showed that the reform process under the first Menem 
administration should be seen as having ‘broken the logic’ of Argentine politics in 
its achievement of durable change. As such, this constitutes a reformulation of the 
questions that are usually asked about reform in Argentina. The usual ‘why did 
reform happen’ question is explained with reference to the politics of crisis and 
hyperinflation which opened up a space for radical economic and political 
restructuring. What these perspectives cannot answer is the ‘why did it last’ 
question. The thesis has offered an explanation for the consolidation of reform that 
focuses on international currents of influence.
Chapters 3 and 4 detailed the nature of the political and economic reform 
processes directed by the Menem government from 1989 to 1995. In the economic 
sphere, the process was one of neoliberal restructuring, which emphasised policies 
of deregulation and liberalisation and the ‘reform of the state’. From April 1991 
onwards these were encapsulated in the ‘Convertibility Plan’ which achieved the 
virtual elimination of inflation and exchange rate stability. In the political sphere, 
the Menem government achieved the significant disempowerment of the traditional 
veto powers in Argentine politics (labour and the military) and the establishment of 
an alliance with the holders of economic power (business and the technocrats). The 
‘logic’ of Argentine politics (outlined in Chapter 2) would have suggested a 
resurgence of these disempowered political interests from 1991, and a consequent 
reduction in macroeconomic consistency. Rather, from 1991/2 to the end of the 
first Menem administration in 1995, the processes of both economic and political 
restructuring were sustained and consolidated.
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It was argued that both the implementation and the consolidation of reform 
depended on an enhancement of state power, defined in the Introduction in terms of 
the government’s capacities to implement its preferences and its degree of 
centralisation and insulation from society. The initial autonomy was derived from 
the conditions of crisis and hyperinflation, which allowed a short-term space for 
the implementation of the reform package. However, the autonomy necessary for 
the consolidation of the package was derived from other sources, which were 
identified in the thesis as the influences of globalisation, conditionality and 
regionalisation.
The conceptual construct used to elaborate these arguments was the 
‘paradox of state power’ which arises as a result of these international influences. 
According to this formulation, state power was seen to be reduced in the 
international arena but ‘strengthened’ in the domestic arena. The first relates to the 
limitations imposed by the specific types of international change examined in the 
thesis on the policy-making autonomy of national states, primarily as a result of the 
changing structure of rewards and punishments in the international economy. The 
second relates to the increasing centralisation of political power and the insulation 
of the state from societal interests, as well as the state’s policy-making 
effectiveness. Specifically, the strengthening of the state allowed for a 
consolidation of state power. This in turn allowed for a situation of ‘increasing 
returns to power’, in which there was a progressive accretion of political capital 
and an increase in presidential popularity as the reform programme advanced. As a 
result, the consolidation of reform was made possible after 1991/2. As such, 
globalisation has both a constraining and enabling impact on state actions and 
reform processes. The nature and mechanics of this impact were analysed in detail 
in Chapter 5.
The augmentation of the capacity of the state to implement its preferences 
and centralise power stemmed from the government’s very deliberate use of 
international constraints to overcome domestic constraints. The increasing returns 
to power as a result of the initial successes of the reform strategy can be seen to 
derive from the rewards to conformity in the international economy described 
above. The responses of the capital markets in an era of globalisation, furthermore,
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tends to weight political alignments in favour of economic actors whose interests 
are consistent with the neoliberal orientation of the international economy as well 
as those with transnational linkages. As such, the process of political reform 
instigated by Menem was accommodated to the specific type of coalition that the 
government needed to assemble in support of the new economic model, in order to 
enhance credibility and competitiveness in the international economy. Chapter 6 
demonstrated, in addition, the role of international financial institutions in 
offsetting potential opposition to the new international model and the implications 
of specific conditionality provisions for various societal actors. Similarly, the 
regional impact examined in Chapter 7 reinforced this type of political structure 
through the strongly intergovernmental nature of integration and the privileging of 
elements of the business sector at the expense of other societal actors.
It has been shown that these international influences were very deliberately 
used by the Menem government in order to reinforce its strategies of political (and 
economic) reorganisation. This was not a process of external influence that acted 
independently of the government. There was a clear coincidence of interests 
between the Argentine state and the agents of the globalising international system 
which opened the space for a constructive relationship. Specifically, the external 
factors (such as the changing dimensions of international finance, the new 
development ‘consensus’ and the conditionality attached to loans from multilateral 
financial institutions) acted as an additional legitimating element for the economic 
restructuring process and contributed a perception of compulsion and necessity. In 
the political sphere, these factors facilitated the consolidation an exclusionary 
model of state-society relations and a centralised and presidentialist style of 
government.
The dimensions of our ‘paradox of state power’ are linked by two further 
ideas: the international / regional ‘rescue’ and the ‘internationalisation’ of the 
state’. The first was a mechanism used to alleviate the crisis situation in the first 
couple of years of the Menem government. The second was a consequence of the 
first, and the most important dimension in the consolidation of reform. Both 
involved the voluntary consolidation or ‘locking in’ of policy options at the 
international and regional levels. The ‘rescue’ of the state provided the means by
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which the fiscal crisis and the question of ungovernability were resolved as a result 
of the increasing location of responsibility for policy-making at the international 
and regional levels. Furthermore, the operation and performance of the economy 
became increasingly dependent on international and regional dynamics. Although 
this undoubtedly increased the vulnerability of the state and economy to external 
shocks (produced by the same forces of change), it nevertheless ‘rescued’ the state 
by enhancing the space for reform strategies and resolving the fiscal crisis.
The consequent ‘internationalisation’ of the state created the political and 
economic space for sustained reform in Argentina by providing an additional 
‘support structure’ for the reform efforts. The effect was to remove the operation of 
the economy from the direct control of the state once these reforms had been 
implemented. In political terms, these developments reduced the effectiveness or 
utility of lobbying efforts on the part of organised interests in society by breaking 
down traditional linkages between state and society. The internationalisation of the 
state (of which the ‘technocratisation’ of government is an integral part) 
contributed to an increase in its implementation capacities and its insulation from 
civil society, particularly from organised groups such as trade unions, and the 
nature of reform eliminated the arenas in which these interests had formerly been 
active. As such, the internationalisation of the state contributed significantly to the 
consolidation of the political restructuring effected by the Menem government and 
the centralisation of political power in Argentina.
We have seen that the process was one of voluntarily-imposed restrictions 
on policy innovation through the ‘locking in’ of reform originating at the 
international and regional levels. As such, the reforms implemented at the national 
level were accorded a degree of irreversibility through the coincidence of national 
and international preferences and priorities. This, however, is part of a broader 
picture which concerns the state’s abandonment of its control over a variety of 
policy instruments and the reduction of its role in the distribution of resources.1 
Such measures at the domestic level as the establishment of the independence of 
the Central Bank and Convertibility have the effect of severely curtailing the state’s
1 Stephan Haggard & Robert R. Kaufman: “Estado y Reforma Econdmica: La Iniciacidn y 
Consolidacidn de las Polfticas de Mercado”, Desarrollo Economico 35,139, Oct-Dec 1995 (pg 
356).
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capacity for discretionary action. Similarly, neoliberal reform is all about the 
reduction in the size and role of the state through such measures as privatisation 
and deregulation. The market, rather than the state, becomes the principal 
mechanism for resource allocation and in this way the problems of the hyper­
politicised state discussed in Chapter 2 are overcome. This process, then, is 
conducted at the international, regional and domestic levels, and is concerned with 
the establishment of credibility: by imposing restrictions on itself, the government 
is able to demonstrate its commitment to its economic orientation to the 
international financial community and the domestic sector on which it depends for 
the success of reform.
The Contribution to the Study of Argentina
The contribution to the study of Argentina offered in the thesis relate both 
to the reformulation of the issues and to the sustained analysis of the role of 
international factors in explaining the consolidation of the Menem government’s 
reform package. Neither of these elements of the empirical agenda of the thesis is 
readily found in the existing literature on reform processes in general or on 
Argentina in particular. Furthermore, the emphasis on the ‘phases’ of reform casts 
light on new and emerging issues that are increasingly important in the study of 
Argentina and Latin America. The ‘consolidation’ phase of reform is 
characteristically associated with increased pressures for participation and 
accountability and with demands for the ‘democratisation’ of the state. This can be 
seen clearly in the development of new forms of opposition in Argentina, such as 
the FREPASO. As such, the consolidation phase of reform necessarily involves the 
elaboration of different political strategies that aim to manage and channel 
opposition, in this case through the consolidation of political restructuring and the 
use of international processes to reinforce these changes.
Second, the thesis offered an analysis of the nature and impact of 
international influences which have been underdeveloped in the literature. Apart 
from the role of these in the consolidation of economic and political reform in 
Argentina from 1991/2 onwards (which have been described above), the thesis
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identified an important empirical argument to supplement the theoretical arguments 
covered in the next section. The influences of conditionality and regional 
integration were identified as among the principal mechanisms by which the two 
major bottlenecks in the Argentine political economy - problems of 
(mis)management and growth - were overcome in the 1989-95 period. The 
influence of the IFIs was presented as a mechanism by which questions of 
economic management were addressed, through the existence of binding 
conditionality provisions and the more consistent supervision of the Argentine 
political economy as a result of the changes associated with globalisation. Changes 
in the style of negotiation between the institutions and national governments made 
this situation more palatable than previously. The stagnation problem, which can 
be traced to a crisis in the export economy, was addressed in part by the 
establishment of the Mercosur which allowed for the significant expansion of the 
external sector (as demonstrated in table form in Chapter 7). Apart from their 
theoretical significance, therefore, the identification of conditionality and regional 
integration as two of the dimensions of international influence had an important 
empirical validity.
The third contribution to the study of Argentina (and reform) has been the 
demonstration of the central importance retained by the state, especially in the 
context of the ‘paradox of state power’. In the ‘implementation’ stages of reform 
the process of policy change stemmed from purposive actions on the part of the 
government which progressively eroded its direct control over the economy. The 
implementation of policies of liberalisation, deregulation and administrative 
reform, as well as specific measures such as Convertibility all acted to reduce the 
size of the public sector and the regulatory influence of the state on the economy. 
As a direct result, however, this strengthened both its capacities and its insulation 
from society, which constituted our parameters of ‘state power’. Furthermore, the 
thesis drew attention to the differences in the role of the state in countries like 
Argentina that were concerned to establish and consolidate a functioning market 
economy, rather than in the more developed market economies of the world. As 
such, the thesis has demonstrated that a relatively statist approach to Argentine and 
Latin American political economy is neither outdated nor anachronistic, but rather
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the most appropriate starting point for the study of contemporary change in these 
areas.
The Contribution to the Study of IPE
Clearly the thesis took as its starting point questions concerning reform in 
Argentina, and concepts grounded in the study of IPE were used to explain certain 
anomalies in this particular empirical case. Nevertheless, the Introduction 
highlighted that the thesis had both an empirical and a theoretical agenda, and that 
the application of the ideas to the case of Argentina would throw significant light 
on the ideas themselves. Returning to proposed contributions outlined in the 
Introduction, then, we can elaborate the contributions of the thesis to the study of 
IPE.
The thesis offered an analysis of the linkages between domestic and 
international factors which contributed a specific conception of the nature of the 
dynamic interaction. On the one hand, it identified three dimensions of 
international influence and showed how these affected processes of change at the 
national level (in this case in Argentina). On another level, it demonstrated the 
ways in which there is a ‘loop’ between the national and the international which 
creates a relationship of mutual feeding and reinforcement. The processes of 
change generated and consolidated at the domestic level by the identified 
international influences in turn shape and sustain the global order.
Although this is not a particularly novel assertion in itself, the thesis 
deliberately aimed to identify the specific mechanisms by which this interaction 
occurs. It focused on what happens at the ‘sharp end’ of globalisation in terms of 
the concrete ways in which it is manifested at the national level. This constitutes its 
major contribution. The ‘mediating’ variables were identified as the conditionality 
provisions attached to loans from the international financial institutions and 
regional integration. On the one hand, these were presented as both transmission 
mechanisms for the influences of globalisation and as the principal means by which 
these influences are translated into concrete policy outcomes. On the other hand, 
they were also identified as the mechanisms by which the conditions are created for
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the maintenance and development of the global order itself. Conditionality, 
specifically, was identified as standing at the interface between the national and the 
international, and as creating the policy conditions at the national level that are 
necessary for the consolidation of the global orientation. Similarly, regionalisation 
was presented as a form of ‘limited globalisation’ in which these same policy 
conditions (particularly liberalisation) could most easily and effectively be 
achieved.
Second, the thesis aimed to contribute to the study of globalisation as a 
branch of IPE. This involved the classification of our three dimensions of influence 
which contributed a broader conceptualisation of what is usually presented as ‘the 
international economy’ or indeed ‘globalisation’. The previous section 
demonstrated the interconnected nature of these influences and the ways in which 
the consideration of the second and third - conditionality and regionalisation - 
contributed to a more specific and detailed understanding of globalisation. With 
respect to ‘globalisation’, the thesis provided an empirical application to a region 
that is not usually considered in the literature and, more importantly, engaged with 
the debate on globalisation and the state. The ‘paradox of state power’ formulation 
extends and tightens the somewhat imprecise metaphor of the ‘competition state’, 
and thereby engages with IPE and the study of globalisation as well as the political 
economy of Argentina.
The study of conditionality was advanced, it is hoped, by a focus on the 
contemporary dynamics which stem from significant change in the operations of 
the IFIs as well as the processes of negotiation with national governments. The 
changing orientation of conditionality (encapsulated in the good governance 
concept) and changes in the nature of relations with borrowing countries (towards 
greater flexibility and negotiation) have led to a fundamental shift in perceptions of 
conditionality and the IFIs in Latin America. In addition, the literature for the most 
part has not related these influences to the processes of globalisation, which 
appears to be a significant omission. With the development of globalisation, the 
role of the IFIs has assumed additional importance in view of the need to generate a 
degree of policy convergence at the national level. This is necessary, as discussed 
above, both for the maintenance of domestic growth (through the attraction of
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foreign capital and trade flows) and for the development of the globalised 
international order. In this way, the links between the policy ‘agenda’ of 
globalisation and the lending activities of the IFIs become pivotal to an 
understanding of contemporary trends.
The novel elements of the treatment of regionalisation, finally, lay in its 
presentation as a policy input with significant implications for the nature of state 
power. At the empirical level, the thesis offered an analysis of the impact of the 
institutional structures and decision-making procedures in relation to the political 
and economic reform agenda pursued by the Menem government. These sorts of 
connections are not generally addressed in the existing literature and, as with the 
discussion of conditionality, the focus on state power in the thesis sheds light on 
precisely these issues. The theoretical dimensions of the analysis located 
regionalisation in the Southern Cone in the context of the globalisation process, 
and showed how this particular instance of regional integration constitutes a means 
of engaging with the processes of broader international change. If conditionality is 
the ‘transmission mechanism’, the, we can perhaps see regional integration as the 
principal response to globalisation and a significant means by which member 
countries attempt to meet the requirements and challenges they currently face. In 
this way, the thesis suggested an understanding of regionalisation which 
emphasises the multi-way ‘loop’, or the dynamic interaction, between national and 
international processes of change.
The ‘Depoliticisation of the State’ Debate
The above discussion of state power feeds into another growing debate in 
the IPE literature on the ‘depoliticisation of the state’. The analysis in the thesis 
took issue with the idea of a ‘separation’ between economics and politics that is 
often ascribed to processes of neoliberal economic management. We saw, for 
example, the highly political nature of Menem’s political reform which aimed to 
disempower interests in society and insulate the state from the associated pressures. 
Similarly, the discussion of globalisation and the state, and the paradox of state 
power itself, refuted the notion of a ‘powerless’ state as a result of international
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change and domestic reform processes. The concept in recent IPE of ‘depoliticised’
economic management, in the same way, does not suggest the ‘end of politics’ or
0  •  « • •the “wholesale evacuation of politics from policymaking”. The depoliticisation of 
the state refers, rather, to strategies which aim to “place at one remove the political 
character of decision-making”. The act of depoliticisation itself is highly political, 
and state managers “retain arms-length control over crucial economic processes 
whilst benefiting from the distancing effect of depoliticisation”.
This clearly fits well with the arguments advanced in the thesis about 
Argentine political economy and the concept of the internationalisation of the state 
used to explain the dynamics of the reform process. The position of ‘one remove’ 
according to our argument and the bulk of the ‘depoliticisation of the state’ 
literature is, obviously, located at the international and regional levels. In the 
Argentine case, furthermore, internal political and economic restructuring achieved 
the highly politicised depoliticisation of the arena in which interests formerly had 
exercised a significant veto power over the policy process. In this light, it is useful 
to build on a typology offered by Peter Burnham in a recent paper4, and to 
construct a similar outline for the case of Argentina (Figures 8.1 and 8.2).
The implications of both the theoretical and empirical analysis offered in 
the thesis, then, is that the relegation of the state in contemporary IPE and political 
science is misplaced, both in general and in the study of Argentina and Latin 
America. Although, as the Figures below demonstrate, the case of Argentina and 
the characteristic impact of globalisation have generated the ‘depoliticisation’ of 
the state according to the definition outlined above, this does not translate into 
either the elimination of politics or the demise of the state. Rather, both remain 
pivotal to generating and sustaining processes of international change, and in 
managing the domestic political economy. Especially since the Mexican and Asian 
crises, the new awareness of the need for a ‘management’ of globalisation again 
has propelled the state and policy choice to centre-stage. Furthermore, the type of
2 Peter Burnham: “IPE, Marxian Political Economy and Governing Strategies in the 1990s: The 
Politics o f State and Labour”, mimeo, University o f Warwick, May 1998 (pg 13).
3 ibid., pgs 13 & 20.
4 op.cit.
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Figure 8.1: Politicised Economic Management in Argentina
Politicised Economic Management in the Post-War Period
1. Discretion-based
2. Government assumes responsibility for economic regulation, economic 
management and public welfare.
2. Emphasis on direct intervention (labour, capital, finance) and conciliation / co­
optation.
3. Upshot is that ‘economic’ crisis routinely becomes a ‘political’ crisis, accounting 
for the prevalence of both simultaneously. Government takes considerable credit 
for successful policy / economic performance.
Principal characteristic features:
• Direct controls (production, consumption, exchange)
• Formal and informal incomes policies
• Fiscal and monetary ‘autonomy’
• Discretionary control over foreign capital flows and trade
• Growth of the public sector: ‘state as employer’, leading to political disputes
• Centralisation of policy-making functions
• Corporatist system of interest representation, state ‘control’ of political actors
• Resort to inflationary policies as substitute for redistribution
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Figure 8.2: Depoliticised Economic Management in Argentina
Depoliticised Economic Management, 1989-
1. Rules-based
2. Aim: to increase government control and protect government from political 
backlash
3. Acceptance of binding ‘rules’ limiting government room for manoeuvre, at both 
domestic and international levels (Convertibility, conditionality, etc.)
4. Increased external validation of policy
5. Development of the ‘managerial state’
Principal characteristic features:
• Centrality of exchange rate management: fixed rate parity under Convertibility 
Plan
• Institutional realignment to enhance policy credibility
• Independence of the Central Bank to limit space for discretionary monetary 
policy
• Devolution of policy-making responsibility
• Deregulation (NB: financial markets and external sector)
• Marginalisation of unions
• Centralisation of power in the executive branch vis-a-vis legislature
• International cooperation and regional integration
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democratic politics that has emerged in Latin America demonstrates that the state 
probably remains more ‘politicised’ in conventional terms than many of its 
counterparts in other areas of the world.
The concept of the ‘depoliticisation of the state’, then, is consistent with the 
arguments presented throughout the thesis: this is a strategy for maintaining and 
consolidating state control or insulation through a process of redefinition. In 
essence, in Argentina the process of depoliticisation has strengthened the state and 
consolidated the types of state ‘power’ outlined in the Introduction. We have also 
seen that the depoliticisation of the state itself is conducted primarily through an 
engagement at the international and regional levels, reinforced by certain 
‘domestic’ policy measures such as the independence of the Central Bank and the 
Convertibility Plan. In this way the depoliticisation argument offers an alternative 
slant on the ‘internationalisation’ of the state.
Future Directions
The most immediate questions generated by these observations relate to the 
impact of the identified changes on democracy and, by extension, on the study of 
politics. These are issues which will demand significant future research. It seems 
appropriate, therefore, to outline a few preliminary ideas on both the future of 
Argentine democracy and on the ways in which the processes of globalisation are 
likely to affect political development in the longer term. The question, in both 
cases, is whether the domestic and international trends identified in the thesis are 
likely to create a disempowerment of political processes in the face of the structural 
dynamics o f  globalisation and the processes of neoliberal restructuring. Is this, in 
other words, ‘politics without outcomes’?
The ‘Marginalisation ’ o f  Argentine Democracy?
The thesis has very deliberately steered clear of the normative debate on the 
development of the Argentine political system and the merits of neoliberalism as an 
economic model, but has argued throughout that the reform process in Argentina
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has been oriented towards the establishment of an exclusionary style of policy­
making and the insulation of the state from societal pressures. As such, it may be 
that globalisation and reform - or in other words the conjunction of the national and 
the international - have contributed to the marginalisation of democracy.5 The 
thesis has demonstrated that this argument works very clearly if it is understood to 
refer to participatory forms of democracy.
The ‘exclusionary’ nature of Menemist politics is related to the dismantling 
of the traditional corporatist structures and the progressive concentration of 
political power and the insulation of the state from societal pressures. The new 
political model is a far cry from the generally useful definition of corporatism 
advanced by Philippe Schmitter: as “a system of interest representation in which 
the constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, 
non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, 
recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective categorises in exchange for 
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands 
and supports”.6
However, the new political structures do not correspond either to the 
pluralist model of interest group activity, which assumes a level and equality of 
access to the policy-making arena across interest groupings, and a state 
characterised by a relatively high degree of permeability to such pressures. 
Argentine politics may be labelled pluralist only to the extent that the state does not 
directly control or subsidise societal interests. It retains corporatist hallmarks such 
as the emphasis on co-optation and control, rather than the articulation or 
representation of societal interests, and also in the relative impermeability of the 
state and the decision-making processes to those interests that the government has 
not decided to favour or co-opt. The shift, therefore, was from corporatism or neo­
corporatism to a much less regulated system of interest group or societal pressure 
which, nevertheless, stopped far short of the pluralist character which Garcia
5 With respect to the latter see, for example, Jan Aarte Scholte: “Global Capitalism and the State”, 
International Affairs 73, 3, 1997.
6 “Still the Century o f Corporatism?”, Review o f  Politics 36,1974 (pp. 93-4).
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Delgado ascribes to it.7 The result was an exclusionary model of politics and a 
reinforcement of state power that allowed little space for genuine contestation or 
participation, and which corresponds far more to theories of elitism than pluralism.
In this light, it is clear that despite sweeping political reform under Menem 
there are striking elements of continuity in Argentine politics. This is particularly 
apparent in the comparison between Menemism and Peronism. Menem’s 
neopopulism shares little in common with its populist ancestors in terms of 
economic policy, but the points of continuity are clearly apparent if we analyse 
these two ‘movements’ as an approach to politics. The conceptions of power and 
leadership, for example, appear to be little changed in the 1990s from the 1940s. 
Similarly, the anti-institutionalist bias of Argentine politics is evident throughout 
Argentine political history, and the policies of interest incorporation pursued by 
Menem do not seem radically dissimilar (as strategies rather than in their concrete 
orientation) from the policies of successive governments in the post-war period, 
particularly Peronist administrations. The structure of government and political 
power under Menem, therefore, perhaps represents nothing new in terms of an 
approach to politics: what is new is the successful combination of this approach 
with a strategy of radical economic reform.
These points can be elaborated further with reference to what Guillermo 
O’Donnell has termed ‘delegative democracy’, of which Argentina is clearly an 
example.8 Delegative democracies effectively rest on the assumption that election 
involves a mandate to govern, whatever the chosen content or style of the 
government. Furthermore, in delegative democracies institutions such as judiciaries 
and legislatures are perceived to be obstacles to the exercise of the full authority 
that the President has been ‘delegated’.9 It can be argued, then, that this conception 
of leadership facilitates a sort of ideological suspension, in which the leader is the 
only one capable of correctly interpreting the sentiment and needs of the
7 Daniel R. Garcia-Delgado: Estado y  Sociedad: La Nueva Relacidn a Partir del Cambio 
Estructural (1994).
8 “Delegative Democracy”, Journal o f  Democracy 5, 1, 1994.
9 ibid., pp. 59-60.
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population.10 The direct manifestation of this is a high level of centralised and 
presidentialist power. The question is whether this is inherently anti-democratic.
Conventional literature, furthermore, holds that presidentialism is 
inherently inimical to democratic consolidation.11 “Bonapartist democracy” is not 
an inevitable corollary of neoliberalism, but rather of the pressing need for political 
and economic reform. This is likely to exacerbate the authoritarian tendencies that, 
it has been argued, are a staple of the Argentine and Latin American political 
systems.12 It has been suggested, furthermore, that the success of governing elites 
in Argentina and a variety of Latin American countries in implementing neoliberal 
economic reforms may be directly linked to the strength of the president or 
presidency, in that this connotes a certain autonomy in relation to immediate 
political pressures.13
However, contrary to many predictions in the early 1990s, the centralisation 
and personification of power has not led to political instability or democratic 
breakdown14: on the contrary, the same processes in the Argentine case have led to 
the consolidation of political stability, regardless of views on the representative or 
participatory quality of the democratic system in question. It has been argued that 
the ‘new populism’ of which the Menem government is part has a “symbiotic 
relationship’ with presidentialism.15 This position would contend that “a temporary 
period of hyper-presidentialism was much less damaging to democracy than would 
have been the likely alternative - namely prolonged institutional crisis of a kind 
threatening to democratic stability”.16 Likewise, as far as the international financial 
community is concerned, competitive and representative attributes in a democratic
10 Ana Margheritis: “Reforma Econ6mica y Estado en la Argentina: La Institucionalizacidn de la 
Discrecionalidad”, Working Paper no. 28, Universidad Torcuato Di Telia, November 1995 (pg 10).
11 See, for example, Scott Mainwaring: “Presidentialism in Latin America”, Latin American 
Research Review 25, 1, 1990.
12 Ian Roxborough: “Neo-Liberalism in Latin America: Limits and Alternatives”, Third World 
Quarterly 13, 3, 1992 (pg 427). Also see Susan & Peter Calvert: Argentina: Political Culture and 
Instability (1989).
13 George Philip: “The New Economic Liberalism and Democracy in Latin America: Friends or 
Enemies”, Third World Quarterly 14, 3, 1993; Haggard & Kaufman: “Estado y Reforma 
Econdmica”, pg 358.
14 Roxborough, op.cit.. For another example o f early pessimism, see Adam Przeworski: Democracy 
and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (1991).
15 George Philip: “The New Populism in Spanish South America”, Government and Opposition 33, 
1, Winter 1998 (pg81).
16 Philip: “The New Populism”, pg 82.
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system are far less important than the formal institutions of democratic rule and the 
maintenance of political stability.17
These observations, then, challenge the assumption that the reform 
processes in Argentina led to a regression of democracy and the derogation of 
accountability. Rather, it could be argued that democracy was strengthened by the 
adoption of presidentialist forms of government in that this type of ‘delegative’ 
democracy ensured political stability and the endurance of democratic government. 
This, it could be argued, may well give way to more representative forms of 
government as democracy becomes more institutionalised. The evidence at the 
present time seems to suggest that pressures on this type of political system are 
emerging, but that they remain located within the democratic system rather than 
outside it. In the course of the second Menem administration these can be seen in 
increasing levels of popular mobilisation (such as the student riots, the provincial 
crisis and the teachers’ strike action) and in the emergence of new and serious 
forms of party opposition, such as the FREPASO (formed in 1995) and the 
opposition alliance formed to fight the 1997 elections between the FREPASO and 
the UCR.
These developments accord to an extent with the predictions of the 
‘neoliberal policy cycle’. This suggests that following the shock treatment (in 
response to the conditions which prompt reform in the first place) and the 
consolidation of a political model such as the one described above, the legitimacy 
of the neoliberal model is likely to be eroded as (or if) the material conditions and 
the democratic options of the population degenerate. This, it is argued, will be 
reflected in increasing levels of popular protest and mobilisation.18 As such, it can 
possibly be hoped that at the national level, the initial marginalisation of 
democracy was linked to the short-term political economy of reform. It may well 
be the case that this situation has started to give way to a revitalisation of demands 
for participatory democracy which can be accommodated within the existing 
political framework.
17 Roxborough, pg 424.
18 Henry Veltmeyer, James Petras & Steve Vieux: Neoliberalism and Class Conflict in Latin 
America: A Comparative Perspective on the Political Economy o f  Structural Adjustment (1997), 
pp. 66-70.
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The question, however, is whether this can have any significant impact. 
None of these opposition groupings has questioned the fundamentals of the 
economic strategy. Certainly none has dared to explicitly advocate the abolition of 
Convertibility. The ‘internationalisation of the state’ and the network of 
international and regional commitments constructed by the Menem government 
similarly throw into doubt the possibilities for genuine change. Certainly there is a 
demand for the modification of certain aspects of neoliberalism, such as social 
policy and employment policy, but given the fiscal targets negotiated with the IMF 
significant concessions to government spending are unlikely in the medium term. 
The question is, then, ‘participation in what?’ ‘For what expected result?’ It seems 
that the possibilities for political opposition are vast, but that its capacities (and 
expectations) significantly limited.
Globalisation as ‘Politics without Outcomes’?
A final consideration relates to the question of whether a smoothly 
functioning, internationalised economy is compatible with an active civil society, 
or whether the effects of globalisation create a kind of ‘politics without outcomes’. 
In effect, the versions of globalisation theory that perceive a ‘withering away’ of 
the state, to whatever degree, feed into a current that may be labelled the ‘politics 
of anti-politics’. This can be found quite as much in the international relations and 
political science academic literature as in the rhetoric of politicians and in countries 
and institutions throughout the world. Globalisation can be seen to have eroded the 
possibilities for genuine change through political action, as a result of both policy 
convergence and as a result of the ‘globalisation’ of both political and economic 
activity.
The question for future research, then, is whether the internationalisation of 
economic activity and increasing global convergence will have led to the 
disempowerment of politics. On the one hand, Chiapas and recent developments 
with terrorist groups in Peru might suggest that globalisation and closer relations 
with international financial institutions have made economic development and the 
maintenance of a corrupt, belligerent or subversive society incompatible. This ties
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in which general observations that increasing international integration has acted to 
eliminate political extremes in most areas of the world. On the other hand, if we 
look at the issue more in terms of the arguments presented in this thesis, it may be 
the case that economic development in its present ‘internationalised’ form and 
participatory forms of democracy are not compatible with each other. The question, 
then, is whether certain elements of civil society are inherently inimical to the 
development of neoliberal globalisation, or whether there are genuine possibilities 
for accommodating new forms of political challenge to depoliticised market forces. 
The presently increasing questioning of the ‘convergence’ notion itself appears to 
offer an open path for addressing these issues.
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Appendix: List o f Interviewees
Raul Alfonsm
President of the Republic of Argentina, 1983-89 Buenos Aires, 31 July 1995
Roberto Bloch
Lawyer and Researcher on Mercosur Buenos Aires, 12 July 1995
Raul Buonuome
Economist, ING Barings Buenos Aires, 1 August 1995
Adolfo Canitrot
Deputy Economy Minister, 1985-1988 Buenos Aires, 28 July 1995
Gabriel Casaburi 
Fundacion Mediterranea
FLACSO Buenos Aires, 29 May 1997
Francisco Corigliano
FLACSO Buenos Aires, 26 May 1997
Francisco Delich
Professor, Universidad de Buenos Aires Buenos Aires, 10 June 1997
Carlos Escude 
Advisor on Foreign Policy
Universidad Torcuato Di Telia Buenos Aires, 26 July 1995
29 May 1997
Alberto Ferrari Etcheberry
President of the Junta Nacional de Granos 1984-6
Secretary for Latin American Affairs, 1987-1989 Buenos Aires, 25 July 1995
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Aldo Ferrer
Economy Minister, 1970-71
Professor, University of Buenos Aires Buenos Aires, 26 May 1997
Andres Fontana
Advisor to the Undersecretary for Foreign Policy
Undersecretary for Planning, 1997-date Buenos Aires, 10 July 1995
Rosendo Fraga
Advisor on Military Policy Buenos Aires, 2 June 1997
Jonathan Friedland
Wall Street Journal Buenos Aires, 27 June 1997
Julio Godio
Researcher, Labour Issues Buenos Aires, 26 May 1997
Jorge Hugo Herrera Vegas
Undersecretary for Latin American Integration Buenos Aires, 17 July 1995
Bernardo Kosacoff
Researcher, CEPAL Buenos Aires, 24 July 1995
Fernando Lahoz
President, Joint Parliamentary Commission (CPC) Buenos Aires, 5 May 1997 
Roberto Lavagna
Minister of Industry and Foreign Trade, 1985-7 Buenos Aires, 27 July 1995
Miguel Lengyel
FLACSO Buenos Aires, 3 June 1997
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Claudio Lozano 
Head oftheCTA Buenos Aires, 13 June 1997
Alejandro Mayoral 
Undersecretaiy for Economic Policy Buenos Aires, 13 July 1995
Cristian Mira
Editor, External Trade Supplement, La Nation Buenos Aires, 9 June 1997
Guillermo Mondino
President of the Fundacion Mediterranea Buenos Aires, 5 June 1997
Alfredo Morelli
National Director of Mercosur Buenos Aires, 19 July 1995
Ana Maria Mustapic 
Universidad Torcuato Di Telia Buenos Aires, 22 May 1997
Alejandro Nayfeld 
YPF
Mercosur Negotiator on Industrial Policy, 1991 -2 Buenos Aires, 19 July 1995
Rogelio Pfirter
Argentine Ambassador to the UK London, 14 June 1995
Fernando Porta 
CENIT Buenos Aires, 1 August 1995
Jesus Rodriguez 
Economy Minister, 1989 Buenos Aires, various dates
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Roberto Romero Ullmann 
Universidad de Belgrano, 12 July 1995 Buenos Aires, 12 July 1995
Juan Sourrouille
Economy Minister, 1985-1988 Buenos Aires, 26 July 1995
Nestor Stancanelli
National Director of External Trade Buenos Aires, 17 July 1995
Juan Carlos Torre
Instituto Torcuato Di Telia Buenos Aires, 21 July 1995
Javier Villanueva
Instituto Torcuato Di Telia / Universidad Catolica Buenos Aires, 24 July 1995
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